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A B S T R A C T

is thesis investigates electoral accountability for incumbent leaders and their parties in Latin
America. It addresses two central questions. First, it seeks to explain sources of contextual and
institutional variation in the degree to which voters punish and reward incumbents. Second, it
asks how voters hold incumbents accountable for other areas of government control besides the
macro-economy. 
e first paper develops a framework of executive accountability as dependent
on the degree to which the presidential candidate of the incumbent party is identified with the
performance of the outgoing president. It differentiates between presidents running for re-election,
successors, and non-successors. Estimating random-intercept random-slopes models on an original
dataset, it shows different levels of accountability for the three types of candidates. 
e second
paper examines whether endorsements from incumbent politicians to co-partisans lead to more
electoral sanctioning. It uses a randomised experiment embedded in a national survey conducted
in the run-up to the  Mexican general election to demonstrate that Senate candidates endorsed
by the outgoing president are held more electorally accountable. Using a difference-in-difference
design, the third paper finds causal evidence of tactical allocation of federal funds to municipalities
governed by co-partisans of the president in the run-up to the  Mexican presidential election.
It shows that voters rewarded the party in the federal government for these additional transfers to
their municipalities by voting for the ruling party. Taken together, the three papers have important
theoretical implications for the study of electoral accountability, comparative electoral behaviour,
and the quality of democracy in Latin America.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
General elections worldwide are considered referenda on the state of the economy and the perfor-
mance of the government. During election campaigns, political commentators as well as members
of the general public discuss how economic conditions affect the incumbents’ electoral fortunes. In
good economic times, incumbent politicians or their parties are considered to be a certain lock for
re-election. In economic downturns, the challengers are thought to have a chance of making it to
office. Voters, in short, are considered to focus on the performance of the macro-economy – or on
their evaluations thereof – when casting a vote. In the words of Norpoth (: ), “[t]here are
signs that [economic voting] is hard-wired into the brains of citizens in democracies.”
Latin America is no exception to this electoral narrative, as the presidential elections in Bolivia in
, Chile in , and Mexico in  illustrate. According to journalistic accounts of these elec-
tions, incumbent parties were able to secure re-election due to the good economic times over which
they presided. In the case of Bolivia, the media emphasised the fact that the country’s economy had
grown an average of . percent during Evo Morales’ presidency, and that economic growth in 
had been the highest in all of Latin America – . percent in the midst of a global recession (El
País,  December ; Público,  December ). In the Chilean case, post-election accounts
underscored that the good state of the Chilean economy had been instrumental in securing the
election of Michelle Bachelet, the candidate of the ruling Concertación (El País,  January ).
A newspaper editorial less than a month before the Mexican presidential election suggested that
Felipe Calderón, the candidate of the incumbent Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), would benefit
from the “recovery of the Mexican economy, without any doubt, the central topic of the election.”
(El País,  June ).
While economic conditions certainly helped incumbent parties achieve re-election in these three
cases, the difference in the magnitude of economic voting between them was considerable. Figure
 shows the probability of voting for the incumbent parties based on different levels of economic

e economic legacy of Lagos’ presidency was impressive. During his time in office GDP per capita had risen from
 U.S. dollars in  to  in . Unemployment had fallen from . to . percent, while the minimum
salary had gone up by  percent. Minimum pensions, furthermore, had risen by  percent, and exports had more than
doubled (Angell : ).


perceptions. 
e slopes for the three candidates are clearly different. 
e slope for the re-running
Morales is the steepest, while the slope for Bachelet is steeper than the slope for Calderón. 
is
comparative approach suggests a more nuanced view of economic voting than the straightforward
accounts depicted in the media.
Figure : Economic Voting in 
ree Latin American Cases
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Notes: Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evaluations of the national economy in Bolivia (Evo
Morales), Chile (Michelle Bachelet), and Mexico (Felipe Calderón). 
e figure is based on binary logistic regression
models in which the dependent variable is the incumbent vote, the main predictors are economic evaluations, and socio-
demographic controls are included for gender, age, education, marital status, and socio-economic level. Estimations are
for a non-married man between  and  years of age who has a university degree and is in the highest socio-economic
category.
Source: Latinobarómetro.
What explains these differences in the magnitude of economic voting across these three cases
and, more generally, across Latin America? In other words, why do voters hold incumbent parties
more accountable for the performance of the government in some cases than in others? Do other
factors besides perceptions of the national economy play a role in how voters punish and reward
incumbents? 
is thesis explores how variation in the institutional and political context in which
elections take place affects how voters reward and punish incumbent parties for their performance

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in government. It also investigates the mechanisms by which voters hold incumbents accountable
for other areas of government control besides evaluations of the national economy.
As my review of the literature will show, these questions are not new to political science. Yet, I
provide new theoretical ideas to the electoral accountability debate, and investigate a region, Latin
America, that until recently has been neglected by the accountability literature. In contrast to the
classic view of retrospective voting, which suggests that voters hold parties collectively accountable
for the performance of the government, the first two papers of this thesis argue that the identity
of the candidates of the incumbent party matters for electoral accountability. 
ese two papers
show that voters hold incumbent parties more accountable in presidential and legislative elections
when the candidates are closely associated with the performance of the outgoing government. 
e
third paper – an in-depth study of the  Mexican presidential election – shows how voters hold
incumbents accountable for other areas of government control besides evaluations of the macro-
economy. It demonstrates that the incumbent PAN allocated disproportionately more funds to
municipalities ruled by co-partisans, and that voters rewarded the party for this behaviour. A sim-
ulation of the  election shows that these additional funds were instrumental in securing the
presidency for the PAN in an election that was decided by half a percentage point.

e arguments and evidence I present in this thesis shed light on the varying magnitude of eco-
nomic voting demonstrated in the three cases above. 
ese cases share several important features
relating to the political context, which have been shown to mediate retrospective voting in previous
studies. In all three cases incumbent parties did not enjoy a legislative majority, presidential and
legislative elections were held concurrently, and the incumbent presidents were not policy switchers
– i.e. politicians that run on a particular platform, but implement policies in the opposite direction.
Yet, they differ in the type of candidate that ran for president. In Bolivia, voters could directly sanc-
tion Evo Morales for the policies of his government, as the president was running for re-election.
In Chile, Michelle Bachelet had been president Lagos’ favourite candidate in the Concertación pres-
idential primary, and was running on a platform of economic continuity. In contrast, in Mexico
the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderón, was an internal party opponent of president Vicente Fox, and
was critical of several of the outgoing government’s policies.

e remainder of this introduction is organised as follows. I first discuss the concept of electoral
accountability, focusing on the distinction between selection and sanctioning models. I then discuss
the major contributions of the economic voting literature, in particular regarding how the institu-
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tional and political contexts in which elections take place mediate the magnitude of the economic
vote. 
e following section presents the two central gaps in the literature that I address in this thesis.
I argue that the literature has not convincingly addressed in which ways the relationship between
incumbent politicians and the candidates of their parties affects how voters sanction incumbent
parties, and has not paid enough attention to other areas of government control for which voters
hold incumbents accountable. 
e subsequent section discusses the contributions of this thesis to
the electoral accountability literature in Latin America. 
e introduction concludes by discussing
the central questions of this study against the background of existing research.
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In this section I summarise the standard view on electoral accountability that emerges from the
economic voting literature in established democracies. I first discuss the concept of electoral ac-
countability, followed by the major contributions of the literature for our understanding of how
the political and economic context of elections mediate the magnitude of the performance-based
vote.
Conceptualising and Measuring Electoral Accountability

e degree to which voters hold incumbent governments accountable is a central concern of demo-
cratic theory. From a normative perspective, scholars have sought to justify representative democ-
racy not only in the Curchillian sense as “the worst form of government, except for all the rest,”
but as effectively superior in providing a combination of both representation and accountability
(Sartori ; Manin ; Maravall ). 
e normative value assigned to accountability is so
strong, that contemporary theorists of democracy treat representative democracy and accountabil-
ity virtually as equals. For Robert Dahl (: ), “continuing responsiveness of the government
to the preferences of its citizens [is] a key characteristic of democracy.” Walter Lippmann (:
) finds that “[t]o support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they
seem to be going badly, this [...] is the essence of popular government.”
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Accountability can be understood as an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions be-
tween rulers and citizens “in which the former agree to keep the latter informed, to offer them
explanations for decisions made, and to submit to any predetermined sanctions that they may im-
pose” (Schmitter : ). 
is exchange of responsibilities has been conceptualised in terms of
principal-agent theory, in which there is a relationship of delegation and accountability that goes
from the voters to the civil servants through the elected representatives (Strøm ).

eorists of democracy as well as empirical researchers agree that a central mechanism by which
citizens can hold their representatives to account is the vote. At its core, the literature on electoral
accountability treats voters as instrumentally rational actors. Since Downs (), it is standard to
assume that individuals make vote choices based on their comparison of expected utilities for each
of the main political parties. At the time of Downs’ groundbreaking publication, the notion that
voters behaved as utility maximising agents constituted a significant departure from approaches
grounded in social psychology (Berelson et al. ; Campbell et al. ). 
e utility maximising
assumption became the basis of all subsequent research on electoral accountability (Kramer ;
Stigler ; Ferejohn ).
By suggesting that voters were future oriented and that they compare the platforms of compet-
ing parties when deciding their vote, Downs pointed the way towards a rational model of electoral
accountability based on the selection of competent politicians. In the “mandate” view of account-
ability, which he pioneered, voters use information about the past performance of the government
– such as the state of the macro-economy – to assess the future competencies of the candidates
(Stigler ; Alesina et al. ; Duch and Stevenson ). Building on these insights, for-
mal models drew out the implications of rational expectations and competency signals for electoral
accountability (Persson and Tabellini ; Alesina and Rosenthal ).

e fact that voters do not have any institutional devices to force incumbent politicians to adhere
to promises, makes the concept of prospective voting inherently weak. Politicians will often have
incentives to deviate from the mandate, and may choose to do so in an unresponsive fashion, pur-
suing their own or a minority’s interests over the interests of the majority of the electorate (Stokes
: ). Politicians may also promise what median voters want to hear, in order to increase
An exemption may be the rule that allows for presidential recall. However, this is a costly process and most consti-
tutions do not include this provision.
However, policy switches will not always be unresponsive. As Stokes (: ) suggests, politicians may act in
what they believe to be the best interest of citizens, even if that is in their perceived self-interest as well. Circumstances
may change in such a way that the implementation of the mandate is no longer best for voters.
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their chances of being elected. 
ey may then choose to pursue their preferred policies expecting
that voters will become persuaded that this was the best course of action and therefore choose to
re-elect them. As Manin et al. (: ) point out, voters “may not like governments that betray
promises, but they will not punish politicians who made them sufficiently better off by deviating
from the mandate.”
In contrast to the selection model, the sanctioning model claims that voters use elections to judge
the past actions of incumbents. As a famous quote by V.O. Key (: ) suggests, “[v]oters may
reject what they may have known; or they may approve what they have known. 
ey are not
likely to be attracted in great numbers by promises of the novel or unknown.” 
e sanctioning
model assumes that voters are more concerned about actual outcomes than the particular means of
achieving those outcomes. As Fiorina (: ) puts it, “citizens care about results rather than the
policies that produce those results.” 
e attractiveness of the punishment model lies in the fact that
it does not demand much political sophistication from the average voter.
Nevertheless, the notion of retrospective voting is not exempt from problems either. According to
Maravall (: ), one potential flaw lies in the assumption that citizens can establish a threshold
for re-electing incumbents that generates incentives for governments to be representative. 
is
mechanism becomes extremely difficult under conditions of low clarity of responsibility (Powell
and Whitten ), or when information is concealed. According to Maravall, the notion of pure
retrospective models in which no selection is involved at election times is also problematic.
While the literature has gained conceptual clarity by thinking of accountability both as a selection
and a sanctioning device, empirically, the overwhelming majority of studies rely on measures of
past government performance to measure electoral accountability. Most accounts of retrospective
voting rely either on economic evaluations measured at the individual level (Fiorina ; Lewis-
Beck ; Anderson ; Hellwig ; Duch and Stevenson ), or on objective measures
of the state of the economy – such as GDP growth, inflation or unemployment – measured at the
aggregate level (Kramer ; Tufte ; Hibbs ; Samuels ; Hellwig and Samuels ).
Both ways of measuring the economic vote have advantages and disadvantages. 
e main strength
of the aggregate measures is that they cannot be subject to the “endogeneity critique” that individ-
ual economic perceptions often face – I return to this issue below. 
eir main weaknesses are that
they cannot capture the mood of the voters, and are only useful for estimating a single average
magnitude of the economic vote across elections (Duch : ). 
e main advantages of the
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individual measures are that, “if available for several different elections, [they] can be used to con-
struct (and compare) estimates of the magnitude of economic voting in each election” (Duch :
). 
ey can also be estimated controlling for other individual-level factors, making estimates
more precise. However, they face the critique that, by being endogenous, they may be simply a
measurement artefact.
What We Know About Electoral Accountability

e early literature on economic voting assumed that the relationship between economic perfor-
mance and the vote was an unquestionable empirical fact. Tufte (: ) summarised this idea
very succinctly: “[w]hen you think economics, think elections; when you think elections, think
economics.” Not surprisingly, this early literature was mainly focused on finding the right way
to model the economy-voter relationship. Some points of contention were whether to study the
behaviour of individuals or the behaviour of aggregates, or whether voters react to growth, unem-
ployment, or inflation. Scholars disagreed, furthermore, over whether individuals react to national
economic performance (sociotropic voting) or their own economic situation (egotropic voting). As
Anderson (: ) suggests, the early literature was convinced that “a relationship existed be-
tween economics and political attitudes/behavior and that the “true” relationship between economic
conditions and public support could be demonstrated if we only looked hard enough.”
In contrast to such early efforts, recent works claim that the economy-voter relationship is not as
straightforward as originally assumed, suggesting it is contingent on both institutional and psycho-
logical factors. Regarding the latter, scholars argue that economic evaluations are not exogenous.
According to Nadeau et al. (), and Sanders and Gavin (), the media’s presentation of eco-
nomic developments, rather than objective changes in the economy, determines how citizens eval-
uate the economic performance of the government. Similarly, recent studies raise the concern that
voters’ ideology or partisanship influences how they perceive the economy depending on whether a
co-partisan is in power (Duch et al. ; Rudolph ; Zaller ; Evans and Andersen ;
Stanig ). In sum, the literature focusing on psychological factors argues that citizens’ biased
perceptions undermine the correct translation of actual economic conditions into voters’ economic
evaluations.
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In the past two decades, studies focusing on the institutional and contextual factors that mediate
the economic vote have dominated the literature. 
e central finding of these studies is that the
institutional and political contexts in which elections take place matter – in some cases a great
deal – for how voters punish and reward incumbents. Powell and Whitten () opened up the
debate about the mediating effect of institutions with the concept of “clarity of responsibility.”

eir cross-national study of established democracies demonstrates that there is more retrospective
voting when voters can clearly identify who is responsible for policy outcomes, i.e. in high clarity
situations. 
e highest clarity of responsibility is achieved when a highly cohesive majority party
forms the government, controls the committee chairs, and enjoys a legislative majority in both
chambers.

e theoretical underpinnings and results regarding clarity of responsibility identified by Powell
and Whitten () resonated positively with scholars of comparative economic voting. In the
two decades since the publication of their seminal article, several studies confirmed that differences
in the magnitude of the economic vote arise from variation in institutional and political context.
Anderson () and Hellwig () demonstrated that there is more retrospective voting when
viable alternatives to the incumbent government exist. Hellwig () and Duch and Stevenson
() showed that democracies that are more integrated in the world economy enjoy lower levels
of economic voting, because governments have less control over the management of the national
economy. Hellwig and Samuels () showed that voters have greater potential to hold incum-
bents to account under separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Within presidentialism,
Samuels () identified more retrospective voting when presidential and legislative elections are
held concurrently. He argues that non-concurrence attenuates the impact of national factors, such
as the macro-economy, on the vote.
Recently, Kayser and Peress () have shown in a highly original contribution that voters
benchmark across borders: When only the economy in their own country contracts, voters punish
their government much more than when the economies in many countries deteriorate. 
ey thus
show that the international context matters for the domestic vote. 
is effect “arises not from
According to Samuels (), when legislative and presidential elections are held concurrently, candidates for both
positions have strong incentives to coordinate election campaigns, in order to benefit from organisational advantages and
coattail effects (Golder ). 
is encourages voters to hold presidents and legislators accountable for the same things.
In contrast, non-concurrence attenuates the impact of national factors, focusing voters’ and candidates’ energies on local
(legislative elections) and personality issues (presidential elections) (Samuels : ).
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highly informed voters making direct comparisons but from “pre-benchmarking” by the media
when reporting on the economy” (Kayser and Peress : ).
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After reviewing the existing literature on electoral accountability, in this section I argue that there
are two central aspects that have not been adequately addressed in the literature. First, empirical
accounts of economic voting have, for the most part, assumed that voters hold incumbent parties
collectively accountable for the performance of the government, without taking into account how
intra-party factors – such as the identities of the candidates – may affect how voters assign responsi-
bility for past performance. Second, studies have not paid enough attention to the mechanisms by
which voters hold incumbent governments accountable for other areas of executive control besides
the macro-economy – such as the tactical allocation of federal transfers from central to sub-national
governments. I discuss these gaps in this section.
Collective Party Responsibility

e literature on electoral accountability generally assumes that voters hold incumbent parties col-
lectively accountable for the performance of the government. From a normative perspective, mod-
ern political science has had a preference for collective party responsibility at least since the s,
when the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association published
its influential report on the state of the American two-party system. 
e report emphasised the
need for cohesive parties, and suggested that collective responsibility was contingent upon the co-
hesion of the party in power (Katz : ). A widely quoted passage of the report explained this
idea very clearly: “An effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth
programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal
cohesion to carry out these programs” (APSA : ).
While the notion of collective party responsibility came to dominate political science in the
s, the origins of the concept go as far back as the s. Martin Van Buren argued that parties
would only render an important public service if they were organised around issues of principle

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(White : ). Later, in , Frank J. Goodnow made a more explicit case for collective party
responsibility, claiming that “[t]he individual candidate must be sunk to a large extent in the party,”
and that “[i]ndividual responsibility must give place to party responsibility” (cited in White :
). Others disagreed. Among the early critics, M.I. Ostrogorski (: ) argued that collective
responsibility “was not borne out by the facts,” while William Graham Sumner () claimed that
individual politicians and not parties could be held responsible for the actions of the government
(cited in White : ).
Despite these critiques, the collective party ideal proved to be resilient. 
is was, to a large
extent, due to its normative appeal. Strong party government, so the theory goes, gives voters a
clear choice in election campaigns and endows the winning party with a clear mandate for governing
(White : ). Moreover, collective party responsibility is the best antidote against irresponsible
behaviour by party leaders. If parties are cohesive organisations led by a national party council who
ensures that party responsibility flows from the top down – as the APSA report envisioned – parties
should not be able to avoid responsibility for their time in office (White : ). At election
time, voters can observe the official party line, and are thus able to hold the party accountable as a
whole.
In the past four decades, the overwhelming majority of the empirical economic voting literature
has adhered to the strong party government ideal. With few exceptions (Nadeau and Lewis-Beck
; Norpoth ; Campbell et al. ), economic voting studies have assumed that voters
hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the government’s record in office. As a result,
most studies have not even accounted for the possibility that the magnitude of the economic vote
may vary depending on the identity of the presidential or prime ministerial candidate (Erikson
; Powell and Whitten ; Hibbs ; Hellwig and Samuels ; Fisher and Hobolt ).
Yet, there are good reasons to believe that Ostrogorski was right when he claimed that collective
party responsibility “was not borne out by the facts.”
As Ostrogorski’s () pioneering study on parties in the U.S. showed, parties are not homo-
geneous organisations in which all party members hold the same views. Parties have factions, and
these factions usually reflect different views about how to handle the affairs of government (Bel-
loni and Beller ; Sartori ). Factions, moreover, fight for power with the ultimate goal
of securing the top positions in general elections, which are the presidential and prime ministerial

ese studies investigate whether there is more retrospective voting when American presidents run for re-election.

e three papers find this to be the case.
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nominations (Strøm and Müller ; Siavelis and Morgenstern ; Samuels and Shugart ).

e media often report primary elections as contests between the left and right factions, or between
the conservatives and the moderates. Within parties, there are the ins and the outs that Lippmann
() described for the party system more generally. 
e ins are the party elite in charge of gov-
erning or in control of the key party posts, while the outs are the group of politicians waiting for
their turn to take over the party reigns.
Moreover, in contemporary democracies, parties centre their election campaigns around their
leading candidates, and the media report elections as if they were contests between leaders rather
than between party organisations (King ; Karvonen ). During election campaigns, the
media scrutinise every detail of the trajectories of the main candidates. A wealth of research in the
past three decades has investigated a phenomenon called the ‘personalisation of politics,’ both in
presidential (Miller and Miller ; Wattenberg , Linz ; Bartels ), and parliamen-
tary democracies (McAllister ; Costa Lobo ). Some of these studies find evidence that
candidate specific variables are important predictors of vote choice, even after controlling for party
identification (Andersen and Evans ; Johnston ).

ere is, thus, growing evidence that candidates’ characteristics matter for vote choice. In this
thesis, I argue that voters assign responsibility for past government performance based on the can-
didates’ identities. 
ey assign more (less) responsibility for the executive’s past actions if the can-
didates are closely (weakly) identified with the policy outcomes of the outgoing government. In
other words, voters hold incumbent parties – both in executive and legislative elections – more to
account, if their candidates have close ties to the outgoing government than if they do not.

e first two papers of this thesis investigate how candidates’ characteristics affect how voters re-
ward and punish incumbent parties. 
e first paper examines whether there is more performance-
based voting in Latin America when the presidential candidate of the incumbent party is a re-
running president, than when she is a successor or a non-successor. Successors are political allies of
the outgoing president, while non-successors are internal party opponents of the president. 
e re-
sults show that re-running presidents are held more accountable than successors and non-successors.
In open seat elections, successors are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than non-successors.

e paper reveals that when there is a strong connection between the outgoing president and the
candidate of her party, leaders’ reputations are transferred more to their successors. Empirically,
the paper estimates random-intercept random-slopes models on an original dataset that combines

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information on the different types of candidates with individual-level observations for  elections
in  Latin American countries between  and .

e second paper explores whether endorsements from incumbent politicians to co-partisans
increase the magnitude of the performance-based vote. Endorsements provide voters with specific
information about the distribution of power within a party by signalling that the endorser has
a hold over the candidates’ nominations. Empirically, the study uses a randomised experiment
embedded in a survey conducted two days before the  Mexican general election. 
e study
randomises the endorsements of the outgoing president Felipe Calderón to the Senate candidates of
his party. 
e results show that voters who identify with the incumbent PAN assign responsibility
for past performance in a different way than voters who do not identify with the party of the
president. 
e latter hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the performance of
the government, whereas among voters who identify with the incumbent party, the vote for the
PAN Senate candidates is more tightly linked to the performance of the president when voters are
exposed to a Calderón endorsement than when they are not.
Accountability Beyond the Macro-economy
As alluded to above, the economic voting literature has long justified relying purely on economic
factors to measure electoral accountability, on the grounds that citizens have only limited willing-
ness and capacity to process complex information about politics (Campbell et al. ; Lewis-Beck
et al. ). Since in most contexts the economy is the most talked-about issue in the public opin-
ion, and most importantly during election campaigns, it is assumed that judging macro-economic
performance is more straightforward for average citizens than judging other areas of government
control. As Anderson (: -) points out, “[a]ccountability rooted in economic voting
thus constitutes a minimalist but nevertheless legitimate vision of democracy as a form of govern-
ment that allows ill-informed electorates to exert a circumscribed measure of control through their
ability to “throw the rascals out.””
In recent years, however, studies have speculated that the salience of the macro-economy is con-
text specific. Cheibub and Przeworski (: ) justify not finding positive results on the relation-
ship between macro-economic performance and leader survival rates on the grounds that “voters
[. . . ] may decide to keep governments accountable for matters other than [macro-]economic.”

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According to the studies that model the economy’s salience, citizens base their vote more on eco-
nomic factors when the economy is in a recession (Harrington ; Soroka ; Singer ),
and less in cases of foreign policy crises (Wilcox and Allsop ; Edwards et al. ), and terrorist
attacks (Bali ). In addition, some studies have found over the years that voters are primarily
egotropic (Nannestad and Paldam ; Echegaray ) – i.e. they care more about their personal
finances than the state of the national economy. Singer and Carlin () show that voters empha-
sise personal finances over macro-economic outcomes more in contexts of under-development and
extended poverty.
Given Singer and Carlin’s () finding, it is reasonable to expect voters in low-development
countries to reward governments for allocating more funds to their own constituencies, as these ad-
ditional funds are likely to have a strong impact on their personal finances (Kitschelt and Wilkinson
). Yet, despite the attention the American and comparative literatures have paid to distributive
politics in the last decade, little is known about when and how voters reward incumbent parties
in presidential elections for increasing spending. Most empirical studies focus either on detect-
ing political favouritism in governments’ transfers (Levitt and Snyder ; Larcinese et al. ;
Lauderdale ; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro ; Arulampalam et al. ; Brollo and Nan-
nicini ; Albouy ), or on explaining the electoral consequences of government spending,
irrespective of its allocation (Levitt and Snyder ; Lazarus and Reilly ; Kriner and Reeves
). 
e third paper of this thesis uncovers the mechanisms that incumbent parties in the fed-
eral government use to politicise public spending, and also shows that voters reward them for this
behaviour.
Studying the presidential election returns of political favouritism in federal spending is very im-
portant. First, it sheds light on how voters attribute responsibility for the behaviour of politicians
in contexts in which there is one principal – the voting population – but potentially more than one
agent – the president, members of parliament and mayors. It is not self-evident that incumbent
presidents (or their party’s nominee) should be rewarded or punished for actions that mainly affect
local economies, and for which lower-level politicians, such as legislators and mayors, also claim
responsibility (Kriner and Reeves ). In fact, the retrospective voting literature reviewed earlier
Studies of distributive politics in Latin America have examined the electoral effects of conditional cash transfer
(CCT) programmes in Mexico (Díaz Cayeros et al. ; Díaz Cayeros et al. ; De la O ) and Brazil (Zucco
). 
ese studies show that CCT beneficiaries are more likely to reward incumbent parties in presidential elections.
However, scholars have found little evidence of political manipulation in the allocation of CCT programmes’ funds in
these two countries (Díaz Cayeros et al. ; Sugiyama and Hunter ), and in Latin America more generally (Díaz
Cayeros and Magaloni ).
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finds that executives are rewarded mainly for the state of the national economy, while the literature
on distributive politics focuses on the electoral returns for legislators of delivering patronage (Calvo
and Murillo ; Weitz-Shapiro ), pork (Samuels ), and government spending more
generally (Levitt and Snyder ; Lazarus and Reilly ).
Second, examining the returns of the political manipulation of government spending also has
normative implications. If governments allocate funds tactically to benefit co-partisans and harm
opponents, and voters reward governments for this behaviour, this constitutes a perverse form of ac-
countability, as governments are rewarded for the “wrong” reasons. If politicians become aware that
politicising spending pays off, then incentives are created for politicians to continue this practice in
the future. Moreover, profound political conflicts can arise over the manipulation of public goods,
which are rooted in the losers’ perception that the political process was rigged against them. If the
legitimacy of electoral competition rests on losers’ consent, as Anderson et al. () claim, then
manipulation of public spending can lead to the loss of electoral legitimacy by the losers’ rejection
of the election result.

e third paper of this thesis finds causal evidence of tactical spending to the municipalities in
the run-up to the  Mexican presidential election, and shows that the incumbent party in the
federal government was rewarded for this spending in the presidential contest. Using a difference-in-
difference design, the paper shows that the party of the president allocated more funds to municipal-
ities that had a co-partisan as mayor. 
e evidence indicates that these transfers were instrumental
in securing the victory of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party in an election that
was decided by a razor-thin margin. 
ey were particularly important in increasing the PAN vote
when they were allocated to deprived municipalities: 
e PAN vote shares were three percent larger
in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than one standard deviation above
the mean, than in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than one standard
deviation below the mean. Simulations of the election results based on one of the regression mod-
els shows that if the federal government had not targeted transfers to aligned municipalities, the
probability of a PAN victory would have been lower – . instead of . percent.

    
    

e link between economics and the vote has received considerable attention from studies investi-
gating electoral accountability in advanced industrial democracies. A literature review from 
estimated the number of articles and books published at over  (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier
). However, the same cannot be said of transitional democracies, including Latin America.
According to a literature review from  (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier ), the publications on
economic voting in Latin America included only two cross-national studies (Remmer ; Ben-
ton ), and a few single-case studies on Peru (Stokes ; Weyland ; Kelly ; Arce
; Echegaray ), Mexico (Dominguez and McCann , ; Brophy-Baermann ;
Buendía ), Argentina (Remmer and Gélineau (); Canton and Jorrat (); Echegaray
), Chile (Panzer and Paredes ), and Venezuela (Weyland , ). 
ese studies fo-
cused on asserting that the economy impacts the popularity of the president or the vote function of
the incumbent party after controlling for other factors such as political violence, border conflicts,
coups, and party identification.

e number of studies published on electoral accountability in the region has picked up consid-
erably since . In recent years, three cross-national studies have shed light on the particularities
of economic voting in Latin America. Benton (: ) argues “that thanks to years of economic
adversity, Latin American voters have developed long, sophisticated economic memories,” and pun-
ish not only incumbent governments for economic downturns, but also non-incumbent parties that
were previously in government. Non-incumbents are also punished electorally when electoral sys-
tems are permissive, and allow for the entry of smaller parties. Johnson and Ryu () show that
there is greater electoral sanctioning when incumbent presidents break campaign promises. 
ey
argue that “presidents who abandon their promises assert the executive’s responsibility for the econ-
omy and raise the salience of economic issues in the next election. Consequently, voters respond
Until recently, an important reason for the low number of studies on electoral accountability in Latin America was
data availability. In the first years after the democratic transitions of the s, the number of general elections that could
be pulled together for analysis was small. As a result, researchers had to study single countries, and use a presidential
approval function over a period of months (Buendía ; Stokes ; Arce ; Kelly ). 
is changed with
time, as the number of democratic elections available for study increased, and as individual-level data became readily
accessible.

e author identifies this effect using aggregate-level data from  presidential elections across  Latin American
countries between  and .
Stokes () has shown that several Latin American presidents implemented neoliberalism “by surprise,” by cam-
paigning against free market reforms but later breaking their electoral mandate.
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rationally to these policy switches, rewarding them when they succeed and punishing them when
they fail” (Johnson and Ryu : ). Using individual-level data for  Latin American countries
between  and , Singer and Carlin () demonstrate that prospective voting predom-
inates early in the election cycle, but retrospective voting is the norm at the end of presidential
terms.
While these studies have provided new insights about electoral accountability in the region, there
is still a lot of unexplained cross-national variation in the magnitude of the performance-based
vote. In addition to investigating how candidates’ identities matter for electoral accountability,
the first paper examines several institutional and political factors that have been found to mediate
the economic vote in other contexts. 
e results only find partial support for the thesis that high
clarity of responsibility leads to more electoral sanctioning (Powell and Whitten ), and do not
find evidence of more retrospective voting in contexts of low trade dependence (Hellwig ),
and when presidential elections are held on the same day as legislative elections (Samuels ). I
return to these issues in the conclusion.
From a cross-national perspective, Latin America is a good region on which to test my theory
about the relationship between incumbent politicians and their parties’ candidates. First, due to
the existence of term limits, presidentialism offers greater variation in the type of candidates –
re-running presidents, successors and non-successors – than parliamentarism. 
is is so because,
in contrast to prime ministers, most incumbent presidents are not allowed to re-run. As a result,
their parties have to either choose a candidate with close ties to the outgoing administration, or a
candidate who offers an alternative project. Second, in Latin America, presidential nominations are
not endogenous to economic perceptions or the popularity of the president. As I show in the first
paper, when voters have positive evaluations of the performance of the government, candidates with
close ties to the president are not more likely to be nominated than candidates without close ties to
the president. 
is means that my measure of candidate type is not contaminated by endogeneity
bias.

is is not likely to be the case in parliamentary democracies. In good economic times, the prime ministerial
candidate of the incumbent party is likely to be the incumbent prime minister herself. Why would a prime minister
choose not to re-run when things are going well? Moreover, in many parliamentary systems prime ministers can call
early elections and, not surprisingly, research shows that they do so when the economic cycle is looking upwards (Kayser
, ). In contrast, a candidate other than the prime minister is likely going to run in economic downturns, when
the incumbent prime minister faces party internal pressures to step aside, and allow for the nomination of a new leader.

e case of the incumbent Spanish prime minister, Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who in the midst of a severe recession
chose not to lead his party into the  general election, is a good example. It is likely that when incumbent prime

    
In addition, the study of Mexico in the first presidential term after democratisation (-)
constitutes a very good case for investigating how voters hold the government accountable for in-
creasing spending to the municipalities. First, it provides a unique opportunity to examine the
strategies that “new” parties rely on to consolidate their electoral support after the opening of elec-
toral competition. While a wealth of research investigates how authoritarian regimes use federal
resources to remain in power (see Magaloni  and Greene ,  for the Mexican case),
little is known about how parties previously in opposition to authoritarian regimes consolidate their
support once they enter office. 
e third paper of this thesis demonstrates that the tactical alloca-
tion of federal resources, together with the control of local administrations, allowed the PAN to
make electoral inroads in poor areas of the country, which were traditionally strongholds of the
formerly authoritarian Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the leftist Partido de la Revolu-
ción Democrática (PRD). Second, in developing democracies like Mexico, the potential for political
manipulation of federal resources is much larger than in consolidated democracies (Golden and
Min ). As a result, it is more likely that the tactical use of federal monies may help swing an
election in favour of the incumbent party, as this thesis shows to be the case in the  presidential
election.
    

is thesis is an effort to explain, on the one side, why incumbent parties are subject to more ret-
rospective voting in some contexts than in others and, on the other, to explain what voters hold
governments electorally accountable for. It is also an effort to explore the implications of Latin
American electoral politics for the quality of democracy in the region, and for democratic theory
more broadly. Are incumbent parties held more electorally accountable when incumbent presi-
dents run for re-election? Is there more retrospective voting when the presidential candidates of
the incumbent party are successors rather than non-successors? Do endorsements from incumbent
politicians to co-partisans lead to greater electoral sanctioning? In which ways do incumbent gov-
ernments politicise the allocation of federal resources, and do voters hold them accountable for this?

ese are the questions this thesis sets out to answer.
ministers step down, their parties nominate a candidate who is not closely associated with the outgoing government, i.e.
a non-successor.

    

e central part of this thesis consists of three papers. In the first, I create a new dataset on
presidential candidates in Latin America – included in Appendix  of that paper – which captures
whether the presidential candidate of the incumbent party has strong or weak ties to the policies
of the outgoing government. I match this information with an individual-level dataset that mea-
sures vote intention, economic evaluations, and presidential approval for  election years in Latin
America. Matching these two datasets allows me to test whether the type of presidential candidate
of the incumbent party has an effect on retrospective voting. In the second paper I conduct a survey
experiment that sheds light on the degree to which voters hold the incumbent party in the 
Mexican general election more electorally accountable when the Senate candidates are endorsed
than when they are not. 
e third paper analyses a dataset on federal transfers to Mexican munici-
palities that has not been investigated before. 
e analysis of this data shows that the government
of Vicente Fox allocated disproportionately more funds to municipalities governed by co-partisans,
and that voters rewarded the government for these additional funds. 
e thesis concludes with a
summary of the main findings, and with a discussion of the theoretical, empirical and normative
implications of the results.

1
T H E S U C C E S S O R F A C T O R : E L E C T O R A L A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y I N
P R E S I D E N T I A L D E M O C R A C I E S

Do voters sanction incumbent parties collectively for the performance of the government, or do
they hold politicians accountable individually? Most economic voting studies assume that voters
hold the incumbent party collectively accountable, and that candidate-specific factors do not have
an independent effect on how voters punish and reward incumbents. 
is paper develops a frame-
work of executive accountability in which voters weigh the past executive’s performance differently,
depending on the degree to which the presidential candidate of the incumbent party is identified
with the performance of the outgoing government. Focusing on Latin America, it differentiates
between presidents running for re-election, successors – i.e. political allies of the outgoing presi-
dent – and non-successors – i.e. party-internal opponents of the president. 
e paper shows that
re-running presidents are held more accountable than the other two types of candidates, and that
successors are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than non-successors. Empirically, the paper
estimates random-intercept random-slopes models on an original dataset that combines informa-
tion on the different types of candidates with individual-level observations from  election years
in  Latin American countries.


“On the one hand, I’m the candidate of the governing party. At the same time, I don’t need to take on
the burden of being the government’s candidate. People know that my candidacy developed not only
outside the government but in spite of the government.” Felipe Calderón, Houston Chronicle,
February , . Quoted in Shirk (: ).

In a mass rally on  October , Dilma Rousseff, the candidate of the incumbent Partido dos
Trabalhadores (PT), closed her electoral campaign for the presidency of Brazil. Dilma, as she is
popularly known in her country, chose the city of Sao Bernardo do Campo, the industrial centre
of the state of Sao Paulo, for her final campaign event. 
e choice of location was charged with
symbolism – this was where her political mentor, Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva, had initiated his political
career  years earlier. In the course of the campaign, the media had depicted Dilma as “Lula’s
handpicked successor,” and essentially every media outlet had tied her name to Lula’s, the outgoing,
term-limited president. According to a poll conducted days before the election, voters perceived
that an administration headed by Dilma would guarantee the continuity of Lula’s economic and
social policies (Hunter : ). 
is was not surprising given that Dilma had been until recently
Lula’s Chief of Staff, responsible for drafting many of the government’s policies. On the night her
campaign came to an end, she once more reminded her followers that she would continue the
policies adopted by her mentor, in particular the popular Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer
programme that had granted money to  million families. 
ree days earlier, in the last televised
political advertisement before the election, Lula had made a final appeal in favour of his protégée:
“Like me, Dilma loves the poor. When you vote for Dilma you are voting for me” (MercoPress, 
October ).
A clear counter-example to Dilma’s campaign was the  presidential election campaign of
the incumbent Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) in Costa Rica. During the campaign, the media
emphasised the fact that José Miguel Corrales, the PLN presidential candidate, was an internal
opponent of president José María Figueres, who had “kept his distance” from the outgoing ad-
ministration (LAWR,  July ). As a member of the PLN left, Corrales was a staunch critic
of neoliberalism, whereas the administration of his co-partisan had continued the market reform
process initiated in the early s. According to media reports, it was well known that Corrales


had “fundamental differences with President Figueres over economic policy” (LADB,  July ).
Corrales, a member of parliament, had not occupied a cabinet position in Figueres’ administration,
which made his appeal for change credible. In the party primary, he had defeated the candidate
favoured by the president (Picado León ).

e cases of Dilma and Corrales are two examples of how parties fight election campaigns, and
how the media report on them. 
ey are, by no means, exceptional. In contemporary democracies,
parties centre their national election campaigns around their leading candidate (King : ), and,
depending on the leader’s trajectory, parties and the media emphasise different issues: If incumbents
run for re-election, their campaigns emphasise their accomplishments, and the media hold their
record in office under great scrutiny. In cases of no re-election, parties and the media underline
the candidate’s links – or lack thereof – to other prominent party figures, such as the outgoing
head of government. As a result, voters are usually well aware of the identity and background of
the candidate of the incumbent party. As Felipe Calderón’s quote in the epigraph suggests, voters
likely understand the difference between being the presidential candidate of the incumbent party,
and being the presidential candidate of the government.
Despite the differences in trajectories of the candidates, the electoral accountability literature
has not explored this internal party variation in any detail. With few exceptions, economic voting
studies assume that voters hold the incumbent party collectively responsible for the performance
of the government. As Samuels’ (: ) study of presidentialism claims, “there is no reason
why voters could not hold political parties as a whole and presidential governments as a whole [. . . ]
accountable in a retrospective voting fashion.” Yet, for collective party accountability to exist, a
key condition must apply: Candidate-specific variables cannot have an independent effect on the
magnitude of the economic vote. As the examples above show, this is a very demanding condition,
given that, in some contexts, the candidate of the incumbent party has a stronger connection to
the economic policies of the government than in others. 
us, by holding to the strong party ideal,
the electoral accountability literature failed to account for the possibility that incumbent parties
may avoid responsibility for their time in office by nominating a candidate with weak ties to the
executive.
“Candidates” and “candidates of the incumbent party” are used interchangeably in this study. Unless otherwise
noted, both terms are used to describe politicians seeking an executive position.
By incumbent party, I mean the party of the head of government.



is study constitutes the first systematic attempt at understanding if, and under what condi-
tions, the relationship between the candidate of the incumbent party and the outgoing president
matters for electoral accountability. Do voters sanction incumbent parties collectively for the perfor-
mance of the government, or do they hold politicians accountable individually? 
e paper theorises
that voters do not hold incumbent parties collectively accountable, and develops a framework of
executive accountability in which voters use the candidate’s trajectory to assign responsibility for
government performance. Voters assign more (less) responsibility for the executive’s past actions if
the candidate is closely (weakly) linked to the policy outcomes of the outgoing government.
Empirically, the paper focuses on presidential democracies in Latin America, but I expand on
the external validity of my findings in the conclusion. While the prospect of evaluating politicians
individually is not particular to presidentialism, focusing on presidential democracies in Latin
America has three main advantages: First, due to the existence of term limits, presidentialism offers
greater variation in the type of candidate. In contrast to prime ministers, most incumbent presidents
are not allowed to run for re-election. In this scenario, incumbent parties can either choose a
candidate who is closely related to the outgoing administration, or a candidate who offers a fresh
start. Second, in Latin America, the nomination of a presidential aspirant is not endogenous to
the evaluation of the economy or the popularity of the president. As I show below, when voters
have positive perceptions of the performance of the government, candidates with close ties to the
president are not more likely to be nominated than candidates without. 
is means that my results
are not contaminated by endogeneity bias. 
ird, by focusing on Latin America, home to almost
half of the world’s presidential democracies (Cheibub et al. ), I can build a homogenous
dataset consisting of survey data based on an identically measured set of questions. 
is allows me
to estimate a pooled multi-level model in line with Duch and Stevenson ().

e paper demonstrates that in Latin American presidential democracies, re-running presidents,
and successor candidates – i.e. presidential candidates who have strong ties to the outgoing president
– are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than candidates of incumbent parties who have no

ere is, in fact, a growing literature on the personalisation of politics in parliamentary democracies (McAllister
; Costa Lobo ). Empirically, these studies explore the effects of leader images in countries such as Canada
(Johnston ), the United Kingdom (Bartle and Crewe ; Bartle ; Andersen and Evans ), Israel (Rahat
and Sheafer ), and Germany (Anderson and Brettschneider ). Some of these studies find that candidate-
level variables are not significant predictors of vote choice once a party identification variable is introduced (Bartle and
Crewe ; Bartle ; Anderson and Brettschneider ), while others do find that leader images have an impact
independent of party images (Andersen and Evans ; Johnston ). None of these studies, however, look at the
interaction between candidate-specific variables and government performance.

   
close links to the president – i.e. non-successors. 
us, when there is a connection between the
outgoing president and the candidate of her party – as there was between Lula and Dilma – leaders’
reputations are transferred more to their successors. Moreover, the paper shows that voters are
attentive to intra-party dynamics and, in particular, to the cues they receive from party leaders and
the media.

e paper is organised into six sections. I first discuss the existing literature on the effect of
institutional and political contexts on the economic vote, and develop new hypotheses regarding the
effect of candidate type on electoral sanctioning. 
e second section provides a detailed definition
of the three types of candidates, and describes the criteria used to code each case. 
e third section
presents the dataset, which combines original data on the different types of candidates with survey-
level data. 
e fourth section presents the results and shows that the main expectations of the study
are corroborated. 
e fifth section addresses threats to causal inference, including reverse causation
and omitted variable bias. 
e final section summarizes the results, and discusses the normative
implications of the findings.
   

e question of what determines electoral accountability lies at the heart of democratic theory
(Manin et al. ). Answers to this question are usually framed in terms of reward-punishment
models of retrospective voting. In these frameworks, voters reward incumbents that perform well,
and punish those that perform poorly. As Stokes (: ) suggests, “voters use the past perfor-
mance of the government to predict future performance and see the government as responsible for
that performance.”
Yet, despite normative preconceptions that electoral accountability should exist, empirical stud-
ies show that the link between the economy and the incumbent vote is often weak and unstable
(Lewis-Beck ; Paldam ). Scholars have been able to show that national differences in the
magnitude of the economic vote arise from variation in institutional and political context: 
ere
is greater electoral sanctioning when there is high clarity of government responsibility (Powell and
I consider a presidential aspirant to be a successor when she is the preferred option of the outgoing president among
the group of candidates seeking to clinch the presidential nomination of the incumbent party or coalition. Conversely,
presidential candidates are categorised as non-successors when they are not the preferred option of the outgoing president.

   
Whitten ; Whitten and Palmer ); when incumbent presidents “switch policies” (John-
son and Ryu ); when viable alternatives to the incumbent government exist (Anderson );
when presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently in presidential systems (Samuels
); and when the economy is dominated by domestic relations rather than foreign trade (Duch
and Stevenson ; Hellwig ). However, even after accounting for context, much instability
remains (Anderson ; Dalton and Anderson ).

is paper argues that at least some of the variation in magnitude and remaining instability of the
economic vote emerges from a failure to account for the identity of the candidate of the incumbent
party. With few exceptions, the economic voting literature assumes that voters hold incumbent
parties accountable in the same way, irrespective of the identity of its leading candidate (Powell and
Whitten ; Erikson ; Hibbs ; Fisher and Hobolt ; Hellwig and Samuels ).
Since parties benefit from projecting an image of unity during election campaigns, the assumption is
that even term-limited presidents “ought to convince voters that they share a personal and political
affinity with their successor-candidate” (Samuels : ).
However, even if Samuels is right and outgoing presidents always try to persuade voters that they
share an affinity with their parties’ candidate, it is not clear that they will be successful in persuading
voters that this affinity is real if voters do not perceive the two politicians to share the same policy
positions – most notably on the economy. Clearly, political parties are not monolithic entities in
which every single party member holds the same views. We know at least since Ostrogorski ()
that parties have different factions, and that these different factions are often a reflection of the
cleavage structure that exists in society (Sartori ). Faction leaders and their supporters fight
for power, and their ultimate goal is to secure the prime ministerial or presidential nomination
(Strøm and Müller ; Siavelis and Morgenstern ; Samuels and Shugart ). As a result,
if the candidate who secures the nomination has no ties to the outgoing government – i.e. she
belongs to a faction that advocates different policies from the ones put in place by the executive –
the magnitude of the economic vote may be significantly dampened.

ere is, in sum, good reason to believe that the identity of the candidate of the incumbent party
matters for electoral accountability. I argue that the magnitude of the performance-based vote varies
Johnson and Ryu () find that economic performance is more salient in Latin America when the incumbent
president is a “policy switcher,” i.e. someone who runs on a particular set of policies, but implements policies in the
opposite direction once in office.
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (), Norpoth (), and Campbell et al. () test whether electoral sanctioning
increases when American presidents run for re-election. 
e three studies find evidence in support of this hypothesis.

   
depending on whether a president runs for re-election, or whether the incumbent party nominates
a successor or a non-successor. When incumbent presidents re-run, voters can directly punish the
person in charge of running the government. 
ere is no discrepancy between the policies of the
government and the individual politician in charge of them. As Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (:
) suggest, a “president running for re-election is the economic manager personified. Voters can
look at his or her record in office and cast a ballot accordingly.” Voters’ ability to attribute respon-
sibility is facilitated by the way incumbents run their campaign for re-election, and by the way the
media report their campaigns: 
e candidates emphasise their achievements, and the media put
their performance under great scrutiny. In addition, when presidents run for re-election, voters can
use the incumbents’ past performance to predict the outlook of the future government’s policies.
Discounting major external shocks, voters can expect the president to follow a similar policy trajec-
tory in her consecutive term. 
us, I expect electoral sanctioning to be highest when presidents
re-run.
When presidents do not re-run, the nomination of a successor signals to voters that the presiden-
tial candidate has at least some association with the policies of the outgoing government. Even if a
successor candidate wanted to distance herself from the president – due for example to a weak eco-
nomic performance – this attempt would likely lack credibility and the media and the opposition
would remind voters of the connection between both politicians. Furthermore, when assessing an
outgoing government’s record in office, voters can use the information about past performance to
predict the policy outlook of the new government more effectively when the candidate is a succes-
sor than when she is a non-successor. 
e nomination of a successor gives voters greater certainty
that the new government will follow a similar policy trajectory to the one already in place. In
sum, I expect greater electoral sanctioning when the candidate is a successor than when she is a
non-successor.
When incumbent parties nominate a non-successor, it is not evident to voters that the presiden-
tial candidate has a clear association with the performance of the government. Non-successors are
intra-party opponents of the president, and usually do not share the same policy preferences as the
Most models of electoral accountability separate prospective from retrospective voting. Empirically, however, voters
have only one instrument – the vote – to reach both goals. As a result, even “voters who use their vote prospectively
have good reasons to rely on retrospective information” (Manin et al. : ). Along these lines, Duch and Stevenson
() rely on a retrospective voting question to develop a selection model of electoral accountability.
Bartels () finds that the past performance of U.S. presidents is a good predictor of their future performance.
Similarly, Stokes () finds that Latin American presidents who are re-elected for a consecutive term, do not make
policy switches in their second terms.

     
outgoing government. In fact, most non-successors secure their parties’ nomination by opposing
the policies or the candidate backed by the president. Moreover, during election campaigns, the
media usually highlight the fact that these candidates do not belong to the same faction as the pres-
ident, or that they do not have the president’s support. When assessing the executive’s record in
office, voters cannot use the information about past performance as effectively to predict the policy
preferences of the new government. I thus expect the lowest levels of electoral accountability when
incumbent parties nominate non-successors.

e discussion about the type of presidential candidates leads to the following hypotheses:
H: Electoral accountability is highest when incumbent presidents run for re-election.
H: Successor candidates are held more electorally accountable than non-successor candidates.
     
As suggested in the introduction, the measure of candidate type proposed in this paper consists
of three categories – re-running presidents, successors, and non-successors. I consider a presidential
aspirant to be a successor when she is the preferred option of the outgoing president among the
group of candidates seeking to clinch the presidential nomination of the incumbent party or coali-
tion. Conversely, presidential candidates are categorised as non-successors when they are not the
preferred option of the president. Empirically, two different scenarios describe how these candi-
dates are nominated. In the first scenario, there is contestation for the presidential nomination,
i.e. two or more candidates face or are scheduled to face each other in an internal election. If the
candidate who has the president’s support wins the internal election, she becomes a successor. If,
on the other hand, a candidate who is not supported by the president wins the internal contest, she
becomes a non-successor. In the second scenario there is no contestation to determine the presiden-
tial aspirant. Successors are either handpicked by the president, or emerge out of an overarching
consensus among different factions. Non-successors, on the contrary, are handpicked by a faction
that opposes the president.

e internal election is either a primary – open to at least all party or coalition members (Carey and Polga-
Hecimovich ) – or a contest in which only party delegates are allowed to vote.
While neither handpicked, nor consensus candidates face internal contestation, there are differences between them.
Consensus candidates do not face a challenger because they can gain enough support from different factions of the party.
Handpicked candidates do not face a challenger because some party leaders are so influential that they can impose their
preferred choice on the party.
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Empirically, I code candidates as successors and non-successors based on five criteria:
. Media and/or election reports document public statements of support from the outgoing
president to a candidate during the nomination process. If the endorsed candidate clinches
the nomination, she becomes a successor. If one of the candidates not receiving a public
statement of support wins the nomination, she becomes a non-successor.
. Media and/or election reports describe candidates seeking nomination as the preferred op-
tion of the outgoing president during the selection process. 
is is indicated by expressions
like “favourite,” “protégée,” “preferred candidate,” “ally,” “confidant,” etc. Alternatively, can-
didates seeking nomination are described as opponents of the outgoing president. 
is is
indicated by expressions like “rival,” “critic,” “opponent,” “defeated the preferred candidate
of the outgoing president,” etc. If the former clinches the nomination, she becomes a succes-
sor. If the latter wins the nomination, she becomes a non-successor.
. Even if expressions like “protégée,” “favourite,” or “rival” and “critic” are not used explicitly,
media and/or election reports make it unambiguously clear whether the candidate is a suc-
cessor or a non-successor. For each case I indicate the sources in Appendix .
. In cases in which coalition governments nominate a single candidate, candidates who belong
to the party of the president are coded as successors unless criteria  to  indicate otherwise.
Candidates who do not belong to the party of the president are coded as non-successors
unless criteria  to  indicate otherwise.
. Candidates who have occupied positions of trust, like Chief of Staff or Minister of the Presi-
dency are coded as successors unless criteria  to  indicate otherwise. Candidates that have
not occupied such positions are coded as non-successors unless criteria  to  indicate other-
wise.

e measure of candidate type proposed in this paper captures: a) the degree to which voters
identify the presidential candidate with the performance of the outgoing government, and b) voters’
perceptions of continuity between two administrations of the same party. Focusing on the political
relationship between outgoing presidents and candidates of the incumbent party in cases of no re-
election has the advantage of providing a highly identifiable measure of intra-party variation, while
still capturing differences in policy positions. Both presidents and candidates are highly visible
figures who are heavily scrutinised by the media. When a candidate receives the support of the
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outgoing president during the nomination process, voters are provided with a highly informative
cue. In addition, Wiesehomeier and Benoit () demonstrate that presidents’ policy positions
in Latin American presidential democracies differ systematically from their own parties’ positions
by being closer to the median voter in the electorate and the median party in parliament. 
is
suggests that the distinction between successors – who are closer to the presidents’ ideal points –
and non-successors – who are closer to the incumbent parties’ ideal points – also capture important
differences in candidates’ policy positions.
Table  describes the  cases analysed in this study. 
e first column reports the year and the
country in which the election took place, and the second column the name and party affiliation of
the candidate. 
e third column reports the type of candidate, i.e. incumbent presidents seeking re-
election ( cases), successors ( cases), and non-successors ( cases). 
e fourth column reports
how each case was coded based on the five criteria described above. Columns five and six report
the vote percentage obtained by each candidate, and whether the candidate won the election.

e average vote for re-standing presidents was . percent, for successors . percent, and for
non-successors . percent. Re-running presidents were re-elected in  percent of the cases,
while both successors and non-successors won  percent of the time. 
e seventh column reports
whether the presidential candidate occupied a cabinet position in the outgoing administration, and
the eighth column describes how media reports framed the relationship of the outgoing president
to the candidate of her party.

ree main points emerge from Table . First, the operationalisation criteria allowed for a
straightforward coding of the candidates as successors or non-successors. In  of  cases I relied
on the first and second criteria, which means that the media consistently reported candidates as
being presidents’ “favourites,” “protégées,” “preferred candidates,” “allies,” or, alternatively, “rivals,”
“critics,” “opponents,” etc. I was able to confidently code the remaining eight cases by relying on
the remaining criteria, which similarly provided unambiguous information (Appendix  includes a
detailed description of each case). Second, the fact that  percent of successors and  percent
of non-successors held cabinet positions in the outgoing administrations, further underlines that
successors were much more closely connected to the outgoing government than non-successors.
I report the first round vote for double-round systems.
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the main models of the paper – shown in Table  below – without the eight
cases for which I was not able to use the first two coding criteria. 
e results hold (see Appendix ).
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Finally, the last column indicates that the media followed the trajectories of the candidates and
reported on their relationship to the outgoing president. Given the strong media effects identified
in the literature on political communication (Sanders and Gavin ; Fridkin Kahn and Kenney
), it is not unrealistic to expect most voters to have been aware that successors were closely
linked to the incumbent president, and that non-successors were not. If voters were unaware
about the identity of the candidates, it would be more difficult to detect the patterns of electoral
accountability that I find.
Examples of prominent successors and non-successors include, in addition to Dilma and Cor-
rales, Danilo Medina, and Balbina Herrera. Medina, a member of the incumbent Partido de la
Liberación Dominicana (PLD), had the internal party support of president Fernández in the 
Dominican presidential election. In fact, his running mate was Fernández’ wife, the First Lady Mar-
garita Cedeño. Not surprisingly, Medina ran on a platform of continuity with the macro-economic
policies of the outgoing incumbent (El País,  May ). He profited from the strong growth
rates experienced under Fernández and won the presidential election with . percent of the vote
against . for Hipólito Mejía of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD).

e economic and political context was similarly favourable in Panama in , with growth
rates averaging over eight percent in the three years preceding the election (World Bank ),
and president Martín Torrijos enjoying approval ratings of . percent (Dichter y Neira ).
Despite these auspicious conditions, Herrera could not capitalise on the economic performance of
the government. In the primary of the incumbent Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), she
defeated the Mayor of Panama City, Juan Carlos Navarro, whom the media described as Torrijos’s
candidate (LARR, March ). As the leader of the ‘social democratic’ faction within the PRD,
Herrera was widely regarded as being further to the left of Torrijos, who had pursued market friendly
policies. During the campaign, the media compared her to the leftist president of Venezuela, Hugo
Chávez, with whom she, allegedly, had a close relationship. She lost by a landslide to the centre-right
candidate, Ricardo Martinelli, . to . percent.
Figure  compares the probability of voting for the incumbent party when the candidate is a
president seeking re-election (the Venezuelan Hugo Chávez in ), a successor (Medina) and a
non-successor (Herrera). 
e y-axis reports the incumbent vote, while the x-axis reports economic
perceptions (left panel), and presidential approval (right panel). 
e figure in the left panel is based
As a robustness check, Appendix  summarises whether media reports described the candidates’ economic and social
policies as being of continuity, change, or a mix of both. Successors ran on a platform of continuity, while non-successors
advocated a mix of continuity and change, or only change.
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Figure : Incumbent Vote and Government Performance in 
ree Cases
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
Vo
tin
g 
In
cu
m
be
nt
Worse Same Better
Economic Evaluations
A - Hugo Chavez B - Danilo Medina
C - Balbina Herrera
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
Vo
tin
g 
In
cu
m
be
nt
No Yes
Presidential Approval
A - Hugo Chavez B - Danilo Medina
C - Balbina Herrera
Notes: Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evaluations of the national economy (left panel)
and presidential approval (right panel) for a re-running president (Hugo Chávez), a successor (Danilo Medina), and a
non-successor candidate (Balbina Herrera). Estimations are for a non-married man between  and  years of age who
has a university degree and is in the highest socio-economic category. Slope A in the left panel is significantly different
from B for economy got better (p=.) but not for economy got worse (p=.). Slope A is also significantly different
from C for economy got better (p=.) and economy got worse (p=.). Slope B is significantly different from C for
economy got better (p=.) and economy got worse (p=.). Slope A in the right panel is significantly different from B
(p=.) and C (p=.), while slope B is significantly different from C (p=.).
Source: LAPOP, and Latinobarómetro.
on binary logistic regression models in which the dependent variable is the incumbent vote, the
main predictors are economic evaluations, and socio-demographic controls are included for gender,
age, education, marital status, and socio-economic level. 
e panel on the right is based on the
same regression, adding presidential approval as a predictor. 
e economic context is similarly
favourable in all three cases, as Chávez also ran during an economic expansion. 
e difference
in slopes is large and statistically significant. Consistent with my two hypotheses, in both panels,
electoral sanctioning is highest for the incumbent Chávez, while successor Medina is held more
electorally accountable than non-successor Herrera.

e examples of Chávez, Medina, and Herrera illustrate how my theory works in individual
cases. In the remainder of the paper I investigate these patterns of electoral accountability more
systematically using time series cross-sectional data for the  Latin American countries over a
period of  years (–).

e Venezuelan economy had grown an average of  percent in  and  (World Bank ), and Chávez
had approval ratings of  percent at the time of the election (Latinobarómetro ).

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  

is section introduces the data and the methods that I use to test the hypotheses outlined in
the theory. I model the effect of candidate type, political context, and perceptions of government
performance on the probability of voting for the incumbent party or coalition. I focus on pres-
idential elections in Latin America, in the period between  and , for which individual-
level data is available. Using individual-level data has two advantages. First, it allows to control
for individual-level covariates, making estimates more precise. Second, it does not raise the usual
ecological inference problems. Due to the hierarchical structure of the data, I estimate random-
intercept random-slopes logit models.

e empirical study relies on data from four Latin American surveys: Latinobarómetro ( stud-
ies), LAPOP ( surveys), CEP (three surveys), and CSES (one study). Between  and 
respondents were interviewed in each survey. Sixty-eight presidential elections were conducted
in Latin America in the period under study – i.e. –. However,  of these elections were
left out of the final dataset. In  cases, the party of the incumbent president did not field a
presidential candidate from its own ranks, and did not join a coalition. In a further six cases,
surveys were conducted before the incumbent candidate was chosen, or after the new government
had taken office. In total, the dataset comprises  individual observations from  different
surveys.

e dependent variable is a measure of national vote intention for the incumbent party or coali-
tion. Latinobarómetro uses the standard formulation of: “If there was an election tomorrow/this
Sunday, which party would you vote for?” 
e LAPOP, CSES, and CEP surveys ask for the names
of the specific candidates. 
e dependent variable is coded as binary in all models, in which 
Note that in contrast to Duch and Stevenson () and Singer and Carlin (), I cannot use non-election-year
surveys because the identity of the incumbent candidate has to be known to the respondents at the time the survey is
conducted.
In the few cases in which more than one survey was available for a particular election, I used the one which was
conducted closer to the election date.
Appendix  re-estimates the main models of the paper without the four cases that scored below  in Polity IV –
Peru in  and , Ecuador in , and Venezuela in . 
e results remain virtually unchanged.

ese were the cases of Bolivia , Colombia , Ecuador , Ecuador , Ecuador , Ecuador ,
Guatemala , Nicaragua , Peru , , , and Venezuela .
Argentina in  and , Bolivia , Colombia , Guatemala , and Mexico .
I also included the case of Chile in , for which individual-level data was publicly available.
I re-estimate the main models of the paper using only the Latinobarómetro data. 
e coefficients on the main effects
and on the interactions between candidate type and government performance remain in the same direction and very close
to the point estimates using the whole sample of cases.

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represents a vote for the incumbent party, and  represents a vote for any other party or candidate
(following standard practice, undecided voters are excluded from the analysis). Forty-nine percent
of respondents across all surveys planned to vote for the incumbent party.

e main predictors are measures of government performance, candidate type and the interaction
between these two variables. I use two different measures of government performance. First, I use
a standard economic sociotropic retrospective indicator for all  election studies included in the
sample. 
e consensus in the field is that assessments of the national economy generally trump
pocketbook considerations (Duch and Stevenson ; Kiewiet ). 
e choice of a retrospective
over a prospective indicator reflects the theoretical importance of the retrospective model (Key
; Fiorina ), and is also based on the recent finding by Singer and Carlin () that in
Latin America, prospective voting predominates early in the election cycle but retrospective voting
dominates as the presidential term nears its end. Following Duch and Stevenson (; ),
I recode the economic indicator into three categories – worse, same, and better. Twenty-two
percent of respondents in the sample thought the economy had improved over the previous year,
. percent thought it had stayed the same, and . thought it had deteriorated. 
e crucial factor
is that these proportions are balanced between cases of successor and non-successor candidates, as
I show below.

e second measure of government performance is constructed for a subset of  surveys. 
e
Latinobarómetro and CEP surveys ask respondents whether they approve or disapprove of the pres-
ident. Respondents who approve of the president are coded , all others are coded . LAPOP asks
respondents to rate the job performance of the president on a Likert scale. Respondents answering
good and very good are coded , all others are coded . In total, . percent of respondents in
the sample approved of the performance of the president. By using presidential approval in addition
to economic evaluations, I avoid reducing government performance to a pure economic measure.
In fact, Singer () demonstrates that the economy does not always figure at the top of voters’
concerns. He shows that it is likely to dominate voters’ evaluations under conditions of economic
recession, volatility, and economic underdevelopment. In addition, all the models control for gen-
In six surveys – Argentina , Chile , , and , Guatemala , and Guatemala  – the so-
ciotropic retrospective question was not available. In these cases I used questions about the current economic situation
of the country.
I re-estimate the economic voting models using a continuous measure of economic evaluations in which better and
much better are coded , same is coded , and worse and much worse are coded -. 
e substantive results do not vary
when using the continuous variable (see Appendix ).
Two recent retrospective voting studies by Fisher and Hobolt () and Hellwig () also rely on presiden-
tial/government approval as measures of government performance.

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der, age, education, marital status, and socio-economic status at the individual level (see Appendix
).

e key second-level predictors in all the models are the three different types of candidates –
re-running presidents, successors, and non-successors. 
e models include further second-level predic-
tors to account for variation in the political, institutional, and economic contexts of elections. Four
dummy variables capture whether the party of the president is in a majority situation, whether pres-
idential elections are held on the same day as parliamentary elections (concurrent elections), whether
presidential candidates are nominated via a primary election, and whether incumbent presidents
are policy switchers. In addition, I also account for the levels of trade dependence (measured as
imports and exports as a percentage of GDP), and for the levels of party system fragmentation (mea-
sured as the effective number of parties that won seats in the previous election). Excluding these
variables from the analysis could have an effect on the overall levels, though not on the nature of the
performance-based vote (Singer and Carlin ). 
erefore, I include these variables and interact
them with the government perceptions measures.
Table  in Appendix  summarises the coding of each institutional and contextual dummy vari-
able for each election year. Regarding the type of candidate, presidents ran for re-election in 
cases, while successors were chosen in  cases and non-successors in  cases. As for the clarity
of responsibility, the party of the incumbent president enjoyed a legislative majority in only 
cases. 
is reflects the fact that most legislatures in Latin America are elected by proportional rep-
resentation (Mainwaring ). Furthermore, most presidential elections –  in total – were held
on the same day as legislative elections, and in  cases primaries were scheduled to nominate the
presidential candidate. Finally, five incumbent presidents in the dataset were policy switchers.
  

is study employs multi-level models to test whether performance-based voting is conditioned on
known contextual variables such as the type of candidate and the majority status of the government.
I re-estimate the main models of the paper controlling for left-right self-placement on a subset of cases for which
this variable is available (see Appendix ). After controlling for this variable, the point estimates on the main effects and
on the interactions between candidate type and government performance remain in the same direction and very close to
the values reported in Table  below.
Presidents are in a majority position whenever their party enjoys a legislative majority in both chambers (in cases
of bicameralism) or only in one chamber (in cases of unicameralism).
Carey and Polga-Hecimovich () show that candidates nominated via primaries get a ‘primary bonus.’ I define
as primaries elections in which at least all party members are allowed to vote.

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My approach follows Duch and Stevenson (; ), in that I pull multiple individual-level
surveys from different sources. For the pooled strategy to be effective, variables need to be identically
measured. In the case of this study, this is not a constraint, because the wording of the question
and response sets in the different election studies are similar enough as to be represented by a single
variable (Duch and Stevenson : ).
In this hierarchical structure, level- units are individual respondents and level- units are the
surveys themselves. A set of individual characteristics, i.e. perceptions of government performance,
affects vote choice, while case-specific variables, e.g. the type of candidate, predict differences in the
effect of the individual-level variables across cases. I estimate random-intercept random-slopes mod-
els in which the individual-level evaluations of the economy and the performance of the president
are allowed to vary from cluster to cluster. Models like these have become standard in political
science, and have been mainly used to study vote choice (e.g. Duch and Stevenson ; ;
Huber and Stanig ; Kayser and Peress ), but also turnout (Ghitza and Gelman ).
Table  reports the results of the full models (the coefficients are on the logit scale). 
e
dependent variable is the vote for the incumbent party or coalition (, ), and the main predictors
are economic perceptions, presidential approval, and the interaction of these two variables with the type
of candidate. 
e first model uses economic evaluations as the indicator of government performance.

is variable is broken into three dummies: worse, better, and same. Two of these, worse and better,
are included in the models. 
e second model uses the dummy variable presidential approval to
capture government performance, and includes economic evaluations as a control variable. 
e key
second level predictor measuring the type of candidate is also broken into three dummy variables:
non-successors, successors, and re-running presidents. Non-successor is the reference category.
In both models in Table , the main effects of the coefficients on the government performance
measures are for a non-successor candidate. As candidates of the incumbent party, non-successors
are expected to be associated, at least to some degree, with the performance of the government.

erefore, in Model , the two dummy variables economy got better and economy got worse are
expected to be statistically significant and have opposite signs, with the former being positive and
the latter negative. However, the results do not fully conform to this expectation, as the coefficient
on the economy got better dummy is positive but not statistically significant at any conventional
level.

e results do not change if random slopes are included for all the individual-level covariates.

e models are estimated using the xtmelogit command in Stata.

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Table : Candidate Type and Performance-based Voting
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Economy Better . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Successor . (.) .
Economy Better*Re-run . (.) .
Economy Worse -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Successor -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Re-run -. (.) .
Presidential Approval . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Successor . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Re-run . (.) .
Successor -. (.) . . (.) .
Re-running President . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Majority Situation . (.) .
Economy Worse*Majority Situation -. (.) .
Presidential Approval*Majority Situation . (.) .
Majority Situation . (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Better*Concurrent Elections . (.) .
Economy Worse*Concurrent Elections . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Concurrent Elections . (.) .
Concurrent Elections -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Better*Primary . (.) .
Economy Worse*Primary -. (.) .
Presidential Approval*Primary . (.) .
Primary . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*ENPS -. (.) .
Economy Worse*ENPS . (.) .
Presidential Approval*ENPS -. (.) .
ENPS . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Trade Dependence -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Trade Dependence . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Trade Dependence -. (.) .
Trade Dependence . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Policy Switch -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Policy Switch -. (.) .
Presidential Approval*Policy Switch -. (.) .
Policy Switch . (.) . . (.) .
Male -. (.) . -. (.) .
Age . (.) . . (.) .
Education -. (.) . -. (.) .
Married . (.) . -. (.) .
Socioeconomic Level -. (.) . -. (.) .
Intercept -. (.) . -. (.) .
σIntercept . .
σEconomyBetter . .
σEconomyWorse . .
σPresidentialApproval .
Number of observations  
Number of elections  

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is suggests that in cases of positive economic perceptions, voters do not identify non-successor
candidates with the economic record of the government.
Model  provides a direct test of H and H using economic evaluations to measure government
performance. Two main findings emerge from Model . First, re-running presidents are subject
to higher levels of electoral accountability than successors and non-successors. 
is constitutes
evidence in favour of H. Second, in line with H, successor candidates are subject to more elec-
toral sanctioning than non-successors. 
e successor dummy interacted with each of the economic
perception variables, is statistically significant at the one percent level, and signed in the predicted
direction.
Figure : Incumbent Vote, Candidate Type, and Government Performance
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Notes: Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evaluations of the national economy (left panel) and
presidential approval (right panel) for a re-running president, a successor, and a non-successor candidate. Estimations are
for a non-married man between  and  years of age who has a university degree and is in the highest socio-economic
category. 
e left panel is based on Model  in Table , while the right panel is based on Model . Slope A in the left
panel is significantly different from B (p=.) and C (p=.) for economy got better, as well as from B (p=.) and C
(p=.) for economy got worse. Slope B is significantly different from C for economy got better (p=.) and economy got
worse (p=.). Slope A in the right panel is significantly different from B (p=.) and C (p=.), while slope B is
significantly different from C (p=.).
Sources: CEP, CSES, LAPOP, and Latinobarómetro.

e panels in Figure  show predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evalua-
tions of the national economy (left panel) and presidential approval (right panel) for a re-running
president, a successor, and a non-successor. 
e purpose of the figure is to show how the differences
in the probability of voting for each type of candidate change as a function of economic evaluations
and presidential approval. 
e panel on the left, which is based on the results of Model , shows
that the three types of candidates are subject to different levels of economic voting. 
e three
However, the difference in the interaction coefficient on successors and re-running presidents is only statistically
significant at the  percent level for economy got better. I estimate these differences using the delta method.

  
slopes are statistically significantly different from each other. 
e slope for re-running presidents
is clearly steeper than the slope for successors and non-successors, while the slope for successors is
steeper than the one for non-successors. 
is illustrates the finding from the hierarchical model
that re-running presidents, successors and non-successors are subject to different levels of electoral
sanctioning.
Model  includes further institutional and contextual variables discussed in the economic voting
literature. According to Samuels (), there is more economic voting when presidential and
legislative elections are held concurrently. However, the results of Model  do not conform to this
expectation. 
e concurrent elections variable, interacted with economy got worse, has a positive and
statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that the impact of negative economic evaluations on
the vote is lower when presidents are elected on the same day as the legislature. Johnson and Ryu
() claim that there is more retrospective voting when presidents switch policies. Yet, there is
also no support for this claim, as the policy switcher dummy, interacted with each of the economic
perceptions variables, is not statistically significant. On the other hand, there is partial support
for the thesis that high clarity of responsibility increases the size of the economic vote (Powell and
Whitten ) – majority situation is statistically significant and in the expected direction when it
is interacted with economy got better, but not when it is interacted with economy got worse. Finally,
in contrast to Duch and Stevenson () and Hellwig (), there is no evidence that presidents
are held less accountable for the economy when elections take place in contexts of higher exposure
to global economic forces. Trade dependence is not statistically significant when it is interacted with
economic perceptions.
Model  examines the hypothesised impact of candidate type on performance-based voting, using
presidential approval as the measure of government performance (economic perceptions are included
as a control variable). 
e economic evaluations coefficients are statistically significant and in the
expected direction. 
e main effect for the presidential approval variable is positively signed and
statistically significant at the  percent level, suggesting that voters identify non-successors only
marginally with the performance of the president. More importantly, the coefficients on successor
and re-running president, when interacted with presidential approval, are in the expected direction
and statistically significant at the five and one percent levels, respectively. 
is is consistent with
H and H: Re-running presidents are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than successors and
non-successors, while successors are held to greater account than non-successors. Model  also

is may reflect the declining prevalence of policy switching in my sample (only five cases).

    
accounts for the other contextual variables. However, none of these variables, when interacted with
presidential approval reach statistical significance at the five percent level.

e panel on the right in Figure  shows predicted probabilities based on Model . 
e line for
re-running presidents is clearly the steepest, while the line for successor candidates is steeper than
that of non-successors. Re-running presidents get on average  percent more votes than successors,
and  percent more than non-successors when voters approve of the president.
Summary of Results

e evidence provided in this section is consistent with the main prediction of this study: 
e type
of candidate has an effect on the magnitude of the performance-based vote. Electoral accountabil-
ity is highest when presidents re-run. In cases in which the incumbent does not seek re-election,
successors are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than non-successors. Regarding the other con-
textual variables, there is only partial evidence that the majority status of the government explains
differences in the magnitude of the economic vote.
    
In this section I address two threats to causal inference: Reverse causation and omitted variable bias.
Reverse Causation
Retrospective voting models usually treat economic evaluations or government approval as exoge-
nous with the implicit assumption that they reflect some objective measure of government perfor-
mance. However, in recent years scholars have raised the concern that voters’ political preferences
may influence their perception of government performance depending on whether a co-partisan is
in power (Duch et al. ; Evans and Anderson ; Zaller ; Stanig ). If evaluations
of the government are not exogenous to party support, vote choice is potentially contaminated by
problems of reverse causation. 
is could inflate or dampen the magnitude of the performance-
based vote (Duch and Stevenson ), which in the context of this study would mean that no

    
clear conclusions can be drawn about overall or average levels of retrospective voting (Fisher and
Hobolt ).
Yet, even if government evaluations are to a certain extent endogenous, it remains possible to
make inferences about the micro-macro interaction terms found in my models. However, there
are two different interpretations to these interactions. Fisher and Hobolt (: ) hold that
“[i]f the association between government evaluations and vote choice appears to be conditioned
by a macro variable, it either means [. . . ] that the strength of retrospective voting is affected by
the macro variable, or that people’s partisanship affects their evaluations of government differently
according to the level of the macro variable.” In the case of this study, this means that either
performance-based voting is weaker when the candidate is a non-successor, or voters’ partisanship
or personal affinity with the president affects their evaluations of the government less when the
candidate is weakly connected to the president. Either way, my results indicate that voters assign
different levels of importance to government performance depending on the type of candidate. For
clarity of exposition, I follow Fisher and Hobolt in reporting and discussing my findings in terms
of the direct interpretation.
While the political bias in retrospective evaluations has received most attention in the literature,
there also are two ‘second order’ concerns with reverse causation in this study. 
e first concern
is that the (expected) incumbent vote may cause the type of candidate and not the other way
around. 
is would be the case if successors (non-successors) are only nominated when the outgoing
president is positively (negatively) evaluated or if only presidents who expect to win re-election
decide to re-run. 
e second concern is that the institution of re-election may be endogenous
to the performance of the president. Ten out of  presidents in my dataset were able to re-run
only after passing constitutional reform to allow immediate re-election. 
e process of changing
the constitution may focus the public’s attention on the president’s record, increasing the overall
salience of the economy.
First, I address whether the nomination of a successor or a non-successor is endogenous to the
popularity of the president and to the evaluations of the economy. Table  shows average economic
evaluations and levels of presidential approval in cases in which presidential candidates are successors
and cases in which they are non-successors. 
e differences are negligible. Economic evaluations
are slightly better in election years with successors – the difference lies in the lower proportion

ese presidents were Carlos Menem (Argentina), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Fernando H. Cardoso (Brazil), Álvaro
Uribe (Colombia), Hipólito Mejía (Dominican Republic), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), Alberto
Fujimori (Peru) and Hugo Chávez (Venezuela, twice).

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Table : Economic Evaluations and Presidential Approval (In Percentages)
Successors Non-successors
Economy improves . .
Economy stays the same . .
Economy deteriorates . .
Presidential approval . .
Number of cases  
of respondents who think the economy deteriorates – while the percentage of respondents who
approve of the government is actually higher in election years with non-successors –  against
. percent.
In addition I run a series of logistic regressions on the  cases in which there is no incumbent
president re-running. 
e dependent variable is a dummy coded  if the candidate is a successor
( cases), and  if she is a non-successor ( cases). Models  and  in Table  have only one
predictor, economic evaluations, measured as the percentage of respondents in each country who
think the economy has improved, and the percentage of respondents who believe the economy has
deteriorated in the previous year. 
e coefficients are not statistically significant, suggesting that
economic evaluations do not predict whether a candidate is a successor or not.
Models  and  include further economic and political controls. 
e aggregate-level economic
controls are election year GDP growth per capita, change in the percentage of unemployed, and the log of
the inflation rate. 
e political controls are party system fragmentation, whether a primary is scheduled
to nominate the presidential candidate, whether the incumbent party is a personalist vehicle, the
age of the incumbent party, and the level of institutionalisation of the party system – measured as the
average age of all parties that gained more than  percent of the vote in the previous election.
None of the additional controls in these models achieve statistical significance.
Second, I look at potential endogeneity problems in the decision to run for re-election. When
the economy is underperforming, presidents may anticipate a defeat and may choose not to re-run.

ere is, however, no evidence of such calculations taking place. In fact, incumbent candidates like
Menem in Argentina, Cardoso in Brazil, and Mejía in the Dominican Republic re-ran in the midst
of severe economic crises. 
e only president in the dataset who chose not to seek another term
Appendix  explains how personalism is conceptualised and coded.
Mainwaring and Scully () and Roberts and Wibbels () have used this measure of party system institution-
alisation in previous studies.

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despite being allowed to do so by the constitutional arrangements already in place is the Argentine
Néstor Kirchner, who according to all indications would have been easily re-elected in .

ird, I address concerns regarding the endogeneity of the re-election institution. Ten out of
 presidents in this study were only allowed to re-run after passing a constitutional reform in
their first terms. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which poorly performing presidents would
have been able to pass such reforms. Since institutions in Latin America are generally fluid, most
popular presidents could have attempted to change the constitution in order to re-run. Moreover,
after  – the year in which my dataset begins – Latin American presidents could look back at
the examples of Fujimori and Menem, who had been successful in passing reform and achieving
re-election. Why would other popular or well-performing presidents not follow the same course of
action?
I first address this problem by testing whether constitutional reform is endogenous to economic
evaluations. In Table , I run logistic regressions on the  cases in which the constitutional rules
previously in place did not allow presidents to seek another term. 
e dependent variable is the
dummy re-run after reform which takes the value of  for presidents who re-run after changing their
constitutions, and  for presidents who pass no reform and do not re-run (no president changes
the constitution and later does not re-run). 
e predictors in Models  and  are average economic
evaluations for all but the last year of a term-limited presidency – i.e. the percentage of survey
respondents who think that the economy has improved in the previous year, and the percentage
of respondents who think it has deteriorated – as well as the personalism dummy. I assume that
constitutional reform will not be initiated in the last year of a presidential term, due to the proximity
to the next election. Models  and  include one further economic control – per capita GDP
growth – and one additional political control – the majority status of the president’s party.
Results in Models  and  show that economic evaluations up to the last year of a presidential
term do predict constitutional change, as positive economic evaluations are associated with constitu-
tional change at the five percent level of significance – negative economic evaluations is statistically
significant at the ten percent level in Model . 
e party-level control is statistically significant
and positive in Model  (at the ten percent level), and in Models  and  (at the  percent level of
Argentina had experienced a GDP growth of . percent in the year of the election, and Kirchner’s approval rating
was at  percent two months before the election.

ere is no individual-level data available for the first years of Menem’s (-), Mejía’s (-), and
Fujimori’s (-) first terms. As a result, the number of observations is reduced to .

is is not an unrealistic assumption. No president in my dataset attempts to change the constitution in the last
year of her presidency.

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significance). 
is suggests that presidents from personalistic vehicles have an easier time changing
their constitutions. 
is is not surprising considering the fact that outsider politicians have been
particularly successful in changing their countries’ institutional settings through plebiscitarian poli-
tics (Philip and Panizza ). None of the additional controls in any of the models reach statistical
significance.

e fact that presidents who perform well at the beginning of their terms are better positioned to
pass constitutional reform does not mean that they should also be significantly better evaluated by
the time the following election arrives. Most of them pass constitutional reforms up to two years
before running for re-election, which leaves enough time for the economic situation to change
before the next election. In fact, former Dominican president Hipólito Mejía was able to change
the constitution after a strong showing in a mid-term legislative election in , only to lose his
re-election attempt by a landslide two years later in the midst of a severe recession (Sagás ).

e models in Table  show that in the last year of their terms, presidents who change their
constitutions to run for re-election are not significantly better evaluated than presidents who do
not pass such reforms. 
e dependent variable is once again the dummy re-run after reform and
the predictors are economic perceptions and per capita GDP on the year of the election, along with
the other two political controls from Table . 
is time, economic evaluations are not statistically
significant, while personalism remains positively signed and significant.

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Having established that in the last year of their terms, presidents who change the law to re-run
are not significantly better evaluated than presidents who do not make such changes, I investigate
whether incumbent presidents who re-run after a constitutional reform are subject to different levels
of performance-based voting than presidents who do not need to pass reform in order to re-run. I re-
estimate the models from Table  adding a fourth category to the type of candidate variable for cases
in which presidents re-run after a constitutional change. Model  in Table  reports interactions of
the four different types of candidates with economic evaluations, while Model  reports interactions
of the four types of candidates with presidential approval. In both models, the baseline performance
indicator is for an incumbent president who seeks re-election without changing the constitution.

e baseline performance variables when interacted with constitutional change are not statistically
significant in either model. 
is provides evidence that incumbent presidents who change their
constitutions to re-run are not held more accountable than presidents who do not need to make
such changes to run again.
To provide an additional robustness check, I re-estimate the models from Table  only taking
into account the six presidents that would have been allowed to re-run by the constitutional rules
already in place – i.e. Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández in Argentina, Lula in Brazil, Leonel
Fernández in the Dominican Republic, Alberto Fujimori in Peru (for his third term), and Hugo
Chávez in Venezuela (also for his third term). Since Kirchner did not seek a second term in Ar-
gentina in , Models  and  in Table  repeat the full multi-level models from Table  with
only five re-running presidents instead of . 
e substantive results do not change. Models 
and  show that government performance still matters more when presidents re-run and when the
candidate of the incumbent party is a successor rather than a non-successor. 
is suggests that the
main findings hold, assuming that institutions such as term limits are exogenous and presidents
cannot change them for their own advantage.
Omitted Variables
Omitted variable bias occurs when an omitted variable is a determinant of the dependent variable
and is also correlated with one or more of the predictors. To rule out the possibility that an omitted
variable could be causing the relationship between candidate type, economic evaluations and the
incumbent vote, the models estimated in Table  are repeated with additional controls for various
features of the political system and the economic context. Personalism, age of incumbent party,

    
party system institutionalisation, and coalition are four features of the political system that may be
correlated with the type of candidate, while also explaining the incumbent vote (see Appendix  for
a codebook). Since incumbent presidents leading personalist vehicles and/or recently established
parties are less likely to face intra-party opposition, they may be in a better position to either change
the constitution to run for a consecutive term, or to impose the nomination of a successor candidate.
In a similar way, due to the absence of consolidated parties capable of putting a stop to their re-
election attempts, incumbent presidents in weakly institutionalised party systems may be more
successful in their attempts to change the constitutional rules to re-run. In addition, incumbent
presidents may not be able to secure the nomination of a successor if their parties are in a coalition
and, as a result, have to cede the presidential nomination to one of the coalition partners. Finally,
three features of the economic context – per capita GDP growth, change in unemployment, and the
log of the inflation rate in the year of the election – are expected to be correlated with economic
evaluations.
Table : Main Effects with Additional Controls
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Economy Better . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Successor . (.) .
Economy Better*Re-running President . (.) .
Economy Worse -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Successor -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Re-running President -. (.) .
Presidential Approval . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Successor . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Re-running President . (.) .
Successor . (.) . . (.) .
Re-standing President . (.) . . (.) .
Intercept -. (.) . -. (.) .
σIntercept . .
σEconomyBetter . .
σEconomyWorse . .
σPresidentialApproval .
Number of observations  
Number of elections  
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To examine how these contextual variables condition individual-level voting behaviour, I interact
the various features of the political system with the individual-level measures of government per-
formance. I also include interaction terms for the aggregate-level economic controls and the type
of candidate. Table  presents the results of these models. 
e coefficients on the interactions
between candidate type and individual-level government performance are essentially unaffected by the
addition of these new variables – they remain in the same direction, are statistically significant, and
are very close to the values reported in Table .
   
A central claim of democratic theory is that democracy induces governments to be responsive to
the preferences of the people. In modern representative democracies, governments are responsive
because they are elected, and citizens exert influence over policy makers by holding them electorally
accountable. Since political parties structure elections in most democracies, observers claim that
voters sanction incumbent parties collectively for the performance of the government. 
is view
of elections has become the dominant model of electoral accountability and has remained virtually
unchallenged for over  years.

is study contests the notion of collective party responsibility. It develops a framework of
executive accountability, in which voters use the candidate’s identity to assign responsibility for
government performance. Voters assign more responsibility for the executive’s past actions if the
candidate is closely linked to the policy outcomes of the outgoing government. Empirically, the
paper focuses on presidential elections in Latin America between  and . 
e results show,
first, that re-running presidents are subject to higher levels of electoral sanctioning than successors
– i.e. political allies of the outgoing president – and non-successors – i.e. party-internal opponents
of the outgoing president. Second, they demonstrate that successors are held more accountable for
the performance of the government than non-successors.
Figure  displayed a graphic illustration of the main results. 
e slope for non-successors can
be interpreted as the lower bound of party accountability, i.e. accountability associated with the
party brand. 
e fact that this slope is not statistically significantly different from zero for positive
economic evaluations suggests that when the economy is performing well, voters do not give credit to
candidates without close ties to the executive. 
e slope for successors represents the upper bound
Appendix  includes a table with the output for all the additional covariates.
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of party accountability, and the lower bound of individual accountability, while the slope for re-
running presidents represents the upper bound of individual accountability. When a president
runs for a consecutive term, her individual performance contributes to the accountability equation.
In sum, the differences between the three slopes, and in particular between the slopes for successors
and non-successors, confirm that voters do not hold incumbent parties collectively responsible for
the performance of the government.
Taken together, these findings have important implications for our understanding of electoral
accountability. 
e results suggest that presidents’ reputations are not equally transferred to all the
presidential candidates of the incumbent party or coalition. 
us, even if Samuels (: ) was
right, and presidents always tried “to convince voters that they share a personal and political affinity
with their successor-candidate,” at the very least, the results of this study show that presidents are
not always equally effective in convincing voters of this affinity. Voters clearly consider whether
candidates have close ties to the outgoing president, and take these ties into account when deciding
their vote. Furthermore, the fact that different types of candidates are subject to different levels of
performance-based voting is indicative of voters’ sophistication. It suggests that voters are attentive
to intra-party dynamics and, in particular, to the cues they receive from party leaders and the media.

is is true even in Latin America, where voters have been described as poorly informed (Carreras
).

e results presented in this study also indicate that voters do not attribute responsibility for
good and bad economic evaluations in equivalent ways: Voters punish all three types of candidates
– even non-successors, to some degree – when they perceive deteriorating economic conditions, but
only reward successors and re-running presidents when their evaluations of the state of the economy
improve. 
is finding is consistent with previous literature that identifies a cognitive phenomenon
called “negativity bias,” by which individuals react more to negative than to positive stimuli of
similar magnitude (Taylor ; Baumeister et al. ). Along these lines, Stanig () shows
that retrospective evaluations respond to economic downturns more strongly than to recoveries. In
downturns, citizens of different ideological persuasions and partisan affiliations tend to agree that
the economy is underperforming, while in recoveries, evaluations are polarised along partisan and
ideological lines.

e foregoing analysis suggests that voters’ evaluations of the economy and assessments of how
good a job the president has done are not fully equivalent measures of ‘government performance.’
Voters hold incumbent parties in majority situations more accountable for the economy, but only
marginally for the perceived performance of the president. 
is suggests that the context in which
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elections take place matters more when the measure of government performance is economic evalu-
ations, than when it is presidential approval. Why this is the case is not fully clear and leaves room
for further research. However, one hypothesis comes to mind. It is likely that many voters approve
of the president for reasons that are not directly associated with the policy performance of the gov-
ernment, but with other characteristics, like the president’s charisma, or whether her party hands
out particularistic benefits (Stokes ). For these voters, the political context in which elections
take place may not matter as much as for voters concerned with the actual policy performance of
the government. 
e latter may better understand the complexities of politics, and may therefore
consider that presidents who have less political control over economic policies – e.g. because their
party is in a minority in the legislature – cannot be held equally accountable as presidents who have
more discretion over the policies that their governments can implement.

e results of this paper also have direct implications for the debate about the advantages of
allowing presidents to run for consecutive terms (Carey ). I show that the re-election rule is
an important tool for enhancing electoral sanctioning. As long as elections are not conducted in
an “uneven playing field” (Levitsky and Way a), the advantages of allowing presidents to run
for re-election seem to be clear on normative grounds. 
us, if the re-election provision enhances
accountability when used in the right context, we should start thinking about the stage in the
process of democratic consolidation at which a country can start contemplating its introduction.
To conclude, regarding the external validity of the findings presented in this study, it needs to
be pointed out that because presidential candidates campaign and are elected separately from the
legislature, presidentialism may provide additional incentives for voters to hold individual politi-
cians accountable independently from their parties (Samuels and Shugart ; Wiesehomeier and
Benoit ). Moreover, Latin America is a region in which several party systems are weak (Main-
waring and Scully ; Mainwaring et al. ) and individual politicians are very influential.
Yet, there are no theoretical reasons to expect that the connection between the outgoing head of
government and the candidate of the incumbent party would not matter for electoral accountabil-
ity in parliamentary and mixed democracies as well. In fact, as suggested in the introduction, case
studies of consolidated parliamentary democracies such as the United Kingdom and Canada find
that leader images have an impact on the vote independently of party images (Andersen and Evans
; Johnston ). 
us, if voters in established parliamentary systems also take candidate-
level factors into account when casting a vote, it is likely that they will assign responsibility for past
performance differently depending on the identity of the candidate of the incumbent party.

2
T H E E F F E C T O F E N D O R S E M E N T S O N E L E C T O R A L
A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y : A S U R V E Y E X P E R I M E N T

Do endorsements from incumbent politicians to co-partisans lead to more electoral accountability
for the performance of the government? To answer this question, I use a randomised experiment
embedded in a national survey conducted two days before the  Mexican general election to
examine the effect of endorsements by the outgoing president Felipe Calderón to the Senate can-
didates of his Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). My results show that voters who do not identify
with the PAN hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the performance of the gov-
ernment. In contrast, among voters who identify with the incumbent party, the vote for the PAN
Senate candidates is more tightly linked to the performance of the president when voters are ex-
posed to the Calderón endorsement than when they are not. I improve on the current standing
of the accountability literature by showing that the relationship between an outgoing politician
and the candidates of his party matters for electoral accountability. My results imply that during
election campaigns, the strategic decisions of incumbent politicians have an effect on how voters
assign responsibility: By nominating candidates without close ties to the endorser in cases of weak
government performance, parties can use nominations strategically to diffuse responsibility.



In election campaigns, do prominent incumbent politicians transfer their reputation to all co-
partisans in the same way, or do voters associate them more with certain candidates than others?

is question is central to our understanding of democratic accountability. Yet, most economic vot-
ing studies assume that voters hold incumbent parties collectively responsible for the performance of
the government, without accounting for the possibility that some candidates may be more closely
associated with the reputation of incumbent politicians than others (Key ; Fiorina ; Erik-
son ; Powell and Whitten ; Hibbs ). As a result, we lack a clear understanding of
whether collective party responsibility exclusively dominates the accountability process, or whether
individual reputations also shape how voters reward and punish incumbents.
A good way of uncovering whether individual reputations are transferred more to certain politi-
cians is investigating whether endorsements from incumbents to co-partisans increase electoral ac-
countability for government performance. 
ere are very good reasons to think that endorsements
affect how voters reward and punish incumbents. First, endorsements are a common feature of
election campaigns, and incumbent politicians often endorse co-partisans running for lower-level
offices. Given that the former already have a trajectory in government upon which voters can eval-
uate them, it is reasonable to think that incumbent parties are held more electorally accountable
when candidates are endorsed than when they are not. I call this the “accountability effect” of
endorsements.
Second, democracies around the world – both presidential and parliamentary – have become
more personalised in recent years. 
e comparative party literature has devoted considerable atten-
tion to identifying (Wattenberg ; Poguntke and Webb ) and explaining (McAllister ;
Rahat and Sheafer ; Dalton and Wattenberg ) the “personalisation of politics.” According
to these studies, voters are attentive to leaders’ characteristics in addition to (Andersen and Evans
; Johnston ), or even as a substitute of party platforms (Manin ). Not surprisingly,
In the words of the  report of the American Political Science Association, collective party responsibility means
“that parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves,” and that voters hold parties as a whole
accountable for the policies they implement (APSA : ).
By incumbent party, I mean the party of the endorsing politician – i.e. the president in this study.

ere are two underlying mechanisms to this. First, voters exposed to an endorsement are likely to associate the
candidates of the incumbent party to the actual past performance of the endorsing politician. In addition, endorsements
inform voters about the policy preferences of the candidates by signalling that their preferences coincide with those of
the endorser, and thus suggest that they will adopt similar policies if elected. In both cases, endorsements increase the
impact of the performance-based vote.


leaders’ characteristics and attitudes shape public opinion more during election campaigns than at
any other point during the electoral cycle (Barisione ). If voters indeed follow leaders’ cues, as
this literature suggests, it is likely that they are responsive to leaders’ endorsements of co-partisans.

us, the increasing personalisation of politics in all democracies suggests that voters are influenced
by whether candidates have close ties to the leader or not.
Endorsements provide voters with very specific information about the distribution of power
within a party: 
ey signal that the faction of the endorser has a hold over candidates’ nominations.

is information is likely to have different implications for voters who do and voters who do not
identify with the incumbent party. 
e former are likely to be more aware and care more about
the differences between the factions of their own party. As a result, they may want to hold these
factions accountable in different ways, and endorsements may allow them to do so. In contrast,
voters who identify with other parties may not be informed or may simply not care about intra-
party differences in the incumbent party. 
ey may be more likely to hold the incumbent party
collectively accountable for the performance of the government. Given these expectations, this
study also investigates the different effects of endorsements among voters who do and do not identify
with the party of the endorsing politician.
I use a randomised experiment embedded in a national survey conducted two days before the
 Mexican general election to examine the effect of endorsements by the outgoing president
Felipe Calderón to the Senate candidates of his Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). My results show
that voters who identify with the PAN assign responsibility for past performance in a different way
than voters who do not identify with the incumbent party. 
e latter hold the incumbent party
collectively accountable for the performance of the government, whereas among panistas, the vote
for the PAN Senate candidates is more tightly linked to the perception of the performance of the
president when voters are exposed to the Calderón endorsement than when they are not.

is study improves on the current standing of the accountability literature by showing how the
relationship between an incumbent politician and the candidates of his party matters for electoral
accountability. In particular, my findings reveal that the magnitude of the performance-based vote
depends, albeit to a limited extent, on the identity of the candidates, i.e. whether they are endorsed
or not. 
is implies that during election campaigns, the strategic decisions of incumbent politicians
have an effect on how voters assign responsibility. By nominating candidates without close ties to
the endorser in cases of weak government performance, parties can use nominations strategically
to diffuse responsibility for their past actions.

   

e findings of this study are of particular importance in contexts of term limits. 
e results
suggest that in the absence of re-election, endorsements can compensate – in part at least – for the
individual accountability effect that is lost due to an incumbent not re-running (Campbell et al.
). 
is is because the performance in office of a term-limited incumbent affects the success of
candidates she endorses in future elections. In other words, the reputation of an outgoing politician
is transferred more to the co-partisans she endorses. 
is process may be conceptualised as an
“indirect accountability effect,” in the sense that it operates not on the incumbent’s own electoral
success but on the success of endorsed candidates.
Conducting a survey experiment in the course of a general election campaign had one key advan-
tage: Since cues are not expected to shape public opinion on straightforward issues and in contexts
of high information such as a general election campaign (Druckman ; Kam ), any results
identifying an accountability effect of endorsements are particularly significant, because they arise
in a scenario in which such effects are least likely. Conducting an experiment among voters who
were not aware that they were subjects in this experiment allowed me to maintain the internal valid-
ity of laboratory experiments that also study endorsements (Lau and Redlawsk ; ), while
examining behaviour in a real setting (Arceneaux and Kolodny ).

e remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
e next section discusses the literature on
source cues and draws on studies of political persuasion to develop three competing claims that
are later tested in the empirical section. I then describe and present the results of the experiment,
and address alternative explanations. I conclude with a summary of the findings, and with some
suggestions for further research.
   
A large body of literature going at least as far back as 
e American Voter shows that citizens have, on
average, minimal knowledge of, and interest in, politics (Campbell et al. ; Sniderman ;
Lewis-Beck et al. ). 
is finding is not exclusive to American politics: In contexts as different
as Latin America and Europe, the public has also been described as poorly informed about poli-
tics (Carreras ; Reif and Schmitt ). In the last two decades, scholars studying political
behaviour have examined the cognitive processes and efficiency mechanisms that help citizens to
reduce the complexity of evaluating politics (Mondak a; Druckman et al. ; Kam and
Utych ). 
ese studies show that a lack of knowledge about politics does not preclude citizens

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from making reasoned choices (Popkin ; Lupia and McCubbins ), as they may use in-
formation shortcuts or heuristics, including endorsements, to compensate for information deficits
(Nicholson ; Sniderman et al. ; Lupia and McCubbins ).
A heuristic or cue is “a piece of information that allows individuals to make inferences without
drawing on more detailed knowledge” (Druckman et al. : ). In judging either policies or
candidates, citizens can use the statements of politicians that they trust as cues (Mondak a).
Alternatively, “they can consider the positions of interest groups whose policy preferences they are
generally inclined to support or oppose” (Kuklinski and Quirk : ). In short, they can use
endorsements to make reasoned choices without having to acquire deep knowledge of the issue
at hand. 
ere is ample empirical support in the literature for the notion that source cues – the
political actors behind an issue – shape public opinion (Nicholson ; Arceneaux and Kolodny
; Arceneaux ; Boudreau ; Kam , Lupia ; Mondak a, b; Lau and
Redlawsk ).
In recent years, the literature on source cues has made important steps in identifying the condi-
tions under which heuristics cause opinion change. Source cues have greater potential for opinion
change on difficult or unfamiliar issues (Mondak b), in situations of increased partisan polar-
isation (Druckman et al. ), and when citizens are unsophisticated (Boudreau ). While
we are now confident about who can give or receive which cues and when (Boudreau ), some
important aspects about how source cues shape public opinion remain understudied. One such
aspect is the effect that endorsements have on electoral accountability for policy outcomes.

is omission in the literature is surprising given that endorsements are a common feature of pol-
itics. Perhaps in no other context are endorsements more relevant than during election campaigns,
where candidates receive endorsements from other politicians, interest groups (Bowler and Dono-
van ; Lupia ), and media outlets (Turner ; Ansolabehere et al. ). Regardless
of who is the source cue, endorsements have one thing in common: 
e attempt to use a source’s
reputation to successfully change citizens’ attitudes or behaviour. As Arceneaux and Kolodny (:
) suggest, whether a candidate “has the backing of trusted political groups may communicate
just as much about the candidate’s issue positions and job qualifications as an in-depth study of all
available information.”
While a few studies examine whether endorsements diminish or enhance accountability for policy positions (Lupia
; Arceneaux ), the existing literature does not explicitly address the effects of endorsements on accountability
for policy outcomes.

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In the following, I derive two different sets of claims from the social psychology literature about
how endorsements affect performance-based voting. 
e first one focuses on the general account-
ability effect of endorsements, regardless of partisanship, and suggests two contrasting arguments,
namely that endorsements do and do not have an accountability effect. 
e second set of claims
takes into consideration the different effects of endorsements among voters who identify with the
party of the source cue, and voters who do not identify with the incumbent party.

e argument suggesting that endorsements increase the performance-based vote draws from
studies in the tradition of the Yale communication programme, which argue that a group of variables
relating to the characteristics of the source have great implications for whether the audience accepts
a message or not (Janis and Hovland ). Along this line, Brady and Sniderman () argue that
citizens use a likability heuristic to estimate the ideological positions of political groups, following
the cues of the groups they like, and rejecting the cues of the groups they do not like. Lupia and
McCubbins () focus on knowledgeability and trustworthiness, and show that citizens follow
the advice of speakers whom they perceive to have these characteristics, while ignoring the advice
of sources who lack them.
Based on these theories and findings, one can argue that past government performance operates
in a way similar to the likability heuristic or trustworthiness: Voters follow the source cue more
when they approve of her performance, and reject it more when they do not approve of her record
in office. 
is implies that persuasion plays an important role in electoral accountability. Voters
who have higher levels of approval for the source are persuaded to vote for the incumbent party,
while message recipients who do not approve of the source are not.
In contrast, other scholars claim that the public is not so easily persuaded, and that there are
limits to the ability of source cues to move public opinion (Nicholson ). 
is line of re-
search argues that endorsements only cause opinion change under particular circumstances, re-
gardless of the source’s likability, trustworthiness or past performance. According to these studies,
source cues are only effective in shaping public opinion about difficult or unfamiliar issues (Mondak
b), and in contexts of low political awareness (Kam ; Arceneaux and Kolodny ), i.e.
the means-oriented, technical and low-salience “hard issues” identified by Carmines and Stimson
(). 
ese contrast the high-salience ends-oriented “easy issues” that are easier for citizens to
comprehend, and for which source cues are not expected to be effective. 
e vote in a national
Lupia and McCubbins (: ) define persuasion as “one person’s attempt to change the beliefs of another.”

e idea that the effectiveness of source cues depends on the complexity or difficulty of an issue is consistent with
theories of social and cognitive psychology. 
ese theories propose two types of information processing: One less arduous

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election fits the description of an “easy issue.” In sum, this stream of the persuasion literature sug-
gests that source cues neither shape public opinion, nor have an electoral accountability effect in
general elections.
With regards to the differential effects of partisanship, the social psychology literature suggests a
third perspective about the effect of endorsements on electoral accountability. Endorsements may
not have a homogenous accountability effect. In particular, in-party source cues may cause opinion
change, but out-party source cues may not. For voters who identify with the party of the source, the
incumbent vote may be more tightly linked to the source cue’s past performance in cases in which
the candidates of the incumbent party are endorsed than in cases in which they are not. However,
the same does not necesarily apply to voters who do not identify with the party of the source. 
ese
voters may simply hold the incumbent party collectively accountable.
Two different but related mechanisms could explain these heterogeneous accountability effects.

e first one is related to how people view in- and out-groups. Research shows that individuals view
their own group as holding diverse opinions on different issues, but view out-groups as holding
homogeneous opinions (Quattrone ; Quattrone and Jones ). Based on this research, a
voter who does not identify with the party of the source cue may think that everyone in the out-
groups holds the same opinions, and may therefore hold the incumbent party accountable as a
whole. In contrast, a voter who identifies with the party of the source cue may think that there are
diverse views on key issues within her party. A statement of support by an incumbent politician
may signal to her that the endorsed candidates are associated with the views held by the source cue.
As a result, depending on her level of approval for the source cue, she may be more persuaded to
vote for the incumbent party.

e second mechanism is linked to the fact that different groups of voters may have different
levels of information about and interest in the intra-party politics of the incumbent party. Voters
who do not identify with the party of the source cue are likely to be less informed and care less about
the differences between factions and the role that they played in shaping policies for the out-party.
As a result, the fact that some candidates are endorsed may not carry any weight. On the contrary,
partisans of the source cue may not only view their own group as holding diverse opinions, but may
also be more informed and care more about what the different individuals and factions within their
relying on heuristics, and one more demanding requiring deep engagement of an issue (Chaiken et al. ; Petty and
Cacioppo ). Systematic processing requires individuals “to look beyond easily-processed information (such as source
cues) and take the cognitive effort to interpret harder-to-process information, such as arguments that resonate with issue-
relevant values” (Kam : ). Heuristic processing, on the contrary, is cognitively less demanding, largely ignoring
the content of a message, relying instead on rules of thumb such as cues.

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own party stand for and the role that they played in shaping policy. If exposed to an endorsement,
they may want to hold their party more accountable for the performance of the government.

e second mechanism suggests that endorsements are activated as accountability mechanisms
among voters who are more informed about the intra-party politics of the incumbent party. 
is
stands in contrast to most of the literature on heuristics, which as suggested above, argues that
cues are more effective in causing opinion change among unsophisticated citizens. It is, however,
worth noting that there are dissenting views in this literature. Chaiken et al. () argue that
an information shortcut can only be effective and efficient if it is both accessible and activated in
the individual’s mind. Without the contextual information to gauge the political implications of a
particular heuristic, individuals are not better off receiving than not receiving a cue (Zaller ;
Lau and Redlawsk ).

e following section provides a brief overview of the Mexican political system and of the 
general election. 
e subsequent section describes the experiment and shows that the patterns in
the responses of the subjects are consistent with the claim that endorsements have an accountability
effect only among respondents who identify with the party of the incumbent president.
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Mexico is a federal presidential republic consisting of  states and a federal district. 
e president
– elected by plurality rule – and the senators serve six-year terms, while members of the lower
house – the Chamber of Deputies – serve three-year periods. 
e rules governing parliamentary
elections are different in each chamber. 
e lower house has  members,  of whom are elected
in single-member districts by plurality, with the remaining  members elected by proportional
representation in five regional constituencies. 
e upper house elects  members,  of whom
are in three-seat districts, and  in a nationwide PR-list. A particularity of the Mexican political
system is that immediate re-election is prohibited at all levels.
In contrast to other Latin American party systems, which have experienced a process of partisan
dealignment (Mainwaring and Scully ; Mainwaring et al. ), and have seen political out-
siders rise to prominence in recent years (Carreras ), the three main Mexican parties have been

e lower house is renewed entirely at the midpoint of the presidential term.
In the state constituencies two seats are awarded to the plurality winner and one to the first runner-up.
Members of parliament, governors, and mayors can run for re-election after sitting one term. Presidents are not
allowed to ever run again after serving one term.

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able to monopolise political power at all levels. Together, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI), the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD)
ruled every single state government, and controlled  percent of all lower and upper house seats at
the time of the  general election. In addition, the levels of party identification have remained
constant across time and well above the Latin American average (Medina Vidal et al. ). As
Table  shows, the number of Mexicans who identify with a party has oscillated between  and
 percent in the last two decades. 
ese numbers are similar to those of other OECD countries.
Table : Party Identification in Mexico, – (In Percent)
Year PRI PAN PRD Other Independents N
      
      
      
      
      
      
Average     
Sources: Medina Vidal et al. (), Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica

e  electoral contest was the third free and fair general election since the  electoral
reform that granted independence to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Until that year, the
authoritarian PRI was a hegemonic force, and the Mexican political system was characterised as
one of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way b). Under this system, other parties,
such as the main opposition party PAN, were allowed to compete in elections and even win a
few seats in parliament. 
e PRI, however, won every meaningful election, often by engaging
in electoral fraud. A second serious challenger to the PRI’s hegemony emerged in , when a
leftist faction of the party split off to form the PRD. However, it was not until  that the PRI
lost its -year monopoly over the presidency when Vicente Fox, the PAN presidential candidate,
defeated the PRI’s Francisco Labastida, by a six-point margin. Six years later, the PAN was able
to retain the presidency, in an election in which, for the first time, the PRI was not one of only two
major players.

e socially conservative and economically liberal PAN was founded in .

e PRI lost a gubernatorial election for the first time in  in the state of Baja California.

e most obvious case of vote rigging was the  general election, in which a former PRI member, Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas, was prevented from winning the presidency.

e PRI had lost its legislative majority in .

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e presidency of Felipe Calderón (–) was marked by the rise of violence originating
from the Drug War among rival cartels fighting each other and the Mexican armed forces. Accord-
ing to conservative estimates, the death toll of the Drug War was at least , for the six years of
the Calderón administration (Washington Post,  November ). Despite these dramatic figures,
the president had approval ratings of  percent at the time of the  election (Buendía y Laredo
). His administration had other accomplishments to show for: 
e Mexican economy had
rebounded strongly from the  economic crisis, growing . and . percent in  and ,
respectively (World Bank ).

e  general election was a major success for the PRI. In contrast to , when the party
nominated a representative of the old authoritarian guard, this time the party chose a member
of the “new PRI.” Enrique Peña Nieto, a former governor of the state of Mexico, ran a media-
savvy campaign that emphasised his accomplishments as governor from  to . His main
opponents were the PRD’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a former mayor of the federal district,
and Josefina Vázquez Mota, a former minister of education and PAN congressional leader. Peña
Nieto was ahead in the polls throughout the campaign, never by less than four percent, and most of
the time by double digits. On  July, he obtained . percent of the vote, ahead of López Obrador
who captured . percent, and Vázquez Mota with . percent.

e legislative election campaign followed a similar trend, with the PRI enjoying a comfortable
lead over its two main rivals in the months leading to the election. Some polls even predicted that
the PRI would win a legislative majority in at least one of the chambers. 
is, however, did not
materialise. 
e formerly authoritarian party won  of  seats in the Chamber of Deputies,
with the PAN coming in second place with  seats, and the PRD coming in third with . 
e
results were very similar in the Senate. 
e PRI was again short of a majority, capturing  of 
seats, with the PAN and PRD obtaining  and  seats, respectively.
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In order to test the three competing claims about the effect of endorsements on electoral accountabil-
ity, I embedded an experiment within a survey during the  Mexican general election campaign.

e survey was conducted face-to-face by Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica, a polling company,
In , López Obrador lost the presidency against Calderón by less than . percent. He contested the election
results and demanded a recount of all the votes. However, the electoral authorities denied a full recount and confirmed
Calderón’s victory.

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two days before the election. Between  and  respondents were interviewed in each of the 
states and the Federal District, adding up to , respondents. 
e experiment used a between-
subjects design in which respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment and a control group.
A randomisation check confirmed that the available covariates did not predict experimental assign-
ment (see Appendix ). Table  contains the specific wording used in each condition, with the
differences between conditions presented in italics.
Table : Question Wording for Experiment
Control Treatment
How likely is it that you vote for the PAN can-
didates for the Senate?
Given that President Calderón is supporting the
PAN candidates for the Senate, how likely is it
that you vote for them?
. Very likely . Very likely
. Somewhat likely . Somewhat likely
. Don’t know . Don’t know
. Not very likely . Not very likely
. Not at all likely . Not at all likely
Given that the focus of this research is on electoral accountability, I use vote intention as the
dependent variable. Subjects placed their answers to the vote intention question on a five-point
Likert scale. Respondents who answered don’t know were placed at the centre of the scale. As
Table  shows, the percentage of respondents who report to be very likely to vote for the PAN
Senate candidates is almost three points larger in the control than in the treatment group – .
against . percent. On the contrary, subjects assigned to the treatment are one and two percent
more likely to be in the somewhat likely and somewhat unlikely categories than subjects in the control
group. 
e very unlikely and don’t know categories are more balanced between treatment and control
group.

is means that two versions of the questionnaire were administered.
Scholars investigating source cues have examined a variety of dependent variables. Policy opinion is the most
common choice (Nicholson ; Nicholson ; Mondak a; Kam ; Popp and Rudolph ), but some
studies also use vote intention (Arceneaux and Kolodny ).

e results generated by this approach are consistent with those generated by the alternative strategy in which
subjects answering don’t know are left out of the analysis (see Appendix ).

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Table : Descriptive Statistics – PAN Senate Vote
Control Group Treatment Group
N Percentage N Percentage
Very likely  .  .
Somewhat likely  .  .
Don’t know  .  .
Somewhat unlikely  .  .
Very unlikely  .  .
Total    
To identify the causal effect of endorsements, respondents were randomly assigned to a control
group that received no source cue and a treatment group that received a cue indicating that president
Felipe Calderón was endorsing the list of PAN candidates for the Senate (see Table ). I chose
an incumbent politician heading an executive position to be the source cue due to my interest in
explaining how past government performance interacts with endorsements to shape public opinion.
In choosing the source cue and the politicians receiving the endorsement, I considered two other
options: A Calderón cue in favour of the PAN presidential candidate, Josefina Váquez Mota, and
the endorsement of Mexican governors to the gubernatorial candidates of their parties, in the states
that were also holding gubernatorial elections.
Ultimately, however, two reasons convinced me to rule out these alternatives. 
e first was re-
lated to the dynamics of the nomination process. At the PAN presidential primary, Calderón had
endorsed Vázquez Mota’s main rival, Ernesto Cordero. 
us, a Calderón cue in favour of Vázquez
Mota would have provided respondents with conflicting information. 
e same argument applied
to some governors whose favoured candidates had lost their parties’ nominations. 
e second rea-
son was methodological. Experiments conducted at the state level would not have provided large
enough samples to test for heterogeneous treatment effects.
To investigate whether endorsements have an accountability effect, the survey included a measure
of government performance, which I interact with the treatment. Survey respondents were asked, how
much they approved of the performance of President Felipe Calderón on a scale from  (failure)
to  (excellent). I treat this variable as continuous. In an additional test, I turn this measure

ese states were Chiapas, Mexico D.F., Guanajuato, Jalisco, Morelos, Tabasco, and Yucatán.

e overwhelming majority of the literature on retrospective voting relies on economic perceptions (e.g. Anderson
; Duch and Stevenson ; Kayser and Peress ) or objective measures of economic performance (e.g. Kramer
; Hibbs ). Recently, some studies have used a broader measure of government performance at the individual
level, which is the level of approval for the performance of the president/government (Hellwig ; Fisher and Hobolt
).

  
into a binary variable by collapsing the lower three categories –  to  – into , and the top three
categories –  to  – into . 
e results obtained from this approach are consistent with those
generated by using the continuous variable (see Appendix ).
In addition, subjects were asked about standard party identification and socio-economic items.
Eighteen percent of respondents identified with the PAN, . percent with the PRI, . percent
with the PRD, and . percent with minor parties. 
e remaining . percent described them-
selves as independents. 
e socio-economic items were gender, age, and education – the latter two
measured as continuous variables (see Appendix  for a codebook). In the survey, both the party
identification and socio-economic items were asked before the intervention – i.e. pre-treatment –
and are therefore not affected by the experimental assignment (Gerber and Green ).
  
In accordance with studies using similar experimental designs, I estimate the effects of the treat-
ment condition using regression analyses (Arceneaux ; Arceneaux and Kolodny ; Popp
and Rudolph ). I follow the approach outlined by Arceneaux () and estimate, first, a set
of linear regression models in which the continuous dependent variable is based on the five-point
Likert scale described above. For the second set of models I follow Lupia and McCubbins’ ()
approach and collapse the response variable into binary categories and estimate binary logistic re-
gression models I collapse the top two categories – very likely and somewhat likely – into , and
the lower three categories – don’t know, somewhat unlikely, and very unlikely – into . In both sets
of models, the experimental treatment is included as an independent variable, and is also interacted
with presidential approval. To account for heterogenous accountability effects among partisans and
non-partisans of the president, I analyse the data by partisan subgroups.

e models in Table  report average treatment effects (ATEs). Models  and  use the contin-
uous five-point dependent variable and estimate linear regression models, while models  and 
use the binary dependent variable and estimate logistic regression models. Each set of models is
estimated with and without the additional covariates for gender, age, and education.
In addition, I estimate the same set of models using ordered logistic regression, and the results remain in the same
direction and close to the values reported in Tables  and  (see Appendix ).
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As the coefficient and standard errors for endorsement indicates, the treatment has a negative and
statistically significant effect in all four models. Voters, in other words, are less likely to vote for
the PAN candidates when they are exposed to a Calderón endorsement. In Model , the average
respondent in the control group lies at . on the five-point Likert scale, while the average respon-
dent in the treatment condition lies at .. Predicted probabilities based on Model  show that
. percent of respondents in the control group are very likely or somewhat likely to vote for the
PAN Senate candidates, while . percent of respondents in the treatment condition are likely to
do so.
To test the proposition that presidential approval and partisanship condition the treatment effect,
I estimate conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) using presidential approval and partisan-
ship as conditioning variables. CATEs can be approached in a straightforward way by estimating
causal effects separately for different subgroups of voters and comparing them using regression. In
these models, a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of treatment as-
signment with presidential approval among voters who identify with the incumbent PAN, as well
as among non-panistas, provides evidence that endorsements have a general accountability effect.
Alternatively, a non-significant coefficient on the same interaction term among neither group (i.e.
panistas and non-panistas) indicates that endorsements do not affect electoral sanctioning. Finally,
a positive and statistically significant interaction coefficient only among panistas, provides evidence
that endorsements only have an accountability effect among partisans of the source cue.

e models in Tables  and  report the interaction effects of treatment assignment with presi-
dential approval. 
e models in Table  use the continuous dependent variable, while the models
in Table  repeat the analysis conducted in Table  using the binary dependent variable and esti-
mate logistic regression models. 
e first two models in each table report the interaction effects for
voters who identify with the incumbent PAN, while Models  and  report the same interactions
for non-panistas. As in Table , I include models with and without socio-demographic controls.
I estimate predicted probabilities using the margins command in Stata.
I re-estimate the models for non-panistas subdividing by partisanship. Priístas, prdistas, and independents do not
hold the incumbent party more accountable for the performance of the government when the Senate candidates are
endorsed than when they are not (see Appendix ).
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First, I analyse the models reported in Table . 
e coefficient on the interaction of treatment
assignment and presidential approval is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level
in Models  and , i.e. among partisans of the president. 
is suggests that, among voters who self-
identify with the incumbent party, the PAN Senate vote is more tightly linked to the performance of
the president when respondents are exposed to the Calderón treatment than when they are not. In
contrast, in Models  and , the interaction terms of treatment assignment and presidential approval
are not statistically significant at any conventional level. 
is suggests that, among non-panistas, the
incumbent vote is not more tightly linked to the performance of Calderón when the PAN Senate
candidates are endorsed. In sum, these results are consistent with the notion that endorsements
lead to more accountability for the performance of the president only among voters who identify
with the incumbent party. Table  presents the results of the analysis using the binary dependent
variable and estimating logit models. Since neither the statistical significance, nor the direction of
logit coefficients can be directly interpreted (Berry et al. ), the inferences for the logit models
are based on the predicted probabilities shown in Figure .
Figure  shows CATEs based on Model  (top left panel), and Model  (lower left panel) from
Table , and Model  (top right panel), and Model  (lower right panel) from Table . 
e slopes
in the four panels have one element in common: Subjects are responsive to the performance of
the government, irrespective of whether they are exposed to an endorsement or not, or whether
they are panistas or not. 
is suggests that voters, in general, hold the incumbent party electorally
accountable for the performance of the government, even in contexts in which the candidates of
the incumbent party have no close ties to the outgoing president. 
is is consistent with the notion
that past performance matters for the vote.

is finding has two implications: First, it indicates that there is a “minimum level” of party
accountability – i.e. accountability related to the party brand (Lupu ). 
is is because the
executive’s reputation is transferred, at least to some degree, to all the candidates of the incumbent
party, even to non-endorsed ones. Second, this result suggests that parties, even if they want to,
cannot fully avoid responsibility for their time in office by asking the president to refrain from
endorsing key candidates. Even when candidates are not closely linked to the president, the per-
formance of the government still matters to voters when deciding whether to reward or punish the
incumbent party.

e top two panels in Figure  show that endorsements provide an additional accountability
effect among respondents who identify with the PAN. 
e slopes for subjects in the treatment group

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Figure : PAN Vote by Treatment, Partisanship, and Presidential Approval
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Notes: Vote intention for endorsed and non-endorsed PAN Senate candidates among panistas and non-panistas with
different levels of presidential approval. 
e left-side panels show linear predictions of voting for the incumbent party,
while the right-side panels indicate predicted probabilities of voting for the PAN. Vertical lines with bars represent 
percent confidence intervals. Panel  is based on Model  in Table , panel  on Model  in Table , panel  on Model
 in Table , and panel  on Model  in Table .
Source: Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica.
are clearly steeper than the slopes for subjects in the control group. As the levels of approval for
President Calderón decrease, panistas exposed to an endorsement are less likely to defect their party
than panistas who are not exposed to an endorsement. Whereas the point estimates in the top level
of presidential approval are almost identical among treated and non-treated, the gap in the lowest
level of approval is wide – half a point in the Likert scale in the top left panel, and  percentage
points in the top right panel. In sum, the panels for panistas provide evidence that the intra-party
dimension matters for voters who identify with the incumbent party, i.e. they do not hold the
incumbent party collectively accountable. 
is suggests that the relationship between incumbent
politicians and the candidates of their parties has a considerable effect on electoral sanctioning.

e difference between point estimates at a level of presidential approval of  is statistically significant at the 
percent confidence level in the logit model for panistas.
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Voters who identify with the incumbent party hold their party more electorally accountable when
the outgoing president and the party’s candidates have a close connection – i.e. they are endorsed
– than when this is not the case.
In contrast, among non-panistas (lower panels), endorsements do not provide an additional ac-
countability effect. 
e slopes for treated and non-treated subjects run parallel to each other, and
the point estimates are almost identical across the presidential approval scale. 
is constitutes ev-
idence that voters who do not identify with the party of the president, hold the incumbent party
collectively accountable for the performance of the government. As suggested in the discussion of
the literature, it is likely that voters who do not identify with the party of the president, either do
not care about who turns out to be the candidates of the incumbent party, or simply do not perceive
any differences between endorsed and non-endorsed candidates.
  
In the previous section I showed that endorsements increase the magnitude of the performance-
based vote among voters who identify with the party of the president. However, one potential
problem of my framework is that I cannot randomise presidential approval. 
ere might be un-
observed factors that explain voters’ opposition to President Calderón and their responsiveness to
the endorsement. For example, there could be a type of panista voter who does not approve of
the president and is also suspicious of endorsements. 
is could be a fixed type in the population,
such that nothing the president does can affect the proportion of people like this. If this were the
case, I would obtain the same results that I displayed in the previous section, but there would be
no accountability of the kind I describe.
In Mexico a residual suspicion of handpicked candidates exists due to the country’s particular
history. 
is suspicion could, in part, explain the negative ATEs, and also the negative CATEs
identified even among panistas who approve of the president. During the years of PRI hegemony,
presidential candidates were imposed by the outgoing president (Cornelius ; Weldon ).

is practice was dubbed in the media and public opinion as dedazo, freely translated as finger-
pointing appointment. 
e dedazo was introduced in Mexican politics during the presidency of
Lázaro Cárdenas (-), and remained intact well into the s. According to Langston
(: ), it ensured regular leadership turnover in the hegemonic party, “while at the same time
creating mechanisms to limit internal conflict.” By the end of the s, this informal institution
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had lost credibility and had become highly unpopular, forcing then president Ernesto Zedillo to
call open primaries to choose the PRI presidential candidate for the  election (Langston ).
Table : Presidential Approval Among Panistas
Coefficient (Standard Errors) P>|Z|
Male -. (.) .
Education . (.) .
Income . (.) .
Age . (.) .
Intercept . (.) .
Number of Observations 
R Squared .
To demonstrate convincingly that the patterns of electoral sanctioning that I identify among
panistas are truly an accountability effect, I need to show that the degree of scepticism of endorse-
ments does not depend on the levels of approval for the president in a way that would undermine
my results. I show this in two different ways. First I characterise the voters who identify with the
party of the president so as to better understand which group of panistas approve and disapprove
of the president. I regress approval on socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, age, edu-
cation and income. 
e results displayed in Table  indicate that men are less likely to approve of
Calderón and that older people are more likely to approve of him. 
e results also show that more
educated and wealthier panistas are more likely to support the president.

e results for income and education are particularly interesting. 
e fact that less educated
and poorer panistas are more likely to disapprove of Calderón should make it more difficult to
identify the patterns of electoral accountability that I detect. If anything, less educated and poorer
voters – less likely to support the president – should be more receptive of endorsements than more
educated and richer voters. During the years of PRI hegemony in which presidential candidates
were handpicked, the PRI obtained disproportionately more votes among uneducated and poor
voters. 
is is also consistent with the literatures on clientelism and tactical spending, which suggest
that these practices are more favoured by poorer and less educated voters (Calvo and Murillo ;
Weitz-Shapiro ).
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Figure : Treatment Effect and GDP Growth
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Notes: Average treatment effects in each state – calculated as the difference between treatment and control conditions
in the state – against state-level per capita GDP growth in the quarter previous to the  election. 
e sloped line
represents the regression line, and the shaded area indicates the  percent confidence interval.
Sources: INEGI, Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica.
Second, I use state-level data to show that the levels of approval are linked to actual developments
in the economy. Given that I have a sample of between  and  respondents per state, I
can estimate the conditional treatment effect of endorsements among panistas for each of the 
states. I plot these conditional average treatment effects against state-level per capita GDP growth
in the quarter previous to the  presidential election (Figure ). 
e regression line shows that
there is a larger treatment effect in the flourishing than in the stagnating states. Given that it is
highly unlikely that panistas who are suspicious of endorsements self-select into well-performing
or stagnating states, this constitutes a second piece of evidence that the accountability effect that I
identify is performance related.
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ere is ample support among political scientists and social psychologists that source cues – the
political actors behind an issue – shape public opinion. In recent years, a wealth of research has
narrowed down the conditions under which source cues cause opinion change. However, little is
still known about the relationship between endorsements and electoral accountability. To address
this gap in the literature, this study investigated whether there is more electoral sanctioning in cases
in which the candidates of the incumbent party are endorsed than in cases in which they are not.
To answer this question, I embedded an experiment within a survey conducted two days before
the  Mexican general election. I randomly assigned respondents to a treatment condition
(an endorsement of the outgoing president to the Senate candidates of his party) and a control
group (no endorsement). My results are consistent both with the classic performance voting model,
and with the thesis that endorsements provide an additional accountability effect. Performance, in
general, guides voters’ retrospective evaluations, as voters, irrespective of party identity, were more
(less) likely to vote for the PAN Senate candidates if they approved (disapproved) of the president’s
performance. However, persuasion only has an accountability effect among voters who identify
with the party of the source cue, i.e. among panistas.
Intriguingly, the findings of this study allow for two competing, and in fact conflicting, nor-
mative interpretations. 
e existing literature favours the “responsible party government” model,
which implies that parties should always be held accountable collectively. From this point of view,
the results of this paper, i.e. that voters who identify with the party of the president punish the
incumbent party more for perceived bad performance when the candidates are endorsed, are rather
discouraging. 
ey imply that parties can use nominations strategically to avoid responsibility for
their time in office. When the economy deteriorates, they can nominate candidates who are critical
of the executive.
I suggest a more critical view of the “responsible party government” model and favour a more
flexible approach, in which the party brand matters for accountability but there is also room for vot-
ers to hold particular candidates more accountable, depending on their ties to the government. 
is
alternative model thus takes into account the notion that parties are not homogenous organisations
in which all party members are equally associated with the performance and policies advocated by
the government. From this point of view, the findings of the paper are rather encouraging – those
more closely associated with the president are held more electorally accountable. Voters who iden-
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tify with the party of the president exercise a “minimum level” of party accountability, while at the
same time holding particular politicians more accountable.

e results of this study also have implications for our understanding of the context in which
source cues shape public opinion. Research on heuristics has found that source cues play an in-
fluential role in shaping public opinion on difficult or unfamiliar issues (Nicholson ; ).
Mondak’s (b) study of judicial decisions shows that source cues do not have an effect on ques-
tions in which citizens are highly conversant. 
e literature on direct democracy has also under-
scored this point by choosing complex policy issues that voters cannot easily comprehend (Lupia
; Bowler and Donovan ). Yet, I show that source cues can also cause opinion changes on
highly salient and straightforward issues – the vote for Senate candidates – and in contexts of high
information – a general election campaign.
Given the renewed interest in the “personalisation of politics” that has emerged in recent years,
future research should investigate in more detail how the accountability effect of endorsements
varies in contexts of high and low personalisation. It is likely that endorsements have a stronger
effect in the former than in the latter. Future studies should also continue to explore the condi-
tions under which source cues matter for electoral accountability. First, it would be important
to investigate whether endorsements shape retrospective voting in presidential elections, i.e. by
randomising endorsements from the outgoing president to the presidential candidate of her party.
Second, researchers should examine how voters respond to different source cues from the incum-
bent party. For example, do endorsements from the president have a stronger accountability effect
than endorsements from a lower-level politician such as a senator or a governor?
As with all surveys, my findings capture public opinion at a particular point in time. Additional
studies should investigate whether these findings are particular to the Mexican case, or whether
they travel to other contexts. Research on source cues should continue to expand its empirical
focus to new democracies, and develop new theoretical insights based on the particularities of these
democracies. One characteristic that many developing democracies share is the weakness of political
parties, and the lack of credibility of political institutions and politicians (Randall and Svasand
; Mainwaring et al. ; Sanchez ; Doyle ). Studies might also examine how
voters respond to endorsements from politicians and from public opinion leaders without partisan
attachments. Such studies would also benefit from randomising the credibility of the source, so as
to compare politicians and public opinion leaders with and without credibility.
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We examine distributive politics in Mexico in the immediate period after its transition away from
authoritarianism (-). We find causal evidence of tactical allocation of federal funds to
aligned municipalities, and demonstrate that voters rewarded the party in the federal government
for this increase in transfers to their constituencies in the  presidential election. Using a
difference-in-difference design, we show that the party of the president allocated more funds to
municipalities that had a co-partisan as mayor in the run-up to the  election. Our evidence
indicates that these transfers were instrumental in securing the election of the presidential candidate
of the incumbent party. A simulation of the election results shows that if the federal government
had not distributed more federal grants to aligned than non-aligned municipalities, they would
have lost the election with a probability of  percent.
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e allocation of federal funds from central to subnational governments is a central concern in po-
litical economy. A vast theoretical and empirical literature has devoted considerable attention to
show how politicians use intergovernmental transfers for political gain. 
eoretical contributions
emphasise the role of office-seeking politicians in allocating federal funds tactically to increase the
probability of being re-elected (Shepsle and Weingast ; Ferejohn and Krehbiel ). Some
studies argue that politicians target funds to swing voters (Lindbeck and Weibull ; Dixit and
Londregan ), others expect them to reward core supporters (Cox and McCubbins ; Besley
and Coate ), while a third group of studies suggests that they allocate more grants to constituen-
cies ruled by members of their own party (Cox and McCubbins ).
Existing empirical studies focus mainly on the role of the U.S. Congress in delivering distributive
gains through powerful committee members (Alvarez and Saving ; Lauderdale ), and
majority party leaders (Albouy ; Levitt and Snyder ). Most inquiries into the electoral
consequences of federal spending look at the re-election prospects of legislators, primarily but not
exclusively (Calvo and Murillo ) in the U.S. context (Levitt and Snyder ; Lazarus and
Reilly ). In contrast, we focus on the role of the president in distributive politics, and study the
case of the first post-transition presidential election in Mexico. Our main contribution is empirical:
We provide causal evidence that the government of Vicente Fox (-) targeted federal funds
tactically towards municipalities controlled by the incumbent Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), and
that these federal funds helped the PAN retain the presidency in .
While most accounts of distributive politics focus on established liberal democracies, studying
Mexico in the first presidential term after democratisation provides a unique opportunity to shed
light on the dynamics that allow “new” parties to consolidate their support after the opening of
electoral competition. While a large body of literature has explored how authoritarian regimes use
federal resources to consolidate their grip on power (Magaloni ; Greene , ), little is
known about how parties previously in opposition to authoritarian regimes, solidify their support
once they access government. We show that the politicisation of federal resources, together with
the control of local administrations, allowed the PAN to make electoral inroads in poor areas of
the country, where its support had previously been meagre. Our simulation of the election results

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shows that if the federal government had not distributed more transfers to PAN than non-PAN
ruled municipalities, it would have lost the election with a probability of . percent.
While we are not the first to estimate the effect of partisan alignment on central government
spending, our empirical strategy differs from standard accounts of distributive politics in two ways.
First, our empirical design allows us to causally claim that the Fox administration allocated funds
tactically to benefit municipalities ruled by co-partisans of the president. From a methodological
standpoint, attempts to identify causal evidence of tactical spending face endogeneity issues. With-
out exogenous variation in partisan identity, and political alignment between different levels of
government, the empirical relationship between the independent variables and government trans-
fers is likely determined by socio-economic factors that are difficult to account for. As a result, the
estimates are likely contaminated by omitted variable bias. We solve this problem by estimating
difference-in-difference (D-in-D) designs. 
e D-in-D estimations show that PAN-aligned mu-
nicipalities received around  pesos per capita larger increases in transfers in the run-up to the 
presidential election – amounting to . dollars in  values. To put this number in context,
the mean increase (taken over the entire sample) in transfers from the non-election years -
to the election years - is around  pesos per capita, and  percent of the distribution
is between . and . pesos per capita. Hence the favouritism we detect is considerable.
Second, in contrast to most studies of distributive politics, which only provide evidence of tacti-
cal allocation of the federal budget, we also demonstrate that these federal funds were instrumental
in securing the re-election of the incumbent PAN in the  presidential election. We show this in
two different ways. First, we collect information on the partisanship of the mayor, the vote shares
of major parties in the presidential elections of  and , along with data on transfers to
municipalities. We estimate multi-level compositional vector autoregressive models to show that
controlling the municipal administration conferred a significant advantage in the  presidential
election. We demonstrate that this advantage was stronger in poorer or more deprived municipal-
ities when the municipalities received more federal transfers. Second, we simulate replications of
the  presidential election results by examining how the election result would have looked if the
federal government had not allocated more funds to aligned municipalities. 
e probability of the
PAN winning decreases from . in the replications of the actual election results to . percent
in the simulation of the counterfactual scenario.

e D-in-D estimations are based on the parallel trends assumption. Treatment induces a deviation from the
common trend (Angrist and Pischke ).
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e remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
e next section reviews the literature on
tactical allocation of federal spending. We then briefly describe the Mexican political system, focus-
ing on the role of the central government in the allocation of federal funds. Next, we provide an
overview of the democratic transition and the  general election. 
e following section lays out
our empirical approach, and presents the main results. In the final section, we discuss our findings
and conclude with some implications for further research.
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Previous studies have explained the tactical allocation of federal funds by focusing on the policy
preferences and electoral incentives of politicians. While these two types of considerations are not
mutually exclusive, they are clearly distinct.
First, incumbent governments may be concerned with policy when targeting politically aligned
circumscriptions. If sub-national governments have some discretion in how they can spend federal
funds, then the central government may prefer to allocate more funds to administrations that share
the same policy preferences. For the U.S., Albouy () shows that Democrats and Republicans
have different spending priorities. An all-Democrat state delegation in either the House or the Sen-
ate procures more grants for housing and urban development, while an all-Republican delegation
garners considerably more funds for defence and transportation. In addition, heads of government
may attempt to advance their legislative agenda by allocating more funds to key co-partisans in
Congress. Jacobson et al. () show, also for the U.S., that presidents reward members of their
own party for their support on important legislative initiatives.
Second, incumbent governments may target more federal funds to aligned municipalities to
improve their own electoral fortunes or to debilitate the prospects of their opponents. Arulampalam
et al. () develop a theoretical model in which parties at the centre target grants to co-partisans
in swing states to avoid sharing the benefits of additional expenditure with politicians of opposing
parties. Incumbent parties at the centre thus try to avoid a “leakage” effect. 
e authors test their
model with data on India, and find that both aligned and swing states receive  percent higher
transfers than unaligned and non-swing states. Using a regression discontinuity design, Brollo
and Nannicini () find that the federal government in Brazil penalises municipalities ruled
by opposition mayors – what they call the “tying hands” effect. 
ey show that municipalities
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controlled by the opposition receive one-third fewer discretionary transfers for infrastructure than
municipalities in which the mayor is a co-partisan of the president.
While these studies emphasise the role of central governments in the allocation of federal grants,
few scholars have been able to show empirically, whether voters hold the incumbent head of gov-
ernment accountable for federal spending. With the exception of Kriner and Reeves (), most
scholarship has focused on whether members of Congress who bring more federal spending to
their constituencies enjoy an electoral advantage (Levitt and Snyder ; Calvo and Murillo ;
Lazarus and Reilly ). However, there are good reasons to expect the allocation of federal spend-
ing to have an effect on the outcome of presidential elections.
First, studies on the U.S. have demonstrated that presidents play a central role in allocating the
federal budget (Larcinese et al. ; Berry et al. ; Arceneaux ). Given the centrality of the
presidency, it can be expected that voters will want to hold the president’s party accountable for that
spending in the next presidential election. Second, research on the U.S. (Gasper and Reeves )
and Latin America (Singer ) shows that voters do not only hold the president accountable for
the state of the macro-economy, but also for other factors – some of them unrelated to politics
(Healy et al. ). As Kriner and Reeves () note, federal spending likely has an important
effect on the economies of local communities, and it can thus be expected that voters will want to
reward (punish) the incumbent head of government for more (less) transfers.
In the Mexican context, several studies have shown that the politicisation of federal resources
allowed the PRI to keep its hegemonic position within an authoritarian setting (Greene , ;
Magaloni ; Díaz-Cayeros et al. ). Greene () develops a formal model in which
dominant parties are able to win elections continuously when they can politicise public resources,
and fail when privatisations put the state’s fiscal power out of their reach. Empirically, he shows
that voters rewarded the PRI for providing them with particularistic benefits. Magaloni ()
demonstrates that, in order to secure mass support, the PRI created a poverty trap. Peasants were
unable to rise from poverty because the state distributed land without property rights. As a result,
peasants were not able to access credit and become profitable farmers, remaining largely dependent
on state patronage and clientelism. Voters rewarded the PRI for providing cash transfers, targeted
side payments like food subsidies, credit, construction contracts, and land titles. Díaz-Cayeros et
al. () show that the National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL) – the main poverty-relief
programme of the presidency of Carlos Salinas (-) – was highly discretionary and partisan.
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e introduction of Progresa – a conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme – by the adminis-
tration of Ernesto Zedillo in , constituted a landmark in the history of Mexican social policy.
Eligibility for Progresa funds was determined using fixed criteria based on poverty, and was made
explicitly non-partisan (De la O ). 
e presidency of Vicente Fox expanded the coverage of the
programme from . million families in  to almost five million in , and renamed it Opor-
tunidades (Díaz-Cayeros et al. ). In addition the Fox government introduced Seguro Popular,
which provides health coverage to uninsured citizens. As Díaz-Cayeros et al. (: ) note, this
“program was intended to remedy the truncated nature of health care delivery, which grants access
only to those working in the formal sector of the economy.” Under Fox, Oportunidades and Seguro
Popular transfers were allocated following technocratic principles (Díaz-Cayeros et al. ).
Despite the programmes being non-partisan, research conducted in recent years shows that ben-
eficiaries were considerably more likely to reward incumbent parties in the  and  presi-
dential elections. According to De la O (), early assignment to Progresa funds led to a seven
percent increase in turnout, and to a nine percent increase in the PRI vote in . Using a match-
ing estimator, Díaz-Cayeros et al. () show that Oportunidades and Seguro Popular recipients
were  and seven percent more likely to vote for the PAN in . 
ey argue that these social
programmes were instrumental in securing the PAN re-election.
While social programmes were insulated from political manipulation after , we show that,
after the  democratic transition, the new party in the central government did find ways to
manipulate federal transfers – albeit in a more subtle way than during the PRI heyday. Social pro-
grammes such as Oportunidades and Seguro Popular became highly scrutinised, but transfers to the
municipalities did not receive the same attention from public opinion and the media. As we show
below, this allowed the federal government to manipulate transfers at the margins. 
is has a clear
normative implication: Studying the electoral consequences of the politicisation of federal trans-
fers is much more important than examining the electoral returns of non-partisan social spending.
Golden and Min () note that “if allocations are welfare maximizing, then the political conflicts
that lie behind them are spurious, incidental, or irrelevant.”
As De la O () notes, the Zedillo administration introduced Progresa in response to the peso crisis of ,
after which  million Mexicans fell below the poverty line.
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e Mexican Political System
Mexico is a federal presidential democracy with a bicameral legislative structure. Its territory is di-
vided into  states – including the Federal District (DF) – and  municipalities. Together with
the federal government, the states and municipalities comprise the three levels of government. Both
houses of congress and the president are elected concurrently every six years, but the Chamber of
Deputies is renewed entirely at the midpoint of the presidential term. 
e president, governors and
mayors are directly elected through plurality rule. Governors serve six-year terms while mayors are
elected every three years. A particular characteristic of the Mexican political system is the absence
of immediate re-election at any level. 
ree large parties – the conservative Partido Acción Nacional
(PAN), the leftist Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), and the formerly authoritarian Par-
tido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) – dominate the Mexican party system. Together they ruled
 percent of all municipalities, every single state government, and controlled  and  percent
of all house and senate seats, respectively, at the time of the  general elections.
Despite being the lowest level of government, municipalities fulfill important functions in edu-
cation, health, and infrastructure. 
ey are ruled by a directly elected mayor (presidente municipal)
and city council (ayuntamiento) and vary greatly in size – the largest being Iztapalapa in the Federal
District (.. inhabitants), and the smallest Santa Magdalena Jocotlán in the state of Oaxaca
(less than  inhabitants). For the election of  percent of the members of the Federal Chamber of
Deputies, all of the municipalities are integrated into  single member districts. Large municipal-
ities, usually in urban areas, are divided into several districts, while small municipalities – mostly in
rural parts of the country – are incorporated into large districts composed of several municipalities.

e remaining  percent of the lower house is elected by proportional representation.
Municipalities obtain their resources from three different sources: ) local revenues such as service
taxes, residential property taxes, and fines; ) transfers from their states; and ) transfers from
the federal government. 
e federal transfers that are allocated directly to the municipalities are
located in a section of the federal budget called Ramo . 
e Ramo  is composed of eight
Each governor is elected on the same day as the mayors of her state and, in some cases, also on the same day as the
president. Since mayors only serve for three years, they are also elected in non-concurrent elections at the midpoint of
the governors’ term.
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different funds, two of which are allocated entirely to the municipalities – i.e. FISM (Fondo de
Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social Municipal), and FORTAMUNDF (Fondo de Aportaciones
para el Fortalecimiento de los Municipios y las Demarcaciones Territoriales del Distrito Federal). We
focus on the transfers that are directly allocated to the municipalities.

e executive and legislative powers play a crucial role in defining how federal transfers are al-
located. 
e president drafts the annual budget law (Ley Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad
Hacendaria), which is then subject to amendments by members of the lower chamber. However,
the extent to which legislators can amend the law is limited. 
e budget committee, in charge of
authorising the bill, has only six to eight weeks to revise the law and is clearly understaffed. After
a period of discussion, the bill is sent to the floor for a final vote. After its approval, the president
has to sign the bill, without having a chance to veto any parts of the law.

e Mexican Transition and the  Presidential Election
Until , Mexico was a paradigmatic case of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way
b). Between  and  – the year in which the opposition first managed to win a legislative
majority in the Lower House – the hegemonic PRI won virtually every meaningful election, often
through fraudulent practices. 
e PRI’s hegemonic rule came to an end in , when the PAN’s
Vicente Fox defeated the PRI’s presidential candidate, Fernando Labastida.
After the  electoral debacle, many observers hastily wrote the PRI off for the foreseeable
future. However, the PRI bounced back in , taking a plurality in the mid-term legislative
elections. 
ree years of divided government had generated a perception of political immobilism
in the electorate. In addition, the country’s economy had been stagnant, averaging a growth rate
close to zero between  and . As a result, the PRI was able to stage a major comeback in
the  mid-term elections, capturing the vote of economically dissatisfied voters (Moreno ).

e strong showing in the mid-terms and in gubernatorial elections in  and  gave the
PRI hope of returning to the presidency in . However, the party’s electoral prospects were
seriously damaged by its choice of presidential candidate. Roberto Madrazo, an established high-
ranking party figure from the state of Tabasco, reminded too many voters of the corrupt practices

e other six funds are first allocated to the states. 
e states then transfer around  percent of those funds to the
municipalities.

e PRI lost a gubernatorial election for the first time in  in Baja California.
In , massive fraud prevented Cuauthemoc Cárdenas, a former PRI member, from winning the presidency.
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of the PRI years, and alienated vast sectors of the party’s base – most notably the powerful teachers
union, and the governors, in particular those from the north of the country. 
roughout the
campaign, Madrazo had the highest negative voting ratings of the three major candidates (Langston
).
By mid-, the electoral campaign was well underway. 
e PAN’s presidential primary turned
into a major upset when a relatively unknown figure, Felipe Calderón, ousted the interior Minister
Santiago Creel, who was openly supported by President Fox. 
e PRD nominated Andrés Manuel
López Obrador, a popular former mayor of Mexico City. His - point advantage during most
of  and early  made him the candidate to beat.
With the PRI out of government, the regime cleavage was no longer dominant, and the election
polarised into a contest between left and right. 
e PAN defended the free market economic model
and a conservative policy agenda on non-economic issues, while the PRD favoured a larger role
for the state in the economy, and liberal non-economic policies. 
e PAN’s appeal for economic
stability was credible thanks to average economic growth rates of four percent in the three years
preceding the election. Moreno () shows that, other things being equal, the probability of
voting for Calderón, among voters who thought the economy was somewhat and much better off
was  and  percent, respectively. In contrast, the probability of voting for López Obrador
among those same groups of voters was  and  percent, respectively. 
e PRD candidate was
able to capture the vote of the economically dissatisfied voters: 
e probability of voting for López
Obrador was  and  percent among voters worse off and much worse off, respectively.

e analysis of survey data representative at the national level paints an unsurprising picture of
the  election – i.e. rich and economically satisfied voters vote for the PAN, while poor and
economically dissatisfied voters vote for the PRD. However, analysing the election at the national
level might miss (or average over) significant variation at the sub-national level. In the remainder
of the paper, we demonstrate that movement at the municipal level does account for a substantial
portion of the variation in the  election results. In particular, we show that presidential election
returns, disaggregated at the municipal level, are predicted by control of local administrations, after
accounting for uniform swings, state-level swings, and a host of other predictors, including results
in the  presidential election, and party popularity in the state. We then show that the tactical
Calderón had served as PAN congressional leader and as Secretary of Energy until , but resigned in protest to
Fox’s open support of Creel (Shirk ).
Moreno estimates these probabilities from a multinomial logit model on national exit poll data collected by the
Reforma newspaper.
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allocation of spending towards municipalities aligned with the federal administration, was one of
the mechanisms that the PAN used to improve its chances of retaining the presidency in .
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Our empirical strategy consists of three parts. In the first we show how controlling municipal govern-
ments conferred an electoral advantage to the three main political parties in the  presidential
election. To show this effect, we analyse aggregate municipal level election returns and estimate
compositional vector autoregression (CVAR) models. In the second part we show that the tacti-
cal allocation of federal funds from the central government to the local level constitutes the main
mechanism by which municipal control leads to increased presidential election returns. In this part,
we estimate two different sets of difference-in-difference (D-in-D) designs, one using matching and
the other using weighting methods. 
e D-in-D estimators show that PAN-aligned municipalities
received significantly more federal transfers in the two years preceding the  election than in
the first four years of President Fox’s presidential term. In the third and final part we return to
the CVAR models including transfers data. We show that municipal control was associated with
presidential electoral results more tightly when it was coupled with more generous transfers from
higher levels of government.
Municipal Control and Presidential Election Returns
To analyse the effect of municipal control on the  presidential election returns, we rely on
aggregate municipal level returns. We collect the official presidential returns at the municipal level
for the  and the  elections, and match them with each other and with information about
the municipality. For each municipality, we know the name of the party in control of the local
administration at the time of the  presidential election, the population, the percentage of
residents living in settlements of less than  people, the illiteracy rate, and the percentage of
MPs for each of the three main parties. We also create an indicator variable that takes the value of
 for municipalities categorised as “very high” or “high” deprivation (grado de marginacion), and 
otherwise (see Appendix  for a codebook). We have information for almost all of the municipalities
in the country, for a total of  observations nested in the  sub-national units.

 
In addition, our models also account for three variables measured at the state level: 
e party
identity of the governor, the proportion of senators of the three main parties, and party identifi-
cation. 
e latter is obtained from several surveys carried out in the months leading to the 
election, for which it was possible to obtain information on the respondent’s state of residence. By
pooling different surveys, we achieved suitably large samples for each state. Ideally, one would use
MRP (multi-level regression and post-stratification), combining census data and survey estimates,
to create such state-level summaries (Lax and Phillips ). Unfortunately, the level of aggregation
at which the census data is reported is almost impossible to match with the coding of individual
demographics in the surveys – hence we rely on survey averages rather than MRP estimates. Given
that the size of the survey samples is small for many states, using the simple average (e.g. the propor-
tion of PAN identifiers among the respondents in a given state) is not recommended: 
e estimate
at the state level can be noisy.
Instead, we use multi-level regression to create state-level summaries that constitute a compro-
mise between the state-level summary and the nationwide average. For those states in which the
average is estimated precisely (because of a larger sample size) the estimate is shrunk only very mildly
towards the grand mean. In those states in which, due to small samples, the estimate is not very
precise, the summary is an average of the state-wise mean and the grand (national) mean, weighted
by the precision with which the state-wise mean is estimated. In practical terms, we run a random-
intercepts logit model, with no covariates, where the response variable are PAN identification, PRI
identification, and PRD identification, respectively. We then use the predictions of the state-level
intercepts as our measures of popularity. 
ese are more conservative than the simple averages, in
that they vary less across states than the simple averages do. 
e main advantage of measuring party
identification in this way is that it is a truly exogenous measure.
We estimate the models for aggregate presidential returns as compositional vector autoregression
models (CVAR) along the lines of those presented by Brandt and Williams (). 
e analysis of
compositional multi-party data has received considerable attention over the years, most notably by
Katz and King () and Tomz et al. (). We estimate CVAR models with a symmetric log
ratio specification, which makes the interpretation of results more straightforward than choosing

ere is considerable variation in the sample sizes, from the  respondents in Baja California Sur and Campeche
to around  both in the Federal District and in Estado de Mexico.
With the exception of Dahlberg and Johansson () and Larcinese et al. (), all previous studies of distributive
politics measure party identification, or partisan leanings using proxy variables obtained from voting data. As Larcinese
and co-authors (: ) note, this approach is clearly problematic “since within models of distributive politics, voting
decisions are – by assumption – endogenous to the distribution of government funds.”
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one party as the baseline, as suggested by Katz and King () and in Tomz et al. (). In
the approach we follow, each model comprises three equations, one of which is redundant. We
estimate each equation separately, including random effects at the state level. It is worth noticing
that there is no efficiency gain by estimating the three equations together (as in a seemingly unrelated
regression) if predictors are the same across equations. 
e model would have to be estimated in
“reduced rank” form in a SUR framework, because the covariance matrix of the errors of the three
equations clearly is singular. Following the practice in American politics of modelling the two-party
vote, we estimate the models as percentages of the three-party vote. We report the estimates for each
model in three columns of each table. 
e interpretation of the model estimates is straightforward,
with the caveat that the regression coefficients describe changes in expected vote shares on the logit
scale.
Formally, call Pi t = [ p1i t , p2i t , p3i t ] the vector of vote shares p for parties 1,2,3 in municipality
i at time t . We first log-transform the vote shares to obtain Y i t = [log( p1i t ), log( p2i t ), log( p3i t )].
We then estimate the three-equation model of the form
KY i t = α+ γXi t +βY i t−1+ η j (i )t + εi t ()
where K = I3 − 13 ı ı ′ is the matrix that divides the vote shares by their geometric mean, the term
η is a state-level random effect, ε is an observation-level error, and j () is a function that maps
municipality i to the state j in which it is located.
For each model, we get three coefficients per predictor. In the tables, the coefficient in the first
column is the effect of an increase in the predictor on vote for the PRI, the second column the effect
on vote for the PAN, and the third on vote for the PRD. 
e coefficients in a given row sum to zero
(apart from rounding discrepancies) because all the gains for one party have to be compensated by
losses for the other two, given that fourth parties are excluded from the analysis. For example, the
coefficients in the row labelled “Log PAN Vote ” in Table  tell us that every unit increase in
the measure of PAN Vote in  leads to an increase by . in the (logit-scaled) vote share of
the PAN, a loss of . (on the logit scale) for the PRD, and a loss of . (on the logit scale) for
the PRI. As a second example, the row labelled “PRI Mayor” in Table  implies that having a PRI
mayor as opposed to having a mayor from a fourth party – i.e. other than the PRD or PAN – leads
We also estimate the same models with state fixed effects, and the main results of interest remain unchanged (see
Appendix ).
We estimate each of the three equations via restricted maximum likelihood as implemented in the function lmer
in the R environment.

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to an increase of . in the (logit-scaled) vote share for the PRI, a result of taking votes from the
PRD (. on the logit scale) and the PAN (. on the logit scale).
One aspect of the model deserves special attention. 
e lags of the election results (namely, the
municipal-level presidential returns for each party in ) are included as controls. 
is explicitly
accounts for differential patterns of election-to-election persistence of electoral preferences, as well
as systematic patterns in transfers of votes from one party to another over the Fox presidency. All
the results for the exogenous variables that are of direct scientific interest have to be interpreted as
holding past support in the municipality constant: 
erefore, the effects of the exogenous variables
can be considered as creating additional electoral advantages over something conceptually close to
the “normal vote” in a given municipality (Converse ).
Table : Municipal Control and Deprivation
PRI PAN PRD
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept . . -.
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRI Vote  .*** -.*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRD Vote  -.*** -.*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log Population -.*** -. .***
() (.) (.)
PAN Mayor .*** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor .** -.* 
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor .** -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
High Deprivation . . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation . .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation . -.* .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation .** . -.**
(.) (.) (.)
σIntercept . . .
Number of observations 
Number of states 
*p<.. **p<.. ***p<.

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e simplest specification for the models that assess the importance of local administrations
control is found in Table . We regress the vote shares in  on the indicator for high deprivation
municipalities, the party identity of the mayor (the reference category being a mayor from a party
other than the three main parties), and their interactions. We also account for the (log) vote shares
in the  presidential election, and the (log) of the population of the municipality. Among the
control variables, vote shares in  (unsurprisingly) predict the vote in . Population is also
predictive of the vote: 
e PRD performs better in larger municipalities, while the PRI’s electoral
returns decrease in more populous locales. As the interaction coefficients indicate, the effect of
local level power is stronger in deprived than in non-deprived municipalities. 
is difference is
statistically significant: 
e coefficient on the interaction between deprivation and PAN Mayor
dummies in the equation predicting PAN vote is ., with a standard error of ., and in the
equation for PRD vote is -. with a standard error of .. In deprived municipalities, a good
part of the contest between PAN and PRD is predicted by control of local administrations.
In Table , we report the estimates for a model that includes additional socio-demographic and
political controls. 
e former are all measured at the municipal level: Percentage of residents living
in settlements of less than  people, and illiteracy rate. 
e political controls are measured at
the municipal level – percentage of MPs of the three main parties – and at the state level – party of
the governor, average party identification, and the proportion of senators of the three largest parties.

e measure of party identification is particularly important, as it accounts for party popularity in
the state. One could suspect that the percentage of local administrations controlled by a given party
simply reflects the buildup in popularity of the party between  and . If this were true,
then the model would simply show that being more popular in a state predicts higher support in the
presidential election. 
is would not explain why this would matter more in deprived communities
than in non-deprived ones, but it would still make it less tenable to infer that political control of
local administrations confers an advantage in presidential elections per se. By controlling for a
measure that reflects how many voters identify with each party in a given state, and that reflects,
directly, how popular each party is in the months prior to the election, we can be more confident
that our results are picking up a genuine effect of local administration control.
We repeat all the models reported in this section with a continuous measure of deprivation and the results do not
change (see Appendix ).

Table : Municipal Control and Deprivation with Additional Controls
PRI PAN PRD
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRI Vote  .*** -.*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRD Vote  -.*** -.*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log Population -.***  .***
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor .** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor .** -.* 
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor .** -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
High Deprivation -.  .
(.) (.) (.)
Illiteracy Rate .*** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Less  Residents  .** -.**
(.) (.) (.)
PAN ID -.* .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRI ID .*** -. -.*
(.) (.) (.)
PRD ID -.* . .
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Governor . -.* .
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Governor -.* . .
(.) (.) (.)
PAN MPs .* -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI MPs . -.** .
(.) (.) (.)
PRD MPs . -. 
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Senators -. . .
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Senators -. -. .
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Senators -. . .
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation . .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation . -.* .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation .*** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
σIntercept . . .
Number of observations 
Number of states 
*p<.. **p<.. ***p<.
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Interestingly, once we account for party identification, the magnitude and statistical significance
of the interactions between municipal control and deprivation are virtually unchanged. 
is evi-
dence shows that the municipal control variable is not simply proxying for party popularity: 
ere
is evidence that party strength in municipal administrations is systematically related to electoral suc-
cess in the presidential election, and that this advantage is stronger in more deprived communities.
At the same time, party popularity as captured by our identification measures is statistically signifi-
cantly associated with vote shares in the presidential election, holding everything else constant.
In the plots in Figure  we display the expected vote shares (in the  presidential election)
for the three main parties, as a function of deprivation. In each panel, we isolate one configuration
of partisan control of the municipality. 
e plots are based on the estimates reported in Table ,
but using a continuous measure of deprivation for illustrative purposes. We set the other variables
(vote shares in  and log population) at their median. So for instance, the plot labelled PAN
Mayor displays the expected vote shares for the three parties in municipalities with varying levels
of deprivation. 
ree main messages can be extracted from these plots. First, the PAN benefits
considerably more than the other two parties from moving from controlling a non-deprived to
controlling a deprived municipality. 
e PAN slope in municipalities with a PAN mayor is much
steeper than the PRI slope in PRI-controlled municipalities and the PRD slope in PRD-ruled areas.
Second, the PRI vote remains constant across levels of deprivation when the other two parties
control the mayor. 
e PRI slope in non-PRI municipalities remains essentially flat. 
ird, the
PRD is the biggest loser of these three-way races. In municipalities it does not control, its vote is
much more depressed when deprivation increases – particularly in PAN-controlled entities.
In sum, the picture that emerges from the models reported in Tables  and  is that a significant
part of the competition in the presidential election takes place between the PAN and the PRD, and
that the outcome of this competition depends significantly on the strength of the party at the local
level and levels of deprivation. While the PRI lost electoral support across the board between 
and , the PRI vote is stable across values of the other predictors. In other words, patterns of
PRI support seem to be unaffected, in the sense that the strongest predictor of the PRI vote in 
is voting for the PRI in , and party identification in the state. 
is implies that the PRI did not
capitalise on strategies that rely on control of local administrations to break into new constituencies,
nor were the other parties able to erode the PRI support using these strategies.
We also estimate a model in which we control for vote shares in the latest municipal election. 
e main results of
the key interaction terms hold after introducing this control (see Appendix ).

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Figure : Party Vote by Municipal Control and Deprivation
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Notes: Expected vote shares in the  presidential election for the three main parties, as a function of deprivation. Each
panel isolates one configuration of partisan control of the municipality. 
e plots are based on the estimates reported in
Table , but using a continuous measure of deprivation. 
e other variables – vote shares in  and log population –
are set at their median.
One could hypothesise that the electoral benefits conferred by municipal control simply is a
“good governance” effect: By demonstrating their party’s ability to govern, mayors indirectly in-
crease the reputation of the party at the national level. However, this would not directly explain
why such an advantage is so much stronger in more deprived municipalities. One could also con-
jecture reasons of why good performance may confer a stronger advantage in more deprived places:
For instance, local governance might matter most to poor people, or to not necessarily poor people
living in deprived areas. 
is optimistic view would imply that the targeting of benefits to specific
voters or groups of voters does not play any role in generating electoral support. Yet, Calvo and
Murillo () and Weitz-Shapiro () show that middle class voters punish clientelism, while
working class and poor voters reward clientelistic practices. 
e expectation is, thus, that good
governance should be an effective strategy in rich rather than in poor municipalities.
Favouritism in Spending
In this subsection, we explore how federal funds were allocated to sub-national governments dur-
ing the Fox presidency. Our goal is to identify causal evidence of any systematic patterns in cen-
tral government transfers to the municipalities. To credibly claim causal evidence, assignment to
treatment needs to be exogenous, i.e., independent of potential outcomes conditional on observed
pre-treatment variables. We rely on two D-in-D estimators to solve the problem of random assign-

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ment. First, we estimate a semi-parametric D-in-D estimator, as proposed by Abadie (), and
then we estimate D-in-D on a matched dataset. Both methods are based on the same propensity
score and, unsurprisingly, yield very similar results. 
ey both find that municipalities controlled
by the PAN received more transfers from higher layers of government and that they did so because
they were governed by the PAN.

e D-in-D estimator is founded on the simple idea that “when only a fraction of the popula-
tion is exposed to the treatment, an untreated comparison group can be used to identify temporal
variation in the outcome that is not due to the treatment exposure” (Abadie : ). While the
idea is simple, the conventional parametric D-in-D estimator is based on a very strong assumption,
which is that in the absence of treatment, the treatment and control groups would have followed
parallel trends. Often, this assumption is implausible, because of imbalance between the treated
and untreated group regarding the pre-treatment characteristics thought to be associated with the
dynamics of the outcome variable (Abadie ). 
is is of particular relevance in our framework,
as we cannot credibly assume that federal transfers would have followed the same path in PAN and
non-PAN municipalities. 
ese two groups differ under many observables that are clearly related
to how much money they received.

e two D-in-D estimators deal with this problem in slightly different ways. 
e semi-parametric
D-in-D estimator relaxes the parallel trends assumption by running the D-in-D on two groups
that are very similar but not identical. In practice, the Abadie estimator down-weights the control
municipalities that do not resemble PAN-aligned municipalities, and assigns more weight to those
control municipalities that are more similar to PAN-mayor municipalities. 
e matching D-in-D
estimator matches each treated unit to a number of untreated units with similar values for the pre-
treatment variables. It uses a single continuous covariate to match (nearest-neighbor, one-to-one),
instead of a fixed number of untreated units. 
is results in a gain of efficiency and consistency
(Abadie and Imbens ).

e balance statistics presented in Table  show that our concern about the differences between
treatment and control groups are well justified. In the  presidential election, municipalities
with a PAN mayor support the PAN more ( percent of the vote, on average, versus  percent
for the control group), and the PRI ( versus  percent) and PRD ( versus  percent) less.
PAN-governed municipalities are also less deprived than municipalities in the control group (-.
on the deprivation index as opposed to . for the control group). In addition, PAN-controlled
municipalities are more urbanised ( percent of the population live in settlements of less than

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Table : Before Balance
Control Group Std. Deviation Treatment Group Std. Deviation
PAN Vote  . . . .
PRI Vote  . . . .
PRD Vote  . . . .
I(PAN Vote ) . . . .
I(PRI Vote ) . . . .
I(PRD Vote ) . . . .
Deprivation . . -. -.
Less  Residents . . . .
Illiteracy Rate . . . .
ENP in  . . . .
I(Deprivation) . . . .
I(Less ) . . . .
I(Illiteracy) . . . .
I(ENP in ) . . . .
Log Population . . . .
 inhabitants, against  percent in control municipalities), more literate ( percent illiteracy
as opposed to  percent in control municipalities), and have larger populations.
To fix this problem, we estimate Imai and Ratkovic’s () covariate balancing propensity score
(CBPS). 
e propensity score is the conditional probability of receiving treatment given covariates.

e main advantage of Imai and Ratkovic’s (: ) method is that it “guards against the potential
misspecification of a parametric propensity score model by selecting parameter values that maximize
the resulting covariate balance, regardless of modeling assumptions.” 
is improves the empirical
performance of propensity score matching and weighting methods like the ones used in this study.
Specifically, we estimate a propensity score model with the following variables: 
e (log) of the
population of the municipality, the vote share of each of the three largest parties in the  presi-
dential election, and the effective numbers of parties at the municipal level in the  presidential
election. 
e model also includes quadratic polynomials for the deprivation index, population in
settlements of up to  people, and the illiteracy rate. As Table  shows, the propensity score
greatly improves balance.
After estimating the propensity score, we can turn to the D-in-D estimations. 
e dependent
variable in these models is the difference between central government transfers in election years
(-) and in non-election years (-). 
e models estimate the average effect of the
treatment for the treated (ATT), where the treatment is “having a PAN mayor during the run-up
We calculate the balance statistics following the procedure outlined by Sekhon ().

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Table : After Balance
Control Group Std. Deviation Treatment Group Std. Deviation
PAN Vote  . . . .
PRI Vote  . . . .
PRD Vote  . . . .
I(PAN Vote ) . . . .
I(PRI Vote ) . . . .
I(PRD Vote ) . . . .
Deprivation -. -. -. -.
Less  Residents . . . .
Illiteracy Rate . . . .
ENP in  . . . .
I(Deprivation) . . . .
I(Less ) . . . .
I(Illiteracy) . . . .
I(ENP in ) . . . .
Log Population . . . .
to the presidential election.” As explained above, the data on government transfers comes from
a section of the federal budget called Ramo  or Aportaciones Federales y Estatales. For the most
part, the federal government assigns these funds directly to the municipalities, but a small part is
transferred by the state governments to the local governments. Clearly, if both the federal and the
state level governments target funds strategically – or, at a minimum, display some partisan bias in
the allocation of funds to municipalities – then, when the state is controlled by a party other than
the PAN, the generosity in federal allocation of funds might be offset by decisions at the state level.

is should make it harder for us to detect patterns of favouritism in the allocation of funds.
Both D-in-D estimators yield very similar and statistically significant results. Using D-in-D
with matching, we obtain that municipalities which have a PAN mayor in the run-up to the 
election, receive an increase in federal transfers of  pesos per capita, with a standard error of
. 
e Abadie semi-parametric D-in-D gives a very similar point estimate of  pesos per capita,
with a standard error of . To put these numbers in context: 
e mean increase (taken over the
entire sample) in transfers from the non-election years - to the election years -
is around  pesos per capita, and  percent of the distribution is between . and .
pesos per capita. Hence the favouritism we detect is meaningful.

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Municipal Control, Federal Transfers, and Presidential Election Returns
In this subsection we show the effect of federal spending on the  presidential election results. In
particular, we demonstrate that municipal control and deprivation were associated with presidential
election results more tightly when they were paired with higher levels of federal transfers. To show
this effect we estimate CVAR models like the ones estimated in the first part, but include a measure
of federal transfers. Like in the previous subsection, we use the federal transfers located in the Ramo
 of the federal budget, and include the (log) per capita of aportaciones at the municipal level.

e model displayed in Table  regresses the vote shares in  on the indicator for high depri-
vation municipalities, the party identity of the mayor, and the (log) of the federal transfers. We
also account for the (log) vote shares in the  presidential election, and the (log) of the popula-
tion of the municipality. In Table , we report the estimates of a model that includes an additional
statistical control for the vote of the three main parties at the municipal level. Controlling for mu-
nicipal vote allows us to capture the “pure” bonus of controlling the municipality, and not only the
effect of being popular in a municipality. 
e main results hold after introducing this control.
For the substantive interpretation, the most important coefficients come from the three interac-
tions and their main effects: A two-way interaction of federal transfers with mayor’s party identity,
a two-way interaction of the indicator for high deprivation with mayor’s party identity, and a three-
way interaction of the three variables of interest. 
e main effects of the coefficients for mayor’s
party identity estimate the difference with a mayor from a party other than the main three in a non-
deprived municipality with average transfers. 
e coefficients on the interaction of mayor’s party
identity and transfers estimate how the results change when the levels of federal transfers increase by
one unit in non-deprived municipalities. 
e interaction of mayor’s party identity and deprivation
estimate the effect for deprived municipalities with average-level transfers. Finally, the three-way
interactions identify the effect in high deprivation municipalities with increased levels of transfers.
We repeat all the models reported in this section with a continuous measure of deprivation and the substantive
results do not change (see Appendix ).

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Table : Transfers, Municipal Control, and Deprivation
PRI PAN PRD
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept .** -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRI Vote  .*** -.*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRD Vote  -.*** -.*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log Population -.***  .***
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor  . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor -. -. .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor -. -. .
(.) (.) (.)
Transfers  .** -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
High Deprivation -. . .
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Transfers -.* . .
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Transfers -.** . .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Transfers -.** . .
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation .*** .** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation . -. .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation .*** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Transfers*Deprivation -.*** . .*
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation .  -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation .*** -.** -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation .*** -. -.**
(.) (.) (.)
σIntercept . . .
Number of observations 
Number of states 
*p<.. **p<.. ***p<.

Table : Transfers, Municipal Control, and Deprivation with Additional Controls
PRI PAN PRD
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept -.* -. .**
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRI Vote  .*** -.** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRD Vote  -.*** -.*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log Population -.***  .***
() (.) (.)
Log PAN Municipal Vote -.*** .*** -.***
() (.) (.)
Log PRI Municipal Vote .*** -. -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRD Municipal Vote -.*** -.** .***
() () ()
PAN Mayor -. -. .
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor -. -. .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor -.** -. .**
(.) (.) (.)
Transfers  . . -.
(.) (.) (.)
High Deprivation -.* . 
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Transfers -. . .
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Transfers -. . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Transfers -.  .
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation .*** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation . -. .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation .*** -. -.**
(.) (.) (.)
Transfers*Deprivation . -.*** .**
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation -.*** .*** -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation -. .** -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation -. .*** -.**
(.) (.) (.)
σIntercept . . .
Number of observations 
Number of states 
*p<.. **p<.. ***p<.
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e plots in Figure , which are based on the estimates from Table , illustrate our findings. In
these plots we display the expected vote shares in the presidential election for the three parties, as
a function of the transfers measure – centred to have mean  and standardised dividing by two
standard deviations, as suggested by Gelman (). In each panel, we isolate one configuration of
deprivation and partisan control of the municipality. We set the other variables – i.e. vote shares
in  and log population – at their median. So for instance, the plot labelled “PAN Mayor
in Deprived Municipality” displays the expected vote shares for the three parties in a deprived
municipality as a function of federal transfers. Municipalities towards the left of the plot receive
less than average funds, municipalities at  receive average transfers, and municipalities towards the
right receive more funds than average.
Figure : Party Vote by Municipal Control, Spending, and Deprivation
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Notes: Expected vote shares in the  presidential election for the three main parties, as a function of transfers –
centred to have mean  and standardised dividing by two standard deviations. Each panel isolates one configuration of
deprivation and partisan control of the municipality. 
e other variables are set at their median. 
e plots are based on
the estimates reported in Table .

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ree main messages emerge from these plots. First, vote shares in non-deprived municipali-
ties are less affected by generosity of transfers, regardless of which party controls the administration.

e slopes are flatter in non-deprived municipalities, as one could already observe by inspecting the
three-way interactions between partisanship, transfers, and deprivation. Second, there is a stronger
relationship between success in the presidential election and generosity of transfers in deprived
municipalities. In particular, the advantage conferred by control of the municipality to the PAN
increases by four percentage points when the transfers are more generous. 
e same pattern applies
for the PRD, which enjoys a larger advantage over the PAN and the PRI in municipalities it con-
trols, when they are well funded. 
ird, municipal control by the PRI seems to matter much less
than municipal control by the two other parties. It confers an advantage to the PRI in deprived
municipalities, but the advantage itself does not seem to be related to generosity of transfers. In
non-deprived municipalities – predicted as a median sized municipality with median results in 
– the PRD is expected to receive more votes than the PRI in the  presidential election.
Summary of Empirical Results

e analysis conducted in the three previous subsections reveals the following patterns. First, we
find that controlling the sub-national levels of government was strongly related to electoral out-
comes in the  presidential election. In particular, the analysis of aggregate presidential returns
shows that the control of municipal administrations conferred a strong advantage in deprived mu-
nicipalities, and a somewhat weaker (and, in many specifications, statistically undetectable) advan-
tage in non-deprived locations. Second, relying on a D-in-D design, we show that municipalities
which had a PAN mayor in the run-up to the  election received a considerable increase in fed-
eral transfers. 
ird, we demonstrate that part of the electoral advantage in deprived communities
is explained by the way in which federal transfers are distributed to the municipalities. In particular,
we demonstrate that municipal control and deprivation were associated with presidential election
results more tightly when they were paired with higher levels of federal transfers.

    
    
Do these results imply that municipal incumbency, and the moderate extent of targeting, allowed
the PAN to secure the presidential election in ? Unlike other presidential democracies such as
the United States, presidential elections in Mexico are decided by national plurality rule. Strategies
at the local level might move some votes but do not necessarily affect national election outcomes.
Since the  election was decided by only half a percentage point ( votes), it is very likely
that the election outcome could have been different if only some of the determinants of voting
behaviour had been different.
In order to understand and illustrate the political significance of the effects we detect, we simulate
the election under various counterfactual conditions, following the approach outlined by Gelman
and King (). To simulate new elections, we draw from the posterior of the model in Table .
In practice, for each of the three equations we simulate M = 1000 vectors of coefficients β; the
stochastic variability of the returns at the municipal level σ (M scalars); and M vectors of state
intercepts η. In every simulation m, and for each party s , we get
• β(m)s , one draw from the posterior distribution of the regression coefficients
• η(m)s , one draw from the posterior distribution of the state-level intercepts
• σ (m)s , one draw from the posterior distribution of the standard deviation of the municipal-
level errors
We draw the municipal-specific stochastic component ε(m)s i from a normal distribution with
mean  and standard deviation σ (m)s . We then predict, for each municipality, the vote shares for
the three parties. In the replication of the actual election results, we predict the vote shares from
a model like Equation . Speficically, call LPs i the linear predictor for party s in municipality i .

en, the predicted value is
LPs i =β
(m)
s X
(hyp)
i + η
(m)
s j + ε
(m)
s i ()
For notational simplicity, we include the lagged presidential vote results in X , while the vector
β also includes what is called γ above. 
e predictors X (hyp) can be the actually-observed values
(when we replicate the election that took place) or they can be different, encoding a counterfactual
scenario under which the election could have been run.

    
From the linear predictors, we can move back to vote share scale. For every district, we get the
predicted vote shares (as proportions of the three-party vote). In order to calculate the national
vote for each of the three parties, we multiply the vote shares by the number of votes cast for the
three parties in the municipality. 
is gives us, for every municipality, the number of votes cast for
each of the three presidential contenders. We can then sum the votes over all the municipalities in
the country, to get a national presidential vote tally. 
is is one simulation of the election. We
repeat the procedure M times. For each of these, we get a winner (the party that is predicted to
have the most votes). By looking at the proportion of simulations in which a given party wins, we
can estimate the probability that each party had to win, under a given set of conditions (captured
by the values of X (hyp)). In practice, we estimate the models as percentages of the three-party vote,
following the practice in American politics of modelling the two-party vote.
Before moving to the simulations, we need to explain our strategy for dealing with missing values.
Most of the missing data is from the DF, for which there is no spending data available. In order
to predict the election outcome, we use the actual results from the DF, adding them to the total
number of votes predicted from the simulation for the rest of the country. 
is means that the
simulations are for hypothetical elections that were to take place throughout the country, except in
the DF – for which we have no model. Before summing the predicted vote tallies to the actual
vote tallies in the DF, we have to make sure that the total prediction equals the number of votes
cast at the national level – minus those cast in the DF. Not accounting for this might give excess
weight to the DF in the simulation. Hence, we count the total number of votes involved in our
prediction, and we multiply them by a constant so that the total number of votes modelled matches
We can also sum them by state. While state-level vote is not of any political relevance in the Mexican presidential
election, the IFE reports official vote totals at the state level, and we can compare our predictions with the actual results.
By simulating the election results in this way, we make two assumptions, which, albeit plausible, should be explicit
for sake of transparency. 
e first one is that turnout would not have been different in these hypothetical elections. If
the municipal incumbency effect is driven by the ability of local administrators to get out the vote – i.e. increase turnout
among supporters of their party – we are underestimating the effect of incumbency. In addition, we also assume that
municipal incumbency does not affect votes for minor parties. In other words, we assume that the most important
role played by municipal incumbency is that of affecting the competition among the three major parties (those with
reasonably high expectations of winning the presidential race), and that this competition takes place among those voters
that actually showed up to vote in the  presidential election.
In the counterfactual simulations, this might give some advantage to the PRD, which had a particularly strong
showing there. We also aggregate the election results excluding the DF, which is informative about the national pattern
but clearly gives an advantage to the PAN in the simulations, given that the PRD stronghold is removed from the analysis.

    
the total number of votes cast in the election. Based on this adjustment, the total votes cast in
our simulations exactly match the national tally as reported by IFE.
Replicating the Actual Election Results
Before estimating the substantively interesting counterfactual scenarios that allow us to estimate
how the election might have looked under slightly different conditions, we evaluate the model’s
ability to simulate the results of the actual election. We follow the procedure outlined above, using
as X (hyp) the observed matrix of predictors X . In other words, we look at hypothetical election
outcomes under the assumption that all other covariates – including past vote shares, state and
municipal characteristics, municipal incumbency, and transfers – are exactly the same as they were
in the actual election. 
e randomness comes from three sources: 
e uncertainty about the pa-
rameters of the model (which are estimated, not observed), the uncertainty about the state-level
heterogeneity, and the random component at the municipal level (which incorporates those deter-
minants of voting behaviour that our model does not capture.) Does the actual election we observe
look “ordinary” according to our model?
Figure : Simulation of Actual Election Results
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Notes: Histograms for the simulation of the actual election results for the PRI (left plot), PAN (centre plot), and PRD
(right plot). 
e dashed vertical lines represent the actual election results as shares of the three-party vote.
First, we investigate whether the model is able to correctly describe the actual election. If this is
the case, then the election we actually observed should look “ordinary” among those that the model

e constant is calculated from the ratio between the total votes for the three parties, as reported by IFE (subtracting
those reported to be cast in the DF) and the total votes cast for the three parties in the municipalities that enter our
estimation sample. 
e constant is approximately ..

    
can simulate. 
e plots in Figure  display the histograms for the simulated vote shares, and the
actual election result, for the three parties. 
e actual election results, as shares of the three-party
vote, are . for the PAN, and . for the PRD. 
e mean vote share in the simulated elections
is . for the PAN, . for the PRD, and . for the PRI. 
us, the model accurately captures
the election, although the PAN vote is slightly lower, and the PRD vote slightly higher than in the
actual election results. Given that the election was so close, it is worth noting that the probability of
the PRD of winning an election analogous to the one that took place, but with different realisations
of the random components of the election, is considerable. In . percent of the simulations, the
PRD gets more votes than the PAN. In all these, the PRD would have won by a small margin:

e median margin in the simulations in which the PRD wins is . percentage points. In .
percent of the simulations, the presidential race is won by the PAN. 
e median margin, in the
hypothetical elections won by the PAN, is ., which is slightly larger than the observed one – less
than . percent.
Counterfactual Scenario: Less Funding to PAN Municipalities
As detailed above, we find evidence of a modest, but detectable bias in the allocation of transfers to
municipalities. 
is biased allocation leads to PAN-controlled municipalities enjoying slightly less
than  pesos per capita extra funds compared to otherwise similar non-PAN-controlled municipal-
ities in the two years preceding the election. In this subsection we examine how the election result
would have looked if the federal government had not allocated more funds to aligned municipalities.
To estimate this counterfactual scenario we do not assume that every municipality controlled by
the PAN received exactly  pesos per capita more than they would have otherwise received. 
is
is because  pesos is the average effect for the treated, and the effect need not be constant. In the
analysis of targeting, we do not explore causal heterogeneity, hence we have no reason to model it
in a specific way in the simulations. 
us, we can average over the uncertainty. In particular, the
effect is estimated to be , with a standard error of .
In order to capture both our uncertainty about the size of the effect, and the heterogeneity of
the targetings, we proceed as follows. First, we draw one replication of the average effect size from
a normal distribution with mean  and standard deviation : Call this θ(M ). 
is implies that,
in a minority of the simulations, the average targeting effect is negative. We then simulate the
municipality-specific targeting effect by drawing θ(M )i for each municipality i from a normal dis-

    
tribution with mean θ(M ) and standard deviation |θ(M )2 |. We then subtract this quantity from the
aportaciones received in  by PAN-controlled municipalities only. We then predict the vote
shares, according to the procedure outlined above.

e results of the simulations show that the PRD would have won the election with a probability
of . percent if the PAN had not allocated disproportionately more funds to aligned municipali-
ties. In other words, in . percent of simulations the PRD gets more votes than the PAN, while in
. percent the PAN gets more votes than the PRD. 
e average PRD vote in this counterfactual
scenario is . – up from . in the simulations of the actual results. 
e average PAN vote is
unaffected, which means that the PRD increases its vote shares by subtracting votes from the PRI,
which loses . percent. 
e PRI vote decreases from . in the simulations of the actual results
to . in the counterfactual scenario. 
e median margin of victory – in the simulations won by
each party – is the same for the PAN and the PRD: . percentage points.
Figure : Simulation of Counterfactual Scenario
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Notes: Histograms for the simulation of a counterfactual scenario in which PAN-aligned municipalities receive, on
average, less transfers following the results of the D-in-D estimations ( pesos per capita with a standard deviation of
). 
e left plot is for the PRI, the plot in the centre for the PAN, and the plot on the right for the PRD. 
e dashed
vertical lines represent the actual election results as shares of the three-party vote.

e plots in Figure  display the histograms for the simulated vote shares of the three main parties
averaging over the uncertainty of the D-in-D results. Again, the dashed vertical lines represent the
actual election results as shares of the three-party vote. 
e plot for the PRD shows that .
percent of the distribution is to the right of the actual election result. 
is means that in two thirds
Note that, by construction, the uncertainty about the voting model and the uncertainty about the targeted spend-
ing effect are orthogonal, as they come from two different estimations. Hence, we can draw the θ(M ) and the set of
parameters ξ = (β,σ ,η) from independent distributions. When averaging the distribution of the predicted vote shares,
we are incorporating both the uncertainty about the targeting effect, and the uncertainty about the parameters of the
voting model.

   
of the simulations the PRD obtains a larger share of the vote than it actually obtained. 
e plot for
the PAN shows the opposite result. Almost two thirds of the PAN distribution is to the left of the
actual result. In  out of  simulations it obtains a smaller share of the vote than it actually
received in the election.
In sum, the results of the simulations demonstrate that the allocation of funds to aligned mu-
nicipalities paid off electorally for the PAN in the  presidential election. It turned an election
that was looking very much in favour of the PRD into a virtual tie. Had the PAN not allocated
more funds to municipalities governed by co-partisans, it would have lost the election with a prob-
ability of . percent. 
e additional transfers gave the PAN a marginal advantage, increasing its
probability of winning the election to . percent, according to our simulations.
   
In this paper we find causal evidence of tactical motivations in the allocation of federal funds to
the municipalities during the presidency of Vicente Fox in Mexico (-). Using a D-in-
D design, we show that in the run-up to the  presidential election, the ruling party in the
central government allocated more transfers to municipalities that had co-partisans as mayors. 
e
favouritism we detect in the allocation of federal grants is considerable. Municipalities which had a
PAN mayor in the run-up to the  election received an increase in federal transfers of  pesos
per capita – equivalent to . U.S. dollars in  values.
We also show that federal transfers were instrumental in securing the election of the PAN pres-
idential candidate, Felipe Calderón, in . 
ey were particularly important in increasing the
PAN vote when they were allocated to deprived municipalities: 
e vote shares of the PAN were
three percent larger in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than one standard
deviation above the mean, than in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than
one standard deviation below the mean. Our simulation of the  election results shows that if
the PAN had not allocated more funds to aligned municipalities, it would have lost the election
with a probability of . percent.
By focusing on the case of Mexico in the first presidential term after its democratic transition,
we shed light on the dynamics that allow parties previously in opposition to authoritarian regimes
to consolidate their support once they access office. Until , the PAN was the main opposition
party to the PRI, and the staunchest critic of its clientelistic practices. After , some progress was

   
made in the way the central government allocated social policy funds. Social programmes which
were for decades highly politicised, were handed over to technocrats. Nevertheless, the evidence
presented in this paper clearly indicates that the PAN was able to politicise funds which – in contrast
to social programmes such as Oportunidades and Seguro Popular – were not subject to heavy scrutiny.

us, while the PAN used federal monies in a more subtle way than the PRI in its hegemonic period,
it was very effective nevertheless. 
e politicisation of federal resources, together with the control
of local administrations, allowed the PAN to make electoral inroads in poor areas of the country,
which were traditional strongholds of the formerly authoritarian PRI and the leftist PRD.

e finding that the PAN was able to consolidate its electoral support between  and 
using federal funds tactically, has clear implications for the debate about the Mexican transition in
particular, and democratic transitions more generally. First, in accordance with previous studies,
it suggests that an open electoral market does not necessarily lead to programmatic competition
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson ), but can also open up the possibility for former opposition parties
to also politicise federal resources – i.e. there is a “democratisation” in the politicisation of central
government funds. Second, it also suggests that the politicisation of federal resources is very difficult
to eradicate in newly established democracies in which the cost for “new” parties of moving back
to the opposition ranks is higher than in established democracies, and voters as well as local-level
politicians have traditionally relied on political connections for access to funds.

e results of this study also have implications for our understanding of the electoral strategies
that incumbent heads of governments, and their parties, adopt in different contexts. 
ese strategies
may be different in centralised and decentralised political systems. In the former, incumbent heads
of government may be able to establish a direct connection with key group of voters, and may be able
to target them directly – e.g. with campaign handouts or ad hoc social programmes (Roberts ).
In contrast, in decentralised systems, such as federal Mexico, politicians at the local level may have
a gatekeeping function, limiting the ability of federal governments to directly target constituents.
To reach voters successfully, parties at the centre may thus have to focus their efforts in allocating
more funds to allied local politicians. It is not surprising that studies of distributive politics have
found empirical evidence of the alignment hypothesis in decentralised systems such as the U.S.
(Larcinese et al. ), Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini ), India (Arulampalam et al. ) and
Spain (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro ).
While this paper was primarily interested in the role of the central government in the allocation
of resources to subnational entities, our study also relates to the literature on political clientelism.

   

is literature focuses on the electoral gains that political machines make by trading particularistic
benefits to voters in exchange for electoral support (Stokes ; Brusco et. al. ). We show that
parties that dispose of well-organised clientelistic machines – like the former authoritarian ruling
PRI – need to rely less on the control of local administrations than relative newcomers who do
not control established party machines at the local level – like the incumbent PAN and the leftist
PRD. While the outcomes of the presidential competition between the “new” parties (the PAN
and the PRD) can be predicted based on municipal control and spending, the PRI vote shares are
not explained by these variables. In contrast, the PRI vote is most strongly associated with past
presidential election results.
To conclude, regarding the external validity of our findings, our results have particularly strong
implications for countries with a similar governance structure to Mexico: An executive with strong
(in)formal powers to allocate funds to the municipalities, and a clear pattern of alliances between
the parties in the central and the sub-national governments. It is thus likely that the results uncov-
ered in this study can also be found in other federal countries in which heads of government have
discretional powers to allocate spending, and in which it is relatively straightforward for voters to
identify which parties at the local level are allied with the party in the federal government. In the
Latin American context, our findings should be of particular importance for students of Brazilian
and Argentine distributive politics.

C O N C L U S I O N S
“I cannot trust a party; I can trust a man. I cannot hold a party responsible; I can hold a man
responsible. I cannot get an expression of opinion which is single and simple from a party; I can get
that only from a man” (Sumner : , quoted in White : ).
“[
e theory of collective party accountability] appeared alluring enough to be adopted by some
writers of prominence, and expanded in certain cases, with brilliancy of literary style. It has, however,
one defect: it is not borne out by the facts” (Ostrogorski : , cited in White : ).


e general motivation of this thesis was to better understand electoral accountability for incumbent
leaders and their parties in Latin America. 
e thesis addressed two central questions. First, it
was concerned with explaining sources of contextual and institutional variation in the degree to
which voters hold incumbents accountable for their performance in government. In particular, I
sought to explain how the relationship between a prominent incumbent politician, such as the
sitting president, and the candidates of her party, both in presidential and legislative elections,
affects performance-based voting. 
e first two papers address this question. Second, I examined
how voters hold incumbents accountable for other areas of government control besides the macro-
economy. 
e third paper investigates whether Mexican voters reward the incumbent party in the
federal government for allocating more federal spending to municipalities governed by co-partisans.
In this concluding chapter, I summarise the main results, and empirical contributions of the thesis.
After reviewing the empirical findings, I discuss the theoretical and normative implications of my
results. 
e chapter concludes with ideas for further research.

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     

e Successor Factor in Latin American Presidential Elections

e first paper of this thesis introduces a new dataset that describes the intra-party variation in
the type of presidential candidates in Latin America. Combining this data with individual-level
information on vote intention and evaluations of the performance of the government, the paper
identifies a very strong empirical regularity in how voters hold incumbent parties to account: Voters
assign more (less) responsibility for the executive’s past actions if the presidential candidate of the
incumbent party is closely (weakly) linked to the policy outcomes of the outgoing government.
To test the argument that the relationship of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party
to the outgoing government affects electoral sanctioning, the paper matches two datasets. 
e first
consists of individual-level information on vote intention, economic evaluations, and presidential
approval, along with socio-demographic controls, for  election years in Latin America between
 and . Second, I created an original dataset that describes the type of presidential candidate
of the incumbent party. 
is dataset captures how closely or weakly related the presidential candi-
date is to the policy outcomes of the outgoing government. It identifies three types of candidates:
Re-standing presidents, successors and non-successors. Re-running presidents are most closely as-
sociated with the policies of the outgoing government. In the words of Nadeau and Lewis-Beck
(: ), they are “the economic manager[s] personified”. In cases of no presidential re-election,
successors have the closest connection to the policy outcomes of the executive. 
ey are political
allies of the outgoing president and her preferred option among the candidates seeking the presi-
dential nomination of the incumbent party. 
ird, non-successors are only weakly associated with
the outgoing government, as they are internal party opponents of the president, having defeated
the president’s preferred candidate to clinch the presidential nomination.
After matching these two datasets, the paper estimates random-intercept random-slopes logit
models. While these models have become standard in political science, few scholars have used them
to study voting behaviour in Latin America. 
e results for the model using economic evaluations as
the measure of government performance, show that when economic perceptions move from worse
to better, the probability of voting for a re-running president increases by  percent – from  to 
percent. In the case of successor candidates, an analogous change in economic perceptions increases
the probability of voting for the incumbent party by  percent – from  to  percent. Finally,

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in the case of non-successors, a similar change in economic perceptions increases the probability of
voting for the incumbent party by only  percent – from  to  percent.

e results for the model using presidential approval to measure performance are very similar.

e probability of voting for a re-running president when voters move from not approving to
approving of the president’s performance, increases by  percent – from  to  percent. In the
case of successor candidates, an analogous change in presidential approval increases the probability
of voting for the incumbent party by  percent – from  to  percent. Finally, in the case of non-
successor candidates, a similar change in perceptions of the performance of the president increases
the probability of voting for the incumbent party by only  percent – from nine to  percent. In
sum, the slopes for the different types of candidates are statistically significantly different from each
other. 
e paper thus provides evidence that the magnitude of the performance-based vote varies
considerably by candidate type.

e quote by Felipe Calderón – the presidential candidate of the incumbent PAN in the 
election – in the epigraph of the first paper effectively summarises that paper’s central idea. He
suggests that there is a difference between being the candidate of the incumbent party, and being
the candidate of the government. According to Calderón, this difference is noticeable to voters. 
e
paper indeed provides systematic evidence that voters throughout Latin America differentiate be-
tween these two types of candidates. 
e paper shows that successors – the government candidates
in the words of Calderón – are held more electorally accountable for the performance of the gov-
ernment than non-successor candidates – the candidates of the incumbent party, according to the
PAN leader. 
e paper further reveals that re-standing presidents are subject to greater electoral
sanctioning than successors and non-successors.

e Accountability Effect of Endorsements
Although some very good survey experiments conducted in Latin American countries have recently
been published (Lupu ; Samuels and Zucco ), the use of surveys for the study of politi-
cal behaviour in the region is still in its early stages. 
e second paper of this thesis uses a survey
experiment conducted in the run-up to the  Mexican general election to investigate whether
endorsements increase the magnitude of the performance-based vote, and whether they affect par-
tisans and non-partisans of the source cue in the same way.
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I embedded my experiment in a survey carried out by Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica, a
polling company, two days before the election. Between  and  subjects were interviewed in
each of the  Mexican states, for a total of  observations. 
is survey asked respondents to
evaluate the performance of the outgoing president, Felipe Calderón, along with other questions
about the  general election and their socio-demographic background. For the purpose of my
experiment, respondents were randomised into two different questionnaires, which varied in an
additional question on the presidential endorsement of Senate candidates. Subjects in the control
group were asked how likely it was that they would vote for the Senate candidates of the incumbent
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). Respondents in the treatment group were asked the same question,
but were told that President Calderón was endorsing the PAN candidates for the Senate.

e empirical setting of the experiment allowed me to estimate conditional average treatment
effects (CATEs), using presidential approval and partisanship as conditional variables. Among vot-
ers who identify with the incumbent party but do not approve of the president’s performance, the
results show that exposure to an endorsement depresses the vote for the incumbent party. In the
models that use a binary dependent variable, panistas in the treatment group who do not at all ap-
prove of the president, are  percent less likely to vote for the PAN Senate candidates than panistas
in the control group with the same levels of presidential approval. 
e results are analogous for
the models using the continuous dependent variable. Among voters in the lowest level of presiden-
tial approval, the gap between panistas in the treatment and control groups is half a point in the
five-point Likert scale.
In contrast, among voters who do not identify with the incumbent party, the results show that
endorsements do not have an effect on retrospective voting. 
e slopes for non-panistas in the
treatment and control groups run parallel to each other and the point estimates are almost identical
across the presidential approval scale – regardless of which dependent variable is used. 
is sug-
gests that voters, who do not identify with the party of the source cue, hold the incumbent party
collectively accountable for the performance of the government.
In sum, the paper shows that the incumbent party in the  Mexican general election was
subject to more electoral accountability when the outgoing president endorsed its Senate candidates
than when he did not. However, endorsements only had an “accountability effect” among voters
who identified with the incumbent party. Among voters who do not identify with the incumbent
party, endorsements did not affect how voters reward and punish the incumbent party.
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Tactical Spending and Presidential Election Returns

e third paper of this thesis consists of an in-depth investigation of the  Mexican presidential
election and, in particular, of the electoral returns of tactically allocating inter-governmental grants.

e paper departs from the recent trend in studies of distributive politics in Mexico of investigating
whether conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes increase incumbent voting (Díaz-Cayeros et
al. ; Díaz-Cayeros et al. ; De la O ). Instead, the paper exploits a dataset on federal
grants allocations that has not received much attention from the literature on federal spending. 
is
dataset consists of two funds that are allocated directly to the municipalities – i.e. FISM (Fondo de
Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social Municipal), and FORTAMUNDF (Fondo de Aportaciones
para el Fortalecimiento de los Municipios y las Demarcaciones Territoriales del Distrito Federal).

e paper focuses on the role of the presidency in allocating funds to municipalities, and exam-
ines the extent to which voters hold the president’s party accountable for this spending. 
e paper
uncovers the mechanism that the incumbent party in the federal government used to politicise pub-
lic funds: It shows that in the two years before the  presidential election the PAN allocated
disproportionately more funds to municipalities governed by co-partisans. 
e evidence indicates
that these transfers were instrumental in securing the victory of the PAN presidential candidate
in an election that was decided by less than . percent of the vote. Transfers were particularly
important in increasing the PAN vote when they were allocated to deprived municipalities.
Empirically, the paper uses a difference-in-difference (D-in-D) design to show that the party of
the president allocated more FISM and FORTAMUNDF funds to municipalities that had a co-
partisan as mayor. Both the semi-parametric, and the D-in-D estimator with matching show that
the levels of spending in PAN and non-PAN controlled municipalities followed a parallel trend
in the first four years of the administration of Vicente Fox (-). However, in the two
years preceding the election, PAN-aligned municipalities received an average of  pesos per capita
increases in transfers. 
is amounts to . dollars in  values.
To estimate the presidential election returns of tactical spending, the paper adopts two different
strategies. First, it estimates multi-level compositional vector autoregressive models, which show
that controlling the municipal administration conferred a significant advantage in the presidential
election, particularly in deprived municipalities that received disproportionately more funds. 
e
Given that social programmes such as PRONASOL – the precursor of the CCT programme Oportunidades – were
highly politicised until the last years of the PRI authoritarian period, the literature on distributive politics in Mexico has
focused mainly on investigating the electoral consequences of CCT spending since the demise of the PRI.
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PAN vote shares were three percent larger in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly
less than one standard deviation above the mean, than in deprived municipalities that received
transfers slightly less than one standard deviation below the mean. Second, the paper simulates
replications of the  presidential election results in which it investigates how the election result
would have looked if the federal government had not allocated more funds to PAN-controlled
municipalities. 
e probability that the PAN wins the election decreases from . percent – in
the simulations using the actually observed data – to . percent.
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e empirical findings discussed in the previous section have far-reaching theoretical implications
not only for the study of electoral accountability but also for comparative electoral behaviour, and
the quality of democracy in Latin America. In the following, I first address the implications of
my findings for the Mexican transition to democracy, the debate about the electoral returns of
tactical spending, and the contextual factors in economic voting, before concluding with general
implications for the study of parties and electoral accountability.
Implications for the Study of the Mexican Democratic Transition
How do parties previously in opposition to authoritarian regimes consolidate their electoral sup-
port once they access office? 
is is a central question for the study of democratic transitions,
particularly in countries with a previous history of fraudulent practices in the conduct of elections.
However, despite its importance, this question remains relatively unexplored in the Latin American
context, where most research focuses on party system (Mainwaring and Scully ; Mainwaring
et al. ), or party consolidation (Levitsky ; Randall and Svasand ). As a result, little
is known about the strategies that new governing parties follow to win the all-important second
election after a transition away from authoritarianism (Huntington ).

e  Mexican presidential election constitutes an ideal case study to investigate these dy-
namics. For  years, a single political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) domi-
nated Mexican politics. In its heyday, the PRI controlled every level of government and won every
significant election, not least by politicising the allocation of federal resources to sub-national lev-
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els (Greene , ; Magaloni ; Díaz-Cayeros et al. ). Levitsky and Way (b)
describe the Mexican political system in the years of PRI hegemony as one of competitive authori-
tarianism. By the late s, the authoritarian system began to show signs of exhaustion (Magaloni
). In , the party had to commit fraud to retain the presidency, and in  it lost its first
gubernatorial election in the state of Baja California. Eight years later, the opposition managed to
take a majority of lower house seats in the mid-term legislative elections, and three years later, the
PRI lost the presidency to the conservative PAN.
After winning the presidency in , the PAN made some important breaks with the past, most
notably on social policy. 
e federal government refrained from using social programmes such as
Oportunidades and Seguro Popular to provide direct benefits to its constituents (Díaz-Cayeros et
al. ; Díaz-Cayeros et al. ). However, while the PAN handed control over social policy
to technocrats, it did retain some discretion in the allocation of other central government funds,
as the third paper of this thesis shows. 
e PAN administration politicised central government
funds such as FISM and FORTAMUNDF, which were subject to less public scrutiny than CCT
programmes. 
us, the PAN used central government grants in a more subtle way than the PRI,
but in a very effective way nevertheless. In fact, the tactical allocation of federal resources to aligned
municipalities in the run-up to the  general election allowed the PAN to make electoral inroads
in poor areas of the countries which were traditional strongholds of the PRI and the leftist Partido
de la Revolución Democrática (PRD).

e finding that the PAN was able to consolidate its electoral support by using federal funds
tactically has clear implications for the debate about the Mexican transition in particular, and demo-
cratic transitions more generally. First, it qualifies the rosy view emerging from studies that only
evaluate the politicisation of social policy transfers, according to which the PAN did not allocate
funds tactically. Second, in accordance with previous studies, it suggests that an open electoral mar-
ket does not only lead to programmatic competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson ), but can also
present former opposition parties with the possibility of politicising federal resources themselves.

ird, it also suggests that the tactical allocation of central government funds is very difficult to
eliminate in young democracies in which the cost for “new” parties of moving back to the opposi-
tion is higher than in established democracies, and voters as well as local-level politicians count on
political connections for access to funds.
While the results of the third paper suggest that, after the defeat of the PRI, the presidency
retained a central position in shaping the electoral fortunes of the incumbent party by allocating
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funds tactically, two findings in the first two papers qualify the notion of a presidency with excessive
powers. First, neither President Fox, nor President Calderón were able to secure the nomination
of their preferred candidates in the  and  PAN primaries (Shirk ). 
is stands in
stark contrast to the years of PRI hegemony, in which outgoing presidents could handpick, and if
necessary impose their preferred candidates on the rest of the party (Weldon ; Langston ).
While PRI presidents could avoid “lame duck” status by retaining a central role in the political
process through the appointment of their successors, the two PAN presidents have not been able
to occupy such a central role.
Second, the survey experiment conducted in the second paper shows that the endorsement by
the outgoing president Calderón depresses the PAN Senate vote regardless of voters’ presidential
approval. 
e average treatment effect estimated for the model using the binary dependent variable
shows that respondents exposed to a Calderón endorsement are almost two percent less likely of
voting for the PAN than subjects not exposed to an endorsement. While further research needs to
clarify whether this is a Calderón effect, or whether this effect can be extended to other presidents,
the finding suggests a certain level of voters’ fatigue with presidents intervening in the electoral pro-
cess. 
e fact that presidential endorsements cannot be considered a strategy of boosting electoral
support is likely to further decrease the president’s power.
Implications for the Debate About the Returns of Tactical Spending
Which parties benefit from politicising public resources to favour co-partisans? In recent years, this
question has received considerable attention from the literature on distributive politics. Answers
to this question have focused on socio-economic factors, ideology, and the interaction of these two
variables.
Kriner and Reeves () study the effect of spending on presidential election results in the
United States. Using individual-level data, they show that liberal voters reward incumbents more
than conservative voters for increases in public spending. Calvo and Murillo () focus on legisla-
tive elections in Argentina and find that the Peronist party is rewarded for increasing the number of
public employees, but that the vote shares of the second main party, the Radicals, are not affected by
increases in public employment. Using more disaggregated data at the municipal level, Nazareno et
al. () find an even starker effect: Patronage spending by Radical mayors depresses their party’s
vote shares.
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What explains the different electoral returns on patronage for the Radicals and the Peronists? 
e
authors of both studies provide similar answers: For the middle-class constituents of the Radical
party, spending on patronage indicates an inefficient use of government resources. In contrast,
for the typical working-class Peronist constituent, patronage has rather a positive connotation (i.e.
access to jobs). 
is argument resonates positively with the findings of a recent study, also on
Argentina, which shows that high electoral competition is compatible with clientelism when poverty
is high, but decreases the incentives for clientelism where poverty is low (Weitz-Shapiro ).
Along these lines, the results of the third paper constitute an interesting puzzle. 
e paper shows
opposite results to the findings of Kriner and Reeves, Calvo and Murillo, and Nazareno and co-
authors. 
e paper demonstrates that the Mexican party that traditionally appeals most to conser-
vative, educated middle- and high-income voters – the PAN – is clearly rewarded for increasing
spending to sub-national governments. It is not completely clear what the differences between the
PAN and the Radicals in Argentina are, and further research needs to investigate the Mexican find-
ings in more detail. However, some hypotheses come to mind. It is likely that these results are
related to the interaction of two main factors: 
e three-party strategic environment, and the high
levels of income inequality in the country.
In Mexico, the media constantly exposes cases of corruption, and allegations of clientelistic prac-
tices by the three major parties. As a result, voters are likely left with the perception that all three
main parties politicise resources, which leaves no option for middle-class and aﬄuent conservative
voters other than voting for one of the minor parties – thereby effectively wasting their vote. In
addition, the fact that Mexico has a very unequal social structure suggests that there is a large de-
mand for targeted spending in poor areas of the country. Given that non-poor voters who would
otherwise oppose the politicisation of public resources are not likely to defect, conservative parties
like the PAN may be encouraged to target poor voters with the expectation of gaining their vote
without sacrificing their natural constituents.
Implications for the Debate About Contextual Factors in Economic Voting

e main theoretical development emerging from the comparative economic voting literature in
recent years is that the political and institutional contexts, in which elections take place, mediate the

e formerly authoritarian PRI, which has the largest network of political brokers and controls the largest numbers
of governorships and municipalities, is particularly well-known for manipulating different aspects of the political process.
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magnitude of the economic vote. 
e notion that context shapes economic voting was introduced
by Powell and Whitten (), who argue that incumbent parties are held to higher account when
clarity of responsibility is high rather than low. Since the publication of this seminal article, count-
less other studies have shown that several contextual factors affect how voters sanction incumbents
(Whitten and Palmer ; Samuels ; Duch and Stevenson ; Dalton and Anderson ;
Singer and Carlin ). 
e first paper of this thesis shows that Latin America is no exception
to this view of elections. In accordance with the central thesis of that paper, the results show that
the type of presidential candidate the incumbent party nominates affects the magnitude of the eco-
nomic vote. In open seat elections, successor candidates are subject to more economic voting than
non-successors. When presidents run for re-election, the magnitude of the economic vote is higher
than it is for the other two types of candidates.

e type of presidential candidate is not the only factor mediating the economic vote in Latin
America. 
e first paper corroborates the finding obtained from developed democracies that the
clarity of responsibility affects how voters punish and reward incumbents. Model  in Table 
shows that the magnitude of the economic vote increases when the party of the president has a
legislative majority. Majority situation is statistically significant and in the expected direction when it
is interacted with economy got better, but not when it is interacted with economy got worse. Model  in
Table  also tests whether there is more economic voting when presidential elections are held on the
same day as legislative ones, in contexts of low trade dependence, and when incumbent presidents
switch policies. However, none of these variables have the predicted effects on the magnitude of
the economic vote.

e models presented in Table  and Appendix  of the first paper estimate how the different
contextual variables mediate the magnitude of the economic vote all at once, i.e. paired with each
other. Estimating the models in this way has two advantages. First, they show that the main
relationship of interest – that the type of presidential candidate affects attributions of responsibility
– has the hypothesised effect even after controlling for all the other variables. Second, following
Duch and Stevenson (), the models produce at least some order-of-magnitude estimates of the
relative importance of the contextual variables for the economic vote.
However, due to some level of collinearity in the sample, and the fact that there are only 
observations of contextual variables in the models, it is difficult to estimate the independent effect
of each contextual variable. One important consequence of combining all the contextual variables
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in a single model is that, in some cases, the interaction effects are statistically significant only in one
direction, and in others, not statistically significant at all despite being in the predicted direction.
As more individual-level studies that estimate contextual variation in economic voting become
available in future years, researchers will get better estimates of the independent effect of each
variable (Duch and Stevenson : ). In the meantime, one can get a sense of how each
contextual variable would affect economic voting if more contextual observations were available,
by estimating individual models for each of these variables. Table  does precisely that. Model 
estimates the effect of candidate type on the economic vote. In accordance with the main findings
of the first paper, successor candidates are held more electorally accountable than non-successors
in open seat elections, while re-standing presidents are subject to more economic voting than the
other two types of candidates. Model  shows that incumbent parties are subject to greater electoral
sanctioning in high clarity situations, i.e. when incumbent parties enjoy a legislative majority. In
contrast to Model  in Table  of the first paper, majority situation is not only statistically significant
and in the expected direction when it is interacted with economy got better, but also when it is
interacted with economy got worse. 
e results of Model  do not conform to the expectation that
there is more economic voting in concurrent presidential and legislative elections. As in Table  in
the first paper, the fact that concurrent elections when interacted with economy got worse is positive
and statistically significant, suggests that the impact of negative economic evaluations on the vote
is lower in concurrent elections. Model  shows that there is less economic voting in cases of high
exposure to the global economy. Trade dependence interacted with economy got better is negatively
signed and statistically significant at the five percent level. Model  shows that incumbent parties
are not subject to higher electoral standards when incumbent presidents switch policies. Although
policy switcher is signed in the hypothesised direction when interacted with economy got better and
economy got worse, it is not statistically significant.

is may be due to the low number of policy switchers in my sample – only five cases.
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Figure : Political Context and Economic Voting
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
Vo
tin
g 
In
cu
m
be
nt
Worse Same Better
PANEL 1
A - Re-running President B - Successor Candidate
C - Non-successor Candidate
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PANEL 2
A - Majority Situation B - Minority Situation
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PANEL 3
A - Concurrent Elections B - Non-concurrent Elections
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PANEL 4
A - One Std. Dev Above Mean B - Average Trade
C - One Std. Dev. Below Mean
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
Vo
tin
g 
In
cu
m
be
nt
Worse Same Better
PANEL 5
A - Policy Switcher B - Non-policy Switcher
Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evaluations of the national economy for different levels of
five contextual variables. Estimations are for a non-married man between  and  years of age who has a university
degree and is in the highest socio-economic category.
Panel : Slope A is significantly different from B (p=.) and C (p=.) for economy got better, as well as from B
(p=.) and C (p=.) for economy got worse. Slope B is significantly different from C for economy got better (p=.)
and economy got worse (p=.).
Panel : Slope A is significantly different from B for economy got better (p=.) and economy got worse (p=.).
Panel : Slopes A and B are not significantly different from each other for economy got better (p=.), but are significantly
different for economy got worse (p=.).
Panel : Slopes A, B, and C are significantly different from each other for economy got better (p=.), but not for economy
got worse (p=.).
Panel : Slope A is neither significantly different from B for economy got better (p=.), nor for economy got worse
(p=.).
Sources: CEP, CSES, LAPOP, and Latinobarómetro.
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Figure  plots predicted probabilities of voting for the party of the president against different
values of economic perceptions. In each plot I include slopes for different values of each contextual
variable. Panel  looks at the effect of candidate type, and shows how the probability of voting for
each type of candidate changes as a function of economic evaluations. 
e three slopes are statisti-
cally significantly different from each other. Panel  shows how the probability of voting for the
incumbent party changes in minority and majority situations as a function of economic evaluations.

e slope is much steeper in majority than in minority contexts, suggesting that incumbents are held
more accountable for the economy when they have a legislative majority. Panel  looks at the effect
of having concurrent presidential and legislative elections. 
e slope is steeper in non-concurrent
elections when economic evaluations move from same to worse, which is not consistent with the
claim that incumbent parties are held more accountable when presidents and legislatures are elected
on the same day. Panel  shows how the incumbent vote changes in situations with average levels
of trade, and with one standard deviation above and below the mean as a function of economic per-
ceptions. When evaluations move from same to better, voters hold the incumbent more accountable
in cases of low trade dependence. Finally, Panel  looks at the effect of having versus not having a
policy switcher as president. 
e two slopes are not statistically distinguishable from each other.
Taken together, the results of the first paper and the this section show that context matters a great
deal for the economic vote in Latin America. 
e analyses show that a contextual factor that has not
been previously studied – the type of presidential candidate – significantly affects the way in which
voters sanction incumbent parties for the performance of the government. 
e results also show
that some of the key contextual factors that have been shown to mediate performance-based voting
in developed democracies – most of which have a parliamentary form of government – also have
an effect on the economy-voter relationship in the presidential systems of Latin America. Voters
hold incumbent parties more electorally accountable in contexts of high rather than low clarity
of responsibility, and in contexts of high rather than low exposure to global economic forces. In
contrast, the factors that are particular to presidential systems and to Latin America – the concurrent
election of the president and the legislature, and whether a president is a policy switcher – do not
have an effect on the magnitude of the economic vote.
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Implications for the Study of Parties and Electoral Accountability

e publication of the report of the American Political Science Association on the state of the
American two-party system in  constituted a landmark in the study of political parties. 
e
central message of the report was that the American political system needed to develop “responsible
parties” to perform its main functions properly. According to the report, the notion of a responsible
party implied that party organisation had to dominate all aspects of the democratic process, from
candidate selection to campaigning, government formation, and policymaking. Even though in
the decades after the publication of the APSA report, students of American politics bemoaned the
absence of responsible parties, “the notion of a responsible party [erected] a normative standard by
which scholars judge the quality of collective representation and accountability under democracy”
(Samuels and Shugart : ).

e “responsible party government” model had a long lasting impact on the electoral account-
ability literature. 
e vast majority of further work conceptualised electoral accountability in terms
of the standards set by the APSA report. Retrospective voting studies focused on explaining the vote
for the incumbent party as a whole, without accounting for the possibility that the magnitude of
the performance-based vote may vary depending on the identity of the candidates of the incumbent
party. 
us, the normative fixation with collective party accountability resulted in a lack of theo-
rising about the effect of intra-party politics and candidate-specific variables on how voters assign
responsibility for past behaviour. 
e few studies that did touch upon this issue mainly reinforced
the views held by the responsible party government model.
In the past decade, three studies on economic voting in American presidential elections have
begun to address the possibility that intra-party variation in the type of candidate may have an
effect on the magnitude of the economic vote. Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (), Norpoth (),
and Campbell et al. () show that incumbent parties are held more electorally accountable
when presidents re-run. Campbell et al. (: ) make their theoretical contribution very
explicit: “[A]ccountability for government performance is partly a matter of party responsibility
and partly a matter of personal responsibility associated with the president. When an incumbent

e early work of David Samuels () is a good example. He claims that because presidents’ legacies are “shaped
by who succeeds them to office, they also care about who that person turns out to be,” and therefore “ought to attempt to
convince voters that they share a personal and political affinity with their successor-candidate” (Samuels : ). 
is
implies that whether a president runs for re-election or not should not have an effect on the magnitude of the economic
vote. As he later summarises, there is “no reason why voters could not hold political parties as a whole and presidential
governments as a whole [. . . ] accountable in a retrospective voting fashion” (Samuels : ).
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is rerunning, both personal and party responsibility apply. When the incumbent is not rerunning,
only party responsibility applies to the vote [. . . ].”

e results of the first paper show that in Latin America, voters also hold incumbent parties
more accountable when the sitting president re-runs, than when the party has to nominate another
candidate in open seat elections. 
is suggests that there is an accountability effect due to an incum-
bent president running for re-election. However, in contrast to the three studies on the American
presidency discussed above, I move beyond the dichotomous distinction between individual and
party accountability, and disentangle the notion of party accountability into two components.

e performance-based vote that is associated with non-successors in the first paper, and with
non-endorsed candidates in the second, can be conceptualised as the “lower bound” of party ac-
countability. 
ese types of candidates have no close ties to the outgoing government, and thus
constitute a good measure of something close to a “pure” party accountability effect. In contrast,
the performance-based vote that is associated with successors, and endorsed candidates can be con-
ceived as the “upper bound” of party accountability. 
is is clearly not a pure party accountability
effect, because voters associate successors and endorsed candidates more closely with the reputation
of the outgoing president.

e finding that, in open seat elections, voters distinguish candidates with close ties from candi-
dates without close ties to the president, indicates that disentangling the “party accountability” effect
into two components provides a better picture of how voters hold incumbents accountable. It also
suggests that voters can hold a party accountable, despite not holding it collectively responsible. In
the classic accountability literature, “party accountability” and “collective party responsibility” are
used interchangeably (White ). Yet these are two different phenomena. For collective party re-
sponsibility to take place, voters must hold incumbent parties accountable to the same degree when
a president re-runs, as when the candidate is a successor or a non-successor. My results disprove this
assumption. At the same time, I provide evidence that, while the magnitude of the performance-
based vote varies by candidate type, voters also hold the party accountable for the performance of
the executive – even when the presidential nominee is a non-successor, or the candidates do not
receive an endorsement.
In the conclusion to Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers, Samuels and Shugart (: )
leave the question open as to “whether voters in presidential elections are retrospectively punishing
an individual, a party, or both.” 
e findings of the first two papers of this thesis suggest that the
answer to this is question is clearly both.
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e empirical findings summarised at the beginning of this chapter have normative implications
for our understanding of how candidates’ characteristics affect the way in which voters sanction
incumbent parties, as well as for the presidential re-election debate in Latin America. I discuss both
normative implications in this section.
Avoiding Responsibility or Differential Attributions of Responsibility?

e results of the first two papers allow for two conflicting normative assessments of how can-
didates’ characteristics affect the way in which voters sanction incumbents. 
e first normative
position favours the classic notion of “collective party responsibility.” In this view, the fact that
voters hold incumbent parties more accountable when candidates have close ties to the outgoing
president has negative implications. It suggests that parties can use nominations strategically to
avoid responsibility for their tenure in office. During economic expansions, parties can nominate
candidates with close ties to the government, and when the economy contracts, they can nominate
candidates who are critical of the executive.

e alternative normative interpretation sees the fact that voters hold the incumbent party ac-
countable in different ways depending on the identity of the candidates as less problematic because
even when candidates are not closely related to the outgoing president – i.e. non-successors in the
first paper, and non-endorsed candidates in the second – voters still associate, at least to some degree,
the candidates of the incumbent party to the performance of the outgoing government. In other
words, voters exercise a “minimum level” of party accountability. Indeed, given this “minimum
level” of accountability, the fact that voters punish and reward the incumbent party more when its
candidates have close ties to the executive, can be seen as a desirable outcome. It suggests that voters
punish and reward those politicians with closer ties to the executive more than politicians with weak
ties to the government. As suggested in the conclusions to the second paper, this second normative
view favours a more flexible approach, in which the party brand matters for accountability but vot-
ers also hold particular candidates more accountable, depending on their ties to the government.

is view recognises the role of intra-party groups and factions in shaping policy outcomes and
voters’ perceptions of these outcomes.
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e Presidential Re-election Debate in Latin America

e institution of presidential re-election has been a source of contention throughout Latin Amer-
ican history. In contrast to the United States, which settled the presidential re-election debate at
the outset of the republic, Latin American countries experienced both periods of no re-election and
phases in which presidents were allowed to re-run – in some cases even without term limits. In
most cases, presidents who abolished term limits ended up concentrating excessive power and per-
sonalising the presidency. 
e case of Porfirio Díaz, who was re-elected five times in late nineteenth
century Mexico, may be an extreme example but is by no means an exception. In recent years,
Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, have sought to follow in his footsteps.

e argument against presidential re-election in Latin America is that democracies in the region
are yet fragile and that re-election provisions thus entail too high a risk of presidents ending up
concentrating excessive power. If Latin America did not have a history of caudillismo, and presidents
governed within the limits provided by their constitutions, re-election would probably not be a
cause for concern. On the contrary, allowing presidential re-election could have several advantages,
most notably for electoral accountability. As Carey (: ) notes, re-election “should improve
democratic responsiveness and accountability by aligning the incentives of incumbent presidents
more closely with those of voters.”

e first paper of this thesis provides empirical evidence in support of the argument that re-
election enhances accountability. It shows that there is greater electoral sanctioning when incum-
bent presidents re-run than when incumbent parties nominate another candidate in open seat elec-
tions. However, this finding does not mean that Latin American countries should necessarily rush
to abolish term limits. If the additional accountability associated with having a re-running presi-
dent opens the door for presidents to abuse their powers, policy-makers should choose democratic
stability over electoral sanctioning. 
e key question then is which countries can afford to change
the constitutional rules to introduce presidential re-election and which ones cannot.
Developments towards establishing re-election in Latin America since the 
ird Wave of democrati-
sation offers some clues. In this period, incumbent presidents in nine countries managed to intro-
duce constitutional changes to run for a consecutive term, while ten presidents in seven Latin Amer-
ican countries sought to make similar constitutional reforms without success. In some countries
– most notably Brazil, Argentina and Colombia – the introduction of presidential re-election did
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not lead to presidents abusing their powers to stay indefinitely in power. In other cases, however,
the results were less auspicious. In Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, incumbent
presidents relied on extra-constitutional means to introduce reforms on term limits.
What are the differences between these groups of countries? 
e first and, arguably, most impor-
tant difference, is that – with the exception of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua – the presidents in the
second group of countries were all political outsiders, while none of the presidents in the first group
fit that description. A second important difference is that the presidents in the second group gov-
erned in the context of a collapse of the traditional party system and, as a result, did not face strong
sources of opposition (Mainwaring et al. ). A third important difference is that horizontal
accountability was much more robust in the first than in the second set of countries (O’Donnell
).
Based on the above observations, one can cautiously conclude that the consolidated democracies
in the region – i.e. Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica – should be able to introduce presidential re-
election without any threats to the stability and quality of their democracies. 
ese three countries
do not allow presidents to run for a consecutive term, although they are by most measures of party
system and democratic consolidation more stable than Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, where the
experience with re-election has not been detrimental. 
e evidence presented in this thesis about
the accountability enhancing effects of presidential re-election should incite policy-makers in the
consolidated countries of the region to consider the adoption of re-election provisions.
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e findings of this thesis offer several avenues for further research. First, the literature on electoral
accountability should continue to investigate how variation in political and institutional context
affects how voters punish and reward incumbents. Despite the progress made in recent years, there
is still room for more. Do the findings about the effect of candidate type on electoral accountability
identified in the first paper carry over to parliamentary democracies? 
e fact that presidential
candidates campaign and are elected separately from legislators in presidentialism, may provide
additional incentives for voters to hold individual politicians accountable independently from their
In Argentina and Colombia, presidents Carlos Menem and Álvaro Uribe did attempt to change the rules to run for
a third consecutive term. In both cases, their attempts were unsuccessful, and the presidents accepted these outcomes.
Álvaro Uribe in Colombia can be described as a maverick – i.e. a politician who leaves a traditional party to run
for president as an independent (Carreras ) – but not as an outsider.
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parties (Wiesehomeier and Benoit ; Samuels and Shugart ). However, as suggested in
the first paper, this does not mean that the effect of candidate type should not also be detectable
in parliamentarism. After all, parties in all regime types have different factions and politicians
with varying levels of identification with the policies of the government. Moreover, research has
shown that leader images have an effect on the vote independently of party images in established
parliamentary systems like the United Kingdom (Andersen and Evans ) and Canada (Johnston
). 
is suggests that if voters in consolidated parliamentary democracies also take candidate-
specific factors into account when casting a vote, it is likely they will hold the party of the prime
minister accountable in different ways depending on the candidate’s identity.

is thesis shows that intra-party variation in the type of candidate has considerable effects on the
magnitude of the performance-based vote. Future work should explore variation across types of par-
ties. 
e fixation with the “responsible party government” model in the accountability research pro-
gramme has slowed down theoretical progress on the relationship between party organisation and
electoral sanctioning. It is likely, however, that voters hold programmatic and non-programmatic
parties accountable in different ways. Moreover, it is likely that this is contingent on whether in-
cumbent presidents run for re-election or not.
In studying the effect of candidate type on electoral accountability without investigating in any
detail why successors are nominated in some contexts and non-successors in others, I have put the
cart before the horse. Future work should therefore devote close attention to the issue of presidential
nominations. Besides suggesting that economic factors do not drive the selection of successors
and non-successors, the analysis conducted in the first paper did not provide any further clues.
From a theoretical perspective, investigating the factors behind the selection of successors and non-
successors sheds light on the sources of intra-party conflict and the mechanisms available to solve
those conflicts in “presidentialized parties” (Samuels and Shugart ). 
e central question is
how two principals – the outgoing president’s faction, and the intra-party challengers – agree on
one single agent. Empirically, this research should include data across time and from presidential
democracies around the world.

e first paper also provided some clues on which types of incumbent presidents are more likely
to be successful in passing constitutional reform to introduce immediate presidential re-election.
I found that positive economic evaluations in the first years of a presidential term are positively
correlated with the introduction of presidential re-election. I also found that presidents leading
personalist vehicles are more likely to succeed in their attempt to introduce re-election. However,
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I was able to show this in a limited sample of only  observations. Future work should explore a
larger sample of presidential democracies and investigate a larger set of explanatory variables, such
as the level of party system institutionalisation, and the popularity of the president. 
e re-election
debate is clearly a central issue in most presidential democracies, and finding clues as to why some
presidents are more successful than others in changing the rules of the game would constitute a
major step forward in our understanding of how these systems operate.
As suggested in the conclusions to the second paper, future research should continue to explore
the conditions under which source cues matter for electoral accountability. First, it would be im-
portant to investigate whether endorsements shape retrospective voting in presidential elections,
i.e. by randomising endorsements from the outgoing president to the presidential candidate of her
party. Second, researchers should examine how voters respond to different source cues from the
incumbent party. For example, do endorsements from the president have a stronger accountability
effect than endorsements from a lower-level politician such as a senator or a governor?
Research on source cues should also continue to expand its empirical focus to new democracies,
and develop new theoretical insights based on the particularities of these democracies. One char-
acteristic that many developing democracies share is the weakness of political parties, and the lack
of credibility of political institutions and politicians (Randall and Svasand ; Mainwaring et
al. ; Sanchez ; Doyle ). Studies might also examine how voters respond to endorse-
ments from politicians and from public opinion leaders without partisan attachments. Such studies
would also benefit from randomising the credibility of the source, so as to compare politicians and
public opinion leaders with and without credibility.
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e regression analyses include the following individual-level variables:
VOTE FOR INCUMBENT
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent votes for the incumbent party,  if she votes for any
other candidate (“no answer” and “don’t know” are coded as missing).
POSITIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent thinks the economy improved in the past  months,
 otherwise.
NEGATIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent thinks the economy deteriorated in the past  months,
 otherwise.
GOVERNMENT APPROVAL
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent approves the performance of the government, 
otherwise.
AGE
Age of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:
 — –
 — –
 — –
 — –
 — –
 —  and over
EDUCATION
Education level of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:
 — Illiterate
 — Elementary uncompleted
 — Elementary completed
 — Secondary uncompleted
 — Secondary completed
 — Higher education uncompleted
 — Higher education completed
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MALE
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent is a man,  if she is a woman.
SOCIOECONOMIC LEVEL
Socioeconomic level of respondent. Continuous variable based on the interviewers’ observations of
respondents’ living conditions. Coded as follows:
- — Very bad
- — Bad
 — Regular
 — Good
 — Very good
MARRIED
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent is married,  otherwise.
In addition, the study employs the following case-specific variables:
RE-RUNNING PRESIDENT
Dummy variable coded  if the incumbent president re-runs,  otherwise.
Sources: See Appendix .
SUCCESSOR
Dummy variable coded  if the incumbent candidate is a successor,  otherwise.
Appendix  explains how this variable is conceptualised and operationalised, and provides a list of
sources used to code this variable.
NON-SUCCESSOR
Dummy variable coded  if the incumbent candidate is a non-successor,  otherwise.
Appendix  explains how this variable is conceptualised and operationalised, and provides a list of
sources used to code this variable.
MAJORITY SITUATION
Dummy variable coded  if the party of the president has a majority in both chambers – in cases
of bicameralism – or in only one chamber – in cases of unicameralism,  otherwise.
Sources: Nohlen (), National Electoral Institutes.
CONCURRENT ELECTIONS
Dummy variable coded  if the presidential election takes place on the same day as a legislative
election,  otherwise.
Sources: Nohlen (), National Electoral Institutes.
PERSONALISM
Dummy variable coded  if the incumbent party is a personalistic vehicle, i.e. a taxi party,  other-
wise. Appendix  provides a summary of how this variable is conceptualised and operationalised.
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PRIMARY
Dummy variable coded  if the incumbent candidate is chosen in a primary election,  otherwise.
I define primaries as elections in which at least all party members are allowed to cast a vote.
Sources: Carey and Polga-Hecimovich () dataset, Latin American Weekly and Regional
Reports, Latin American Database.
POLICY SWITCHER
Dummy variable coded  if the incumbent president is a policy switcher,  otherwise. I follow
Johnson and Ryu’s () definition of policy switchers as politicians who run on a particular set
of policies, but enact policies in the opposite direction once in office.
Sources: Johnson and Ryu () dataset.
COALITION
Dummy variable coded  if there is a coalition government in place at the time of the election, 
otherwise.
Sources: Cheibub et. al. () dataset, Latin American Weekly and Regional Reports, Latin
American Database.
AGE OF INCUMBENT PARTY
Continuous variable equal to the election year minus the year in which the incumbent party was
founded.
Sources: Nohlen (), political parties’ websites.
PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALISATION
Continuous variable equal to the average age of all parties that gained more than  percent of
the vote in the last legislative election. 
is variable has been previously used by Mainwaring and
Scully (), and by Roberts and Wibbels ().
Sources: Nohlen (), National Electoral Institutes, political parties’ websites.
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES
Continuous variable equal to the effective number of parliamentary parties winning seats in the
previous election.
Sources: Singer and Carlin () dataset.
TRADE DEPENDENCE
Continuous variable measured as imports and exports as a percentage of GDP.
Sources: World Development Indicators ().
PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH
Continuous variable that measures the level of per capita GDP growth in the year of the election
– for elections conducted in the last six months of the year – or in the year previous to the election
– for elections conducted in the first six months of the year.
Sources: World Development Indicators ().
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CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT
Continuous variable that measures the change in unemployment in the year of the election – for
elections conducted in the last six months of the year – or in the year previous to the election – for
elections conducted in the first six months of the year.
Sources: World Development Indicators ().
LOG OF INFLATION RATE
Continuous variable that represents the percentage change in the cost of goods and services
consumed by the public in the year of the election – for elections conducted in the last six months
of the year – or in the year previous to the election – for elections conducted in the first six months
of the year. 
is variable is logged, due to some extreme values found in the data.
Sources: World Development Indicators ().

e following table summarises how the institutional and contextual variables were coded for each
election in each country.
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Table : Institutional and Contextual Variables
Election Candidate
Type
Majority
Position
Electoral
Cycle
Primary Policy
Switch
Coalition Perso-
nalism
Source
Argentina  R MIN C NP NPS NC NP LTB
Argentina  S MIN C NP NPS COAL PERS LTB
Argentina  R MIN C NP NPS COAL PERS LAPOP
Bolivia  NS MIN C NP NPS COAL PERS LTB
Bolivia  R MIN C NP NPS NC NP LTB
Brazil  R MIN C NP NPS COAL NP LTB
Brazil  S MIN C NP PS COAL NP LTB
Brazil  R MIN C NP PS COAL NP LTB
Brazil  S MIN C NP NPS COAL NP LTB
Chile  S MIN C PRIMARY NPS COAL NP CEP
Chile  NS MIN NC PRIMARY NPS COAL NP CEP
Chile  S MIN C PRIMARY NPS COAL NP CEP
Chile  NS MIN C PRIMARY NPS COAL NP LTB
Colombia  R MIN NC NP NPS COAL PERS LAPOP
Colombia  S MIN NC NP NPS COAL PERS LAPOP
Costa Rica  NS MIN C PRIMARY PS NC NP LTB
Costa Rica  NS MIN C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LTB
Costa Rica  S MIN C NP NPS NC NP LTB
Costa Rica  S MIN C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LAPOP
Dom. Rep.  R MIN NC NP NPS NC NP LTB
Dom. Rep.  R MAJ NC PRIMARY NPS NC NP LAPOP
Dom. Rep.  S MAJ NC PRIMARY NPS NC NP LAPOP
Ecuador  R MAJ C NP NPS NC PERS LTB
El Salvador  S MIN NC NP NPS NC NP LTB
El Salvador  S MIN NC PRIMARY NPS NC NP LAPOP
El Salvador  S MIN NC NP NPS NC NP LTB
Guatemala  NS MAJ C NP NPS NC NP LAPOP
Guatemala  NS MIN C NP NPS NC PERS LTB
Honduras  NS MAJ C NP NPS NC NP LTB
Honduras  NS MAJ C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LTB
Honduras  NS MIN C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LTB
Honduras  NS MIN C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LTB
Mexico  S MIN C PRIMARY NPS NC NP CSES
Mexico  NS MIN C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LTB
Nicaragua  S MIN C NP NPS NC NP LTB
Nicaragua  S MIN C NP NPS NC PERS LTB
Nicaragua  R MIN C NP NPS NC NP LAPOP
Panama  S MIN C PRIMARY PS NC NP LTB
Panama  S MIN C NP NPS COAL NP LAPOP
Panama  NS MAJ C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LTB
Paraguay  NS MIN C NP NPS NC NP LTB
Paraguay  NS MIN C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LTB
Paraguay  S MIN C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LAPOP
Peru  R MAJ C NP PS NC PERS LTB
Peru  R MAJ C NP NPS NC PERS LTB
Uruguay  NS MIN C PRIMARY NPS COAL NP LTB
Uruguay  S MIN C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LTB
Uruguay  NS MAJ C PRIMARY NPS NC NP LAPOP
Venezuela  R MAJ C NP NPS COAL PERS LTB
Venezuela  R MAJ NC NP NPS COAL PERS LTB
Venezuela  R MAJ NC NP NPS COAL PERS LAPOP
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e purpose of this appendix is to summarise the criteria used to conceptualise and operationalise
presidential candidates as successors and non-successors. 
e appendix also provides information
about the context in which these candidates were nominated, and a description of their policy
preferences based on newspaper end election reports.

e data on successor candidates were obtained from different sources, including the Latin Ameri-
can Weekly and Regional Reports, the Latin American Database, the CIDOB biographies of Latin
American presidents, articles in local newspapers, and the election reports from Electoral Studies.

e data on primary elections for – were obtained from John Carey’s website. I updated
the remaining years.
Conceptualisation
Conceptually, a successor is a presidential candidate who wins the nomination of the incumbent
party or coalition with the support of the outgoing president. She is the preferred option of the
outgoing president among the candidates seeking to clinch the presidential nomination. Con-
versely, a non-successor is a presidential candidate who secures the nomination of the incumbent
party or coalition without the support of the outgoing president. She is not the preferred option
of the outgoing president among the candidates seeking the presidential nomination.
Empirically, two different scenarios describe how successors and non-successors are nominated in
my dataset. In the first scenario, there is contestation for the presidential nomination, i.e. two
or more candidates face or are scheduled to face each other in an internal election. 
e internal
election is either a primary – open to at least all party or coalition members – or a contest in which
only delegates are allowed to cast a vote. In the second scenario there is no contestation to determine
the presidential aspirant. 
e candidate is either handpicked by one of the dominant factions, or
is chosen by acclamation – i.e. there is an overarching consensus among different factions on who
the candidate should be.
Successors:
) No Contestation:
a) 
e president handpicks her preferred candidate, who clinches the nomination without the
need of an internal election.
b) 
ere is a consensus candidate who has the president’s support. As a result of this consensus,
the candidate does not face any intra-party challengers and there is no need to conduct an internal
election.
) Contestation:
a) 
e preferred candidate of the president defeats one or more candidates in an internal election.
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b) An internal election is scheduled to take place, but the main challenger of the candidate
supported by the president withdraws from the race, anticipating a defeat.

e fact that an internal election is scheduled in scenario b indicates that, unlike scenarios a
and b, there are sources of contestation inside the government camp. 
e fact that the challenger
withdraws her candidacy before the internal election takes place suggests that she does not want to
pay the political cost of a likely wipeout.
Non-Successors:
) No Contestation:
) A faction of the party handpicks a candidate who wins the nomination without the need of an
internal election. 
e handpicked candidate is not the preferred option of the outgoing president.
) Contestation:
a) 
e preferred candidate of the outgoing president loses the internal election.
b) An internal party election is to be conducted, but the the president’s preferred candidate with-
draws from the race.
Operationalisation
Empirically, I code candidates as successors and non-successors based on five criteria:
. Media and/or election reports document public statements of support from the outgoing
president to a candidate during the nomination process. If the endorsed candidate clinches
the nomination, she becomes a successor. If one of the candidates not receiving a public
statement of support wins the nomination, she becomes a non-successor.
. Media and/or election reports describe candidates seeking nomination as the preferred op-
tion of the outgoing president during the selection process. 
is is indicated by expressions
like “favourite,” “protégée,” “preferred candidate,” “ally,” “confidant,” etc. Alternatively, can-
didates seeking nomination are described as opponents of the outgoing president. 
is is
indicated by expressions like “rival,” “critic,” “opponent,” “defeated the preferred candidate
of the outgoing president,” etc. If the former clinches the nomination, she becomes a succes-
sor. If the latter wins the nomination, she becomes a non-successor.
. Even if expressions like “protégée,” “favourite,” or “rival” and “critic” are not used explicitly,
media and/or election reports make it unambiguously clear whether the candidate is a suc-
cessor or a non-successor.
. In cases in which coalition governments nominate a single candidate, candidates who belong
to the party of the president are coded as successors unless criteria  to  indicate otherwise.
Candidates who do not belong to the party of the president are coded as non-successors
unless criteria  to  indicate otherwise.
. Candidates who have occupied positions of trust, like Chief of Staff or Minister of the Presi-
dency are coded as successors unless criteria  to  indicate otherwise. Candidates that have
not occupied such positions are coded as non-successors unless criteria  to  indicate other-
wise.
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Table : Incumbent Presidents and Candidate Types in Latin America
Election President Candidate Type Defin. Oper.
Argentina  Carlos Menem (PJ) Carlos Menem R
Argentina  Néstor Kirchner (FPV) Cristina Fernández S a , , 
Argentina  C. Fernández (FPV) C. Fernández R
Bolivia  Jorge Quiroga (ADN) Ronald MacLean NS a , 
Bolivia  Evo Morales (MAS) Evo Morales R
Brazil  F. H. Cardoso (PSDB) F. H. Cardoso R
Brazil  F. H. Cardoso (PSDB) José Serra S b , 
Brazil  Lula (PT) Lula R
Brazil  Lula (PT) Dilma Rousseff S a , , , 
Chile  Patricio Aylwin (C-DC) Eduardo Frei (C-DC) S a 
Chile  Eduardo Frei (C-DC) Ricardo Lagos (C-PS) NS a 
Chile  Ricardo Lagos (C-PS) Michele Bachelet (PS) S b , , 
Chile  Michele Bachelet (C-PS) Eduardo Frei (C-DC) NS a 
Colombia  Álvaro Uribe (PC) Álvaro Uribe R
Colombia  Álvaro Uribe (PC) J. M. Santos (U) S a , , 
Costa Rica  José Figueres (PLN) José M. Corrales NS a , 
Costa Rica  M. Rodríguez (PSUC) Abel Pacheco NS a , 
Costa Rica  Abel Pacheco (PSUC) Ricardo Toledo S b , , 
Costa Rica  Oscar Arias (PLN) Laura Chinchilla S a , , 
Dom. Rep.  Hipólito Mejía (PRD) Hipólito Mejía R
Dom. Rep.  L. Fernández (PLD) L. Fernández R
Dom. Rep.  L. Fernández (PLD) Danilo Medina S a , 
Ecuador  Rafael Correa (AP) Rafael Correa R
El Salvador  A. Calderón (ARENA) Francisco Flores S b , 
El Salvador  F. Flores (ARENA) Antonio Saca S a , 
El Salvador  A. Saca (ARENA) Rodrigo Ávila S a , 
Guatemala  Álvaro Arzú (PAN) Oscar Berger NS  
Guatemala  Oscar Berger (GANA) A. Giammattei NS  , 
Honduras  Carlos R. Reina (PLH) Carlos R. Flores NS a 
Honduras  Carlos R. Flores (PLH) Rafael Pineda NS a 
Honduras  R. Maduro (PNH) Porfirio Lobo NS a 
Honduras  R. Micheletti (PLH) Elvin Santos NS a , 
Mexico  Ernesto Zedillo (PRI) Francisco Labastida S a , 
Mexico  Vicente Fox (PAN) Felipe Calderón NS a , 
Nicaragua  Arnoldo Alemán (PLC) Enrique Bolaños S a , 
Nicaragua  Enrique Bolaños E. Montealegre (ALN) S b , 
Nicaragua  Daniel Ortega (FSLN) Daniel Ortega R
Panama  Ernesto Pérez B. (PRD) Martín Torrijos S a , 
Panama  Mireya Moscoso (PA) José M. Alemán S a , 
Panama  Martín Torrijos (PRD) Balbina Herrera NS a , 
Paraguay  J. C. Wasmosy (ANR) Raúl Cubas NS a , 
Paraguay  L. González M. (ANR) Nicanor Duarte NS a , 
Paraguay  Nicanor Duarte (ANR) Blanca Ovelar S a , 
Peru  Alberto Fujimori (C-) Alberto Fujimori R
Peru  A. Fujimori (Peru ) Alberto Fujimori R
Uruguay  J. M. Sanguinetti (PC) Jorge Batlle NS a , 
Uruguay  Jorge Batlle (PC) Guillermo Stirling S a , 
Uruguay  Tabaré Vásquez (FA) José Mujica NS a , 
Venezuela  Hugo Chávez (MVR) Hugo Chávez R
Venezuela  Hugo Chávez (MVR) Hugo Chávez R
Venezuela  Hugo Chávez (PSUV) Hugo Chávez R

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Argentina 
President Carlos Menem (Partido Justicialista) re-ran.
Argentina 
Incumbent: Néstor Kirchner (Partido Justicialista — Frente para la Victoria)
Candidate: Cristina Fernández
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: None. Fernández ran unopposed in the FPV.
Primary: No
Background: Kirchner was allowed to re-run, but chose not to do so, stressing the need to govern
instead of campaigning. However, he actively endorsed the candidacy of his wife, Cristina Fernán-
dez. He praised her “transformational capacity” and claimed that she would “deepen the change
and bring about Argentina’s consolidation.” He justified this decision to not seek a second term by
claiming that their political project needed continuity of leadership (Singer and Fara : ).
“Given that the [...] law allows former presidents to run again after sitting out an election, it has
[...] been suggested that Kirchner is promoting his wife as the government’s presidential candidate
in order to consolidate political support and run again in ” (LARR, July ).
Policies: Economic issues dominated the campaign. On job creation, Fernández “promised to
continue her husband’s development programmes” (Singer and Fara : ). To keep inflation
under control, she “promised to continue with price controls on food and petroleum, and to work
with employers and workers for a social pact to keep down inflationary demands” (Singer and Fara
: ).
Argentina 
President Cristina Fernández (PJ-FPV) ran for re-election.
Bolivia 
Incumbent: Jorge Quiroga (Acción Democrática Nacionalista, ADN). He becomes president after
Hugo Banzer’s resignation due to illness.
Candidate: Ronald MacLean
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Tito Hoz de Vila, supported by Quiroga.
Primary: No
Background: Ronald MacLean won the nomination in an internal party contest in which over 
delegates cast a vote (Bolivia.com,  May ). He defeated the candidate favoured by Quiroga,
former education minister Tito Hoz de Vila (LAWR,  March ). As a former Finance Minister
in the second Banzer government (–), MacLean was closely identified with the neoliberal
policies put in place in those years. In the same internal election, Quiroga, the leader of a centrist
faction within ADN, won the party presidency (CIDOB, Jorge Quiroga).
Policies: Former Planning Minister Ronald MacLean was “the man most closely identified with the
neoliberal policies adopted by Banzer” (LAWR,  March ). His main party rival, Tito Hoz

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de Vila, a member of president Quiroga’s faction, “made it clear that he was willing to review these
policies” (LAWR,  March ).
Bolivia 
President Evo Morales (Movimiento al Socialismo) re-ran.
Brazil 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB) re-ran.
Brazil 
Incumbent: Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB)
Candidate: José Serra (PSDB)
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Tasso Jereissati. He withdrew his candidacy anticipating a defeat against
Serra.
Primary: No
Background: Health Minister, José Serra, clinched the PSDB nomination after his main rival, the
governor of the northeastern state of Ceará, Tasso Jereissati, withdrew his candidacy anticipating
a defeat against Serra. “Jereissati justified his decision on the grounds that the internal wrangling
was damaging the party’s chances for the October presidential election” (LAWR,  January ).

e media described Serra as Cardoso’s “close confidant” (LARR,  October ), “preferred
candidate” (LARR,  February ), and “chosen successor” (LAWR,  January ).
Policies: During the campaign, Serra praised the economic stability achieved under Cardoso. He
defended the floating exchange rate, inflationary targets, and fiscal accountability measures intro-
duced by the Cardoso administration (Nicolau : ).
Brazil 
President Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) ran for re-election.
Brazil 
Incumbent: Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT)
Candidate: Dilma Rousseff
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: None. Dilma ran unopposed in the PT.
Primary: No
Background: Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s former Chief of Staff and “handpicked successor” was ratified
as PT’s presidential candidate on  June  in front of  party delegates in Brasilia (LAWR,
 June ). Four months earlier, a PT party convention had approved Rousseff’s nomination
by acclamation. Lula had chosen Rousseff as his “political heiress” in February  (LAWR, 
February ). During the campaign, the opposition accused Lula of violating the electoral law
for going on the campaign trail with his party’s candidate. During the campaign, Lula was quoted

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as saying: “Like me, Dilma loves the poor. When you vote for Dilma you are voting for me”
(MercoPress,  October ).
Policies: Rousseff tirelessly defended the economic and social policies adopted by her mentor Lula.
In particular, she advocated the continuation of the popular Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer
programme that had granted money to  million families (Hunter : ). According to polls,
voters perceived that an administration headed by Rousseff would guarantee the continuity of Lula’s
economic and social policies (Hunter : ).
Chile 
Incumbent: Patricio Aylwin (Concertación — Democracia Cristiana, DC)
Candidate: Eduardo Frei (Concertación — Democracia Cristiana, DC)
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Ricardo Lagos (PS)
Primary: Yes.
Background: Senator Eduardo Frei and President Aylwin both belong to the DC, the leading party
within the incumbent Concertación coalition. In the primary election held on  May , Frei
defeated former Minister of Education Ricardo Lagos. Frei obtained . percent of the vote against
. percent for Lagos (CIDOB, Eduardo Frei).
Policies: During the campaign, Frei defended the policies pursued by Aylwin. On the economic
front, Frei promised to continue the liberal economic policies inherited from the Pinochet years,
which had largely remained untouched during the first Concertación administration.
Chile 
Incumbent: Eduardo Frei (Concertación — Democracia Cristiana, DC)
Candidate: Ricardo Lagos (Concertación — Partido Socialista, PS / Partido por la Democracia, PPD)
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Andrés Zaldívar, who belongs to Frei’s party
Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population, excluding members of non-Concertación
parties.
Background: Former Minister of Education (-) and Public Works (-), Ricardo Lagos
and President Frei belonged to different parties within the incumbent coalition. In the primary
election held on  May , Lagos defeated the candidate of Frei’s party, Senator Andrés Zaldívar,
by a  percent margin (. to . percent) (Angell ).
Policies: As a member of the left of the Concertación, Lagos emphasised the need to implement
stronger redistributive economic and social policies. After ten years of liberal policies under two
presidencies of the Concertación’s right, Lagos promised to introduce an unemployment insurance
and implement a wide public works programme (CIDOB, Ricardo Lagos).
Chile 
Incumbent: Ricardo Lagos (Concertación — Partido Socialista, PS / Partido por la Democracia, PPD)
Candidate: Michele Bachelet (Concertación — Partido Socialista, PS)
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Soledad Alvear

 :         
Primary: A primary was scheduled for  July , but Bachelet’s main challenger withdrew two
months before the primary after her candidacy lost support.
Background: Former Health and Defense Minister Michele Bachelet belonged to the same party
as Lagos, who preferred her over the DC challenger, Soledad Alvear. 
e DC accused Lagos of
favouring Bachelet and not remaining neutral during the selection process (Altman ).
Policies: During the campaign, Bachelet emphasised the need to give continuity to the social pro-
grammes introduced under Lagos. Indeed, Bachelet’s economic and social platforms were “delib-
erately represented as a continuation of the policies of outgoing President Ricardo Lagos” (Heath
: ).
Chile 
Incumbent: Michele Bachelet (Concertación — Partido Socialista, PS)
Candidate: Eduardo Frei (Concertación — Democracia Cristiana, DC)
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: José Antonio Gómez
Primary: Yes
Background: Former president Eduardo Frei (DC) defeated radical Senator José Antonio Gómez in
a nomination process plagued with criticism. Neither Frei nor Gómez, who belonged to other par-
ties than Bachelet, had the support of the outgoing president. A socialist deputy, Marco Enríquez-
Ominami, was not allowed to take part in the contest (Toro and Luna : ).
Policies: Frei’s platform offered a mixture of continuity and change with the policies of the Bachelet
administration. He promised to continue the social policies of the outgoing government (CIDOB,
Eduardo Frei), but also committed himself to implement a fiscal reform to increment the tax burden
of the mining industry (La Tercera,  December ).
Colombia 
President Álvaro Uribe (Primero Colombia) re-runs.
Colombia 
Incumbent: Álvaro Uribe (Primero Colombia)
Candidate: Juan Manuel Santos (U)
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Former Agriculture Minister, Andrés Felipe Arias, a member of the
Conservative Party also sought Uribe’s endorsement, but Santos ultimately won Uribe’s support.
Primary: No
Background: Former Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos announced his presidential bid in May
. At the time of his announcement, he indicated that he would only run if the incumbent Uribe
would not run for a third term. After the Supreme Court ruled out Uribe’s second re-election
bid, the three main parties of the Uribista coalition split and nominated their own presidential
candidates. After a meeting with president Uribe on  February , Santos came forward to
say that he had received the backing of Uribe: “
e president told me that ‘you and I have had a
number of goals in common for a long time, we agree fully on the basic ideals of this nation. Keep

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going, Juan Manuel Santos, we’re going to win”’ (Latinnews Daily,  March ). 
e media
portrayed Santos as “Uribe’s heir” (Latinnews Daily,  May ).
Policies: Santos campaigned on a platform of continuity with the policies of his mentor Uribe. On
the economic front, Santos promised to continue the trade and investment policies of the Uribe
administration – in particular with its neighbors and the U.S. (Moreno ). 
e election of
Uribe’s handpicked successor suggested “continued and strong support for many of the policies
undertaken under the Uribe administration” (Moreno : ).
Costa Rica 
Incumbent: José María Figueres (Partido Liberación Nacional, PLN)
Candidate: José Miguel Corrales
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Walter Coto Molina
Primary: Yes
Background: Corrales, an internal opponent of president Figueres, won the party primary against
Walter Coto Molina. He obtained . percent of the vote against . for Coto Molina (Picado
León ). During the campaign, he “kept his distance from the administration of José María
Figueres” (LAWR,  July ).
Policies: Corrales belonged to the PLN’s left as opposed to Figueres, whose administration contin-
ued the neoliberal reform process. According to a media report, it was well known “that [Corrales]
has fundamental differences with President José María Figueres over economic policy” (LADB, 
July ).
Costa Rica 
Incumbent: Miguel Ángel Rodríguez (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana, PSUC)
Candidate: Abel Pacheco
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Rodolfo Méndez Mata, supported by President Rodríguez
Primary: Yes
Background: Pacheco won the party primary with  percent of the vote (LADB  February
) despite “the strong support” given to Rodolfo Méndez Mata by President Rodríguez and by
the party leadership headed by former president and PUSC founder, Rafael Angel Calderón (LARR,
 July ).
Policies: In contrast to Méndez Mata, who defended the government’s record in office, Pacheco
“ran a campaign critical of the President’s policies. He campaigned against the stringent neoliberal
measures advocated by the incumbent president, and proposed more state intervention to resolve
major ills” (Wilson : -). He was particularly critical of privatisation in the energy sector.
Costa Rica 
Incumbent: Abel Pacheco (PUSC)
Candidate: Ricardo Toledo
Successor: Yes

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Main Internal Challenger: Everardo Rodríguez. He was forced to step down as pre-presidential
candidate, after being accused of receiving illegal funds for his campaign.
Primary: No
Background: Presidential hopefuls Ricardo Toledo and Everardo Rodríguez were to compete for the
party nomination in a national convention to be held on  July . However, the convention
was cancelled after Rodríguez was forced to step down, accused of receiving illegal financial support
for his presidential bid (Picado León : ). PUSC leaders knew that the party did not have
any chances of winning the presidency, after a poor performance by president Pacheco and corrup-
tion allegations against former presidents Calderón and Rodríguez had damaged the party’s image.
Calderón, who ran the party machine, accepted the nomination of Toledo, a former Minister of
the Presidency (chief of staff) and Pacheco’s “close confidant.” In exchange, Calderón put together
the list for deputies (Picado León : ).
Policies: During his tenure as Minister of the Presidency, Toledo was behind many of Pacheco’s
least popular and controversial economic decisions, like caving to public sector unions, opposing
the liberal economic policies of consecutive finance ministers, and wavering on free trade. In the
course of the campaign, he could not distance himself from these policies.
Costa Rica 
Incumbent: Oscar Arias (PLN)
Candidate: Laura Chinchilla
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Johnny Araya
Primary: Yes, open to all Costa Rican voters.
Background: On  June , former Vice-president and Justice Minister, Laura Chinchilla, de-
feated former Mayor of San José, Johnny Araya, and former Minister of Public Security, Fernando
Berrocal, in a primary open to all Costa Rican voters. Chinchilla obtained . percent of the vote
against . and . percent for Araya and Berrocal, respectively (CIDOB, Laura Chinchilla). 
e
media described Chinchilla as President Arias’ “favoured candidate” and “close confidant” (LARR,
February ). According to Wilson and Rodríguez Cordero (: ), a “central concern of
the campaign was the possibility of continuismo: that Chinchilla would provide a front behind
which the outgoing Arias could retain control.” On the night of Chinchilla’s primary victory, Arias
was quoted as saying: “An old dream of mine comes true that Costa Ricans could one day choose
a woman as president” (CIDOB, Laura Chinchilla).
Policies: Chinchilla campaigned on a platform of continuity with the policies of her mentor Arias.
On the economic front, she promised to continue the trade policies of the second Arias adminis-
tration. In particular, she promised to culminate the free trade agreement negotiations with the
European Union and China (CIDOB, Laura Chinchilla). Her liberal economic policies contrasted
with those of her main party rival, Johnny Araya, a member of the PLN left.
Dominican Republic 
President Hipólito Mejía (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, PRD) re-ran.
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Dominican Republic 
President Leonel Fernández (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana, PLD) ran for re-election.
Dominican Republic 
President: Leonel Fernández (PLD)
Candidate: Danilo Medina
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: José Tomás Pérez and two other candidates.
Primary: Yes.
Background: After tense negotiations, the two major PLD factions led by President Fernández and
Medina, agreed on a single candidate, in order to avoid projecting an image of disunity (Latinnews
Daily  May ). 
e chosen candidate was Medina himself, a former congressional leader
and Chief of Staff to Fernández. In exchange for Fernández’s support, Medina had to accept the
nomination of First Lady Margarita Cedeño as vice-presidential candidate. In the party primary
on  June  he went on to defeat other minor PLD candidates with  percent of the vote.
Policies: In his acceptance speech, Medina praised “the economic record of the Fernández govern-
ments [. . . ] and Fernández’s personal leadership” (LARR, September ). However, his campaign
also emphasised the need to focus more on social redistribution, and to develop a national industry
to reduce the over-reliance on the tourism sector and the export of commodities (CIDOB, Danilo
Medina).
Ecuador 
President Rafael Correa (Alianza PAIS) re-ran.
El Salvador 
President: Armando Calderón Sol (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, ARENA)
Candidate: Francisco Flores
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Former President Alfredo Cristiani. Lacking support in the party hier-
archy, Cristiani was forced to give up his hopes of running for a second term and did not run in
the party convention.
Primary: No
Background: On  October , Former Legislative Assembly President and Secretary of Infor-
mation, Francisco Flores, secured the ARENA nomination in a party convention in which delegates
were asked to ratify Flores (LADB  September ,  October ). Flores had announced
his presidential bid in February, with “the backing of his  fellow Arena deputies, of President
Armando Calderón Sol, a number of his ministers and of most of the  Arena town mayors”
(LAWR,  February ). A faction within Arena had hoped to nominate former President Al-
fredo Cristiani (-) for another term and Cristiani himself had “made no secret of his interest
in making a comeback” (LAWR,  February ). Calderón’s explicit support for Flores was
interpreted as an attempt to stop Cristiani’s return to the presidency (CIDOB, Alfredo Cristiani).
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Lacking any major support in the party hierarchy, Cristiani was forced to give up his hopes of
running for a second term.
Policies: During the campaign, Flores praised the policies implemented by the incumbent Calderón
Sol. He promised to continue the orthodox and neoliberal economic policies of the outgoing
government. In particular, Flores underscored the need to continue the efforts to cut the public
deficit (CIDOB, Francisco Flores).
El Salvador 
President: Francisco Flores (ARENA)
Candidate: Antonio Saca
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Carlos Quintanilla
Primary: Yes
Background: On  June , businessman Antonio Saca announced his presidential bid with the
“open support” of President Francisco Flores (CIDOB, Antonio Saca). Over a month later, on
 July, Saca defeated Vice-president Carlos Quintanilla in a primary in which , ARENA
members were allowed to cast a vote (CIDOB, Antonio Saca). Saca received an unprecedented 
percent of the vote (LARR,  July ).
Policies: As president of the employers association (ANEP), Saca endorsed the pro-market economic
and monetary policies of the Flores administration. 
roughout the campaign, he defended the
dollarisation of the economy implemented by Flores, and emphasised the need to continue the
strategy of export-led economic growth. He promised to ratify the Central America Free Trade
Agreement signed during Flores’ presidency (CIDOB, Antonio Saca).
El Salvador 
President: Antonio Saca (ARENA)
Candidate: Rodrigo Ávila
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Ana Vilma de Escobar
Primary: No
Background: On  March , the ARENA party convention chose Rodrigo Ávila as its presi-
dential candidate. He defeated Vice-president Ana Vilma de Escobar and legal advisor Luis Mario
Rodríguez. Ávila had “only entered the primary race in January at the behest of the party leadership
committee” (COENA) (LARR, March ). De Escobar accused COENA and President Saca of
conspiring to draw support away from her and direct it to Ávila (LADB,  April ). According
to de Escobar, “party bosses, including Saca, had urged members not to vote for a woman” (LADB,
 April ). Going into the nomination, polls had shown de Escobar with a clear lead, but,
in the voting, she received just  percent of the , votes of the party representatives. Ávila and
Rodríguez obtained  and  percent, respectively (LARR, March ).
Policies: During the campaign, Ávila endorsed the orthodox economic policies of the outgoing ad-
ministration. Like Saca four years earlier, he “stood on a tough-on-crime and pro-security platform”
(Greene and Keogh : ).
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Guatemala 
President: Álvaro Arzú (Partido de Avanzada Nacional, PAN)
Candidate: Oscar Berger
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: None.
Primary: No
Background: On  June , the PAN convention ratified the nomination of Guatemala City
Mayor Oscar Berger almost unanimously (Oscar Berger, CIDOB). Berger and Arzú were former
allies, but at the time of the nomination process their relationship had deteriorated. In February,
Berger had momentarily renounced his nomination as PAN presidential candidate. According to
media reports, the reason had to do with internal party disputes and differences with Arzú (LADB,
 September ). 
e media also reported conflicts between both leaders in putting together
the party’s lists for the legislative election (Hernández Pico ).
Policies: During the nomination process, and later during the presidential campaign, Berger was
very critical of some of the government’s policies. On the economic front, Berger attacked the exec-
utive’s privatisations policies, in particular of the state telephone company TELGUA (Hernández
Pico ).
Guatemala 
President: Oscar Berger (Gran Alianza Nacional, GANA)
Candidate: Alejandro Giammattei
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: None. Giammattei was a last-minute candidate.
Primary: No
Background: According to media reports, president Berger “was biased” in favour of Álvaro Aguilar
for the GANA presidential primary (Prensalibre.com,  May ). However, the primary was can-
celled after Aguilar’s main challenger, Francisco Arredondo, withdrew his candidacy, claiming that
the president and the party leadership were pulling the strings behind the scene in favour of Aguilar.

e party found a last-minute candidate in Alejandro Giammattei, former head of the prison sys-
tem. His presidential nomination was confirmed on  April (LARR, April ).
Policies: As an independent running on the GANA ticket, Giammattei was able to develop his
own policy profile. During the campaign, he was critical of many of the government’s policies. He
emphasised the government’s inability to combat the high levels of criminality in the country (La
Primerísima,  September ).
Honduras 
President: Carlos Roberto Reina (Partido Liberal de Honduras, PLH)
Candidate: Carlos Roberto Flores
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Jaime Rolando Rosenthal Oliva
Primary: No
Background: On  December , former Congress President, Carlos Roberto Flores, secured the
party nomination with . percent of the vote in a contest limited to party delegates (CIDOB,
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Carlos Roberto Flores). Among the three candidates that he defeated were former Vice-president
Jaime Rolando Rosenthal Oliva.
Policies: President Reina and Flores did not belong to the same faction within the PLH, as the
outgoing Reina belonged to the party’s left (CIDOB, Carlos Roberto Flores). During the cam-
paign, Flores “openly criticized the Reina administration and is promising a ‘new agenda’ stressing
economic growth and stability” (LADB,  October ).
Honduras 
President: Carlos Roberto Flores (PLH)
Candidate: Rafael Pineda
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Pineda defeated six other candidates.
Primary: Yes
Background: On  December , the PLH internal primary elected Rafael Pineda, head of the
National Assembly, as its presidential candidate. According to the Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones
(TNE) Pineda won . percent of the internal party vote, beating out six other candidates (LADB,
 February ). Pineda, who was identified with former president Reina, was not the preferred
option of the outgoing Flores.
Policies: As a member of the Liberal party identified with former president Reina and the party’s
left, Pineda was critical of the neoliberal economic policies of the government. His campaign
emphasised the need for an encompassing education reform, and acknowledged the deficits of the
government in this area (LADB,  November ).
Honduras 
President: Ricardo Maduro (Partido Nacional de Honduras, PNH)
Candidate: Porfirio Lobo
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Miguel Pastor
Primary: Yes
Background: On  February , Congress President Porfirio Lobo clinched the PNH nomi-
nation in a party primary in which he defeated the Mayor of Tegucigalpa, Miguel Pastor, by 
to  percent. Lobo was not Maduro’s preferred candidate, and claimed that the two represented
different political projects (LARR, November ). He campaigned in favour of re-introducing
the death penalty – opposed by Maduro – and drafting a harsher anti-gang legislation. According
to Lobo, the legislation introduced by Maduro had not provided enough of a deterrent to crime
(LARR,  February ).
Policies: 
e policy differences between Maduro and Lobo were not only limited to the area of
public security. Lobo favoured increasing the levels of public spending. During Maduro’s term, he
had clashes with the executive over the need to increase public spending. 
ese clashes forced the
resignation of Finance Minister, Arturo Alvarado, in August  (LAWR,  August ).
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Honduras 
President: Roberto Micheletti (PLH). He became the President of the Republic after a military
coup deposed Manuel Zelaya on  June .
Candidate: Elvin Santos
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Roberto Micheletti
Primary: Yes
Background: Vice-president Elvin Santos was not allowed to take place in the party primary on
 November . However, his surrogate, Mauricio Villena, defeated the president of Congress,
Roberto Micheletti, by a margin of  to  percent (LAWR,  December ). Micheletti had
Zelaya’s “open support” (CIDOB, Manuel Zelaya). Santos claimed that “he had been prevented
from running by [...] an under-the-table deal between Zelaya and Micheletti” (LAWR,  Decem-
ber ). During the primary campaign, Zelaya had broken his promise of no interference and
“openly supported Micheletti” (La Vanguardia,  June ). According to several observers, San-
tos’ majority in the primary was a direct punishment of President Zelaya (La Vanguardia,  June
).
Policies: In contrast to Zelaya, Santos belonged to a conservative faction within the Liberal Party
(CIDOB, Manuel Zelaya). He opposed Honduras’ membership in the Bolivarian Alliance for
the Americas (ALBA), an international cooperation organisation founded by then president of
Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. Instead of encouraging his party to not approve Honduras’ entrance in
ALBA, then president of Congress, Micheletti, negotiated the terms of the agreement with Zelaya
(CIDOB, Manuel Zelaya).
Mexico 
President: Ernesto Zedillo (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI)
Candidate: Francisco Labastida
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Roberto Madrazo
Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population.
Background: With over  percent of the vote, former Interior Minister Francisco Labastida de-
feated Roberto Madrazo and two other minor candidates in the PRI open primary held on  Novem-
ber  (CIDOB, Ernesto Zedillo). Labastida was “understood to be [...] Zedillo’s favourite dur-
ing the primary election” (Klesner : ). 
e other candidates accused Zedillo of continuing
the traditional practice of dedazo.
Policies: According to media reports, “[t]he conventional view in Mexico City is that Labastida will
continue with President Zedillo’s current policies if he wins the presidential elections next year”
(Latinnews Daily,  November ). Labastida’s campaign emphasised the need to continue to
implement market-based policies to achieve higher levels of economic development (Klesner :
).
Mexico 
President: Vicente Fox (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN)
Candidate: Felipe Calderón

 :         
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Santiago Creel
Primary: Yes
Background: Former Energy Secretary, Felipe Calderón, ousted the Interior Minister Santiago
Creel, who was “Fox’s apparent choice” (Klesner : ) with . percent of the vote (CIDOB,
Felipe Calderón). Calderón was a member of the traditionalist faction of the party, while Fox and
Creel were leading figures of the renovadores. Calderón had resigned as Secretary of Energy in protest
to Fox’s open support for Creel (Moreno ).
Policies: During the primary and general election campaigns, Calderón promised a mix of continu-
ity and change (CIDOB, Vicente Fox). He promised to stay the course on macroeconomic policy,
but emphasised the need to spend more on social policies to combat poverty and inequality.
Nicaragua 
President: Arnoldo Alemán (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista, PLC)
Candidate: Enrique Bolaños
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: None. Bolaños was handpicked by President Alemán.
Primary: No
Background: Vice-president Enrique Bolaños won the PLN nomination without facing opposition.
 delegates ratified his candidacy in a party convention that took place in Alemán’s El Chile
estate (LADB,  January ). Alemán had firm control of the party apparatus, and was directly
involved in the selection of all major candidates. According to Samuels and Shugart (: )
Alemán “had handpicked Bolaños to be his successor.”
Policies: Economic issues dominated the campaign in a country in which over  percent of the pop-
ulation was poor (CIDOB, Enrique Bolaños). Bolaños’ committed himself to continue the struc-
tural reforms, and austerity policies of his predecessor Arnoldo Alemán. 
e opposition sandinistas
accused Bolaños of continuismo with the failed economic policies of the Alemán administration.
Nicaragua 
President: Enrique Bolaños
Candidate: Eduardo Montealegre (Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense, ALN)
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: None. After forming the ALN months before the election, Montealegre
was the consensus candidate of his party.
Primary: No
Background: Bolaños and Alemán had a feud throughout Bolaños’ presidency. 
is limited Bolaños’
ability to discipline his party’s legislative contingent, which, for the most part, remained loyal to
Alemán. Bolaños left the PLC. “When the time arrive[s] for the party to choose a presidential
candidate, Aleman loyalists back his handpicked selection, Jose Rizo, while Eduardo Montealegre,
who [had] served in Bolano’s administration and had hoped to win the PLC nomination, [is] shut
out. Montealegre respond[s] by forming the ALN, with Bolano’s support” (Lean : ).
Policies: As Minister of Finance (-) under Bolaños, Montealegre was in charge of the eco-
nomic and financial policies of the outgoing government. Like Bolaños, Montealegre was opposed
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to el pacto, a political agreement between former presidents Alemán and Ortega in which the two
had agreed to share the most important positions in the public administration (CIDOB, Enrique
Bolaños).
Nicaragua 
President Daniel Ortega (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN) re-ran.
Panama 
President: Ernesto Pérez Balladares (Partido Revolucionario Democrático, PRD)
Candidate: Martín Torrijos
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Alfredo Oranges Bustos
Primary: Yes
Background: On  October , Martín Torrijos defeated Alfredo Oranges Bustos and eight
other party opponents with  percent of the vote in the PRD primary (CIDOB, Martín Torrijos).
Oranges, who obtained  percent of the vote in the primary and did not have the president’s
support, had announced his candidacy first. As a result, Pérez Balladares endorsed Torrijos, who
was depicted by the media as Pérez Balladares’ protégée. Torrijos had supported Pérez Balladares’
failed re-election attempt (CIDOB, Martín Torrijos).
Policies: On the economic policy front, Torrijos’ campaign did not express “any intention of touch-
ing the main planks of Pérez Balladares’s economic adjustment effort (trade liberalisation, privatisa-
tion, eliminations of subsidies and more ‘flexible’ labour regulations)” (LAWR,  February ).
Panama 
President: Mireya Moscoso (Partido Arnulfista, PA)
Candidate: José Miguel Alemán
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: None. Alemán was handpicked by president Moscoso.
Primary: No
Background: On  June , the PA convention elected the Minister of Foreign Affairs, José
Miguel Alemán, as presidential candidate. No other candidate ran against Alemán, who was de-
scribed in the media as Moscoso’s “chosen successor” (LARR, July ). Before the convention,
President Moscoso publicly announced her support for Alemán, leading to criticism of interference
in the nomination process from prominent PA officials (La Prensa Web,  June ). In addition,
Moscoso revoked a law that made it obligatory for political parties to hold primary elections to elect
their presidential candidates, so that Alemán could run unopposed.
Policies: During the campaign, Alemán endorsed the privatisation of social security proposed by
his mentor Moscoso (Singer : ). He also “promised the continuation of Moscoso’s social
policies, which, he argued, had failed because of PRD’s opposition in the legislature” (Singer :
).
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Panama 
President: Martín Torrijos (PRD)
Candidate: Balbina Herrera
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Juan Carlos Navarro, who had the support of President Torrijos.
Primary: Yes
Background: In the PRD primary in September , Balbina Herrera defeated the mayor of
Panama City, Juan Carlos Navarro, who had “Torrijos’ support” (Informe Latinoamericano, 
March ). Herrera obtained . of the vote against . for Navarro. Six months before
the party primary, Torrijos had been re-elected general secretary of the PRD in an internal election
in which there had been splits between the factions led by Torrijos and Herrera. In addition, Torri-
jos had secured five of the nine seats in the national executive committee (CEN), one of them going
to Navarro. Herrera had been re-elected party president in that same election (LARR, September
).
Policies: Herrera was branded in the media as “a leftwing populist with an anti-US past” (Election
Watch,  May ). A member of the PRD left, during the campaign she promised to combat
“social exclusion through improving public services” (LAWR,  February ). She also promised
to increase the salaries of public employees (LAWR,  February ).
Paraguay 
President: Juan Carlos Wasmosy (Asociación Nacional Republicana, ANR)
Candidate: Raúl Cubas
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Luis María Argaña
Primary: No
Background: On  September , the ANR party convention chose Lino Oviedo as presidential
candidate. Oviedo defeated Luis María Argaña by a narrow margin. Wasmosy “officially endorsed”
his Finance Minister, Carlos Facetti, who came in third place (CIDOB, Juan Carlos Wasmosy).
Oviedo was a retired general who was accused of organising a coup against Wasmosy. Before the
presidential election took place, Wasmosy’s government imprisoned Oviedo. Oviedo’s running
mate, Raúl Cubas, inherited the party’s nomination after promising amnesty for his boss (Pérez-
Liñán : -).
Policies: Cubas emphasised the need to speed up the structural reform process of the economy. He
promised the privatisation of state enterprises running a deficit, an idea rejected by the Wasmosy
administration (CIDOB, Raúl Cubas). His campaign pledges also contemplated an encompass-
ing programme of deficit reduction, focused mainly on reducing the number of state employees
(CIDOB, Raúl Cubas).
Paraguay 
President: Luis González Macchi (ANR). He takes over as president after the resignation of Raúl
Cubas.
Candidate: Nicanor Duarte
Successor: No
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Main Internal Challenger: Osvaldo Domínguez and seven other candidates.
Primary: Yes
Background: Former Education Minister Nicanor Duarte won the party presidency in  in an
election in which he defeated Bader Rachid, the candidate endorsed by González Macchi (CIDOB,
Nicanor Duarte). Duarte became a “staunch critic” of González Macchi’s presidency. In the 
Colorado primary held on  December, he defeated the candidate of González Macchi’s faction
(CIDOB, Luis González Macchi).
Policies: Duarte campaigned on a platform critical of neoliberalism. He promised not “to build
his economic reform programme around privatisations, as did the outgoing government of Luis
González Macchi” (LAWR,  June ). He also rejected the possibility of introducing further
austerity measures.
Paraguay 
President: Nicanor Duarte (ANR)
Candidate: Blanca Ovelar
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Luis Alberto Castiglioni
Primary: Yes
Background: Former Education Minister, Blanca Ovelar, defeated Luis Alberto Castiglioni in the
party primary held on  December . During the primary campaign, the media depicted Ove-
lar as “the favourite candidate of president Nicanor Duarte” (LARR, February ). Castiglioni, a
member of Vanguardia Colorada, a faction that opposed Duarte, claimed that Duarte orchestrated
a fraud in order to favour Ovelar (Informe Latinoamericano,  January ).
Policies: According to media reports, the nomination of Ovelar suggested continued support for
the policies implemented by Duarte (Ultima Hora,  April ).
Peru 
President Alberto Fujimori (Cambio , C-) re-ran.
Peru 
President Alberto Fujimori (Peru ) ran for re-election.
Uruguay 
President: Julio María Sanguinetti (Partido Colorado, PC)
Candidate: Jorge Batlle
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Luis Hierro, supported by president Sanguinetti.
Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population.
Background: 
e PC was split into two major factions, the Foro Batllista and Lista , led by San-
guinetti and Batlle, respectively. “Sanguinetti sought a candidate who would ensure the continuity
of his administration and his policies, particularly the opening up of the economy to international
trade. Accordingly, he chose his Interior Minister, Luis Hierro” (Espíndola : ). On 
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April , Batlle secured the party nomination after polling . percent against . percent for
Hierro.
Policies: While Foro Batllista was identified with the European 
ird Way, Lista  exposed liberal
conservative ideas (CIDOB, Jorge Batlle). On the economic front, the faction led by Batlle was
in favour of deepening the free market reforms – e.g. stronger deregulation of the economy and
privatisation of state enterprises – while the faction led by Sanguinetti advocated more gradual
economic changes.
Uruguay 
President: Jorge Batlle (PC)
Candidate: Guillermo Stirling
Successor: Yes
Main Internal Challenger: Alberto Iglesias
Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population.
Background: 
e two major PC factions, the Foro Batllista and Lista , agreed on a single candidate,
in order to avoid projecting an image of disunity after the severe  economic crisis. Guillermo
Stirling, a former Interior Minister under both Sanguinetti and Batlle, defeated other minor PC
candidates in the party primary on  June .
Policies: During the campaign, Stirling stressed that the economic recovery that the country was
starting to experience (. percent economic growth in ), was due to the policies of the
outgoing administration. He tried to convince voters that this recovery “could be undermined
with an electoral victory by the left” (Altman and Castiglioni : ).
Uruguay 
President: Tabaré Vásquez (Frente Amplio, FA)
Candidate: José Mujica
Successor: No
Main Internal Challenger: Danilo Astori, supported by President Vásquez.
Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population.
Background: On  June , former Agriculture Minister, José Mujica, defeated former Eco-
nomics and Finance Minister, Danilo Astori, in the Frente Amplio primary. Astori was described as
“the preferred candidate of outgoing President Vásquez” (Altman : ). Mujica received 
percent of the vote against  percent for Astori.
Policies: Mujica was the leader of the Movimiento de Participación Popular, together with the Com-
munists, the most radical party of the FA federation. During the primary and general election
campaigns, he promised to continue the sound macroeconomic policies of the Vásquez administra-
tion, but also promised more active social policies (LARR, October ). Mujica advocated “mov-
ing the emphasis away from concentrating on opening Uruguay to financial services and tourism.
Instead, he wants to embrace regional productive development” (LARR, July ).
Venezuela 
President Hugo Chávez (Movimiento Quinta República, MVR) ran for re-election.
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Venezuela 
President Hugo Chávez (MVR) re-ran.
Venezuela 
President Hugo Chávez (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV) re-ran.
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Conceptualisation
A personalist vehicle is a political organisation that is founded and dominated by a single politician.
It serves as a platform for the electoral ambitions of its founder. Since incumbent presidents leading
personalist vehicles are less likely to face intra-party opposition, they may be in a better position
to either change the constitution to run for a consecutive term, or to impose the nomination of a
successor candidate. 
erefore, I include personalism as a control variable in the models predicting
the type of candidate, and also as a statistical control in the hierarchical models explaining the
incumbent vote.
Operationalisation
Empirically I code incumbent parties as personalist vehicles if:
. 
e party is founded by the incumbent president with the clear goal of promoting her own
political ambitions in an upcoming election and, before reaching the presidency, she has been
the only presidential candidate of the party.
. 
e party is founded during the incumbent president’s term as a platform for the presidential
aspirations of one of the president’s protégés.
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e following table re-estimates Models  and  from Table  of the paper with additional controls
for various features of the political system and the economic context. 
e political controls are
party system institutionalisation, age of incumbent party, personalism, and coalition. 
ese control
variables are interacted with the two individual-level measures of government performance. 
e
economic controls are election year GDP growth per capita, change in unemployment, and the log
of the inflation rate (see Appendix  for details on how these variables are coded). 
e coefficients
on the interactions between type of candidate and individual-level government performance are
essentially unaffected by the addition of these new variables, remaining in the same direction, and
very close to the values reported in Table  of the paper.
Table : Main Models with Additional Controls
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Economy Better . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Successor . (.) .
Economy Better*Re-running President . (.) .
Economy Worse -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Successor -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Re-running President -. (.) .
Presidential Approval . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Successor . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Re-running President . (.) .
Successor . (.) . . (.) .
Re-standing President . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Majority Situation . (.) .
Economy Worse*Majority Situation -. (.) .
Presidential Approval*Majority Situation . (.) .
Majority Situation . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Concurrent Elections . (.) .
Economy Worse*Concurrent Elections . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Concurrent Elections . (.) .
Concurrent Elections -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Better*Primary -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Primary -. (.) .
Presidential Approval*Primary -. (.) .
Primary . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*ENPS -. (.) .
Economy Worse*ENPS . (.) .
Presidential Approval*ENPS -. (.) .
ENPS -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Better*Trade Dependence -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Trade Dependence . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Trade Dependence -. (.) .
Trade Dependence -. (.) . -. (.) .
Continued. . .
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Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Economy Better*Policy Switch -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Policy Switch -. (.) .
Presidential Approval*Policy Switch -. (.) .
Policy Switch . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Party System Inst. . (.) .
Economy Worse*Party System Inst. . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Party System Inst. . (.) .
Party System Institutionalization -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Better*Age Incumbent Party -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Age Incumbent Party -. (.) .
Presidential Approval*Age Incumbent Party . (.) .
Age Incumbent Party -. (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Personalist Vehicle -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Personalist Vehicle -. (.) .
Presidential Approval*Personalist Vehicle -. (.) .
Personalist Vehicle . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Coalition . (.) .
Economy Worse*Coalition -. (.) .
Presidential Approval*Coalition . (.) .
Coalition . (.) . . (.) .
Per Capita GDP -. (.) . . (.) .
Per Capita GDP*Successor . (.) . . (.) .
Per Capita GDP*Re-running President . (.) . -. (.) .
Log of Inflation . (.) . . (.) .
Log of Inflation*Successor -. (.) . -. (.) .
Log of Inflation*Re-running President -. (.) . -. (.) .
Unemployment Change -. (.) . . (.) .
Unemployment Change*Successor . (.) . . (. .
Unemployment Change*Re-running President -. (.) . . (.) .
Male -. (.) . -. (.) .
Age . (.) . . (.) .
Education -. (.) . -. (.) .
Married . (.) . -. (.) .
Socioeconomic -. (.) . -. (.) .
Intercept -. (.) . -. (.) .
σIntercept . .
σEconomyBetter . .
σEconomyWorse . .
σPresidentialApproval .
Number of observations  
Number of elections  

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e following table re-estimates the main models of the paper using a continuous instead of a
categorical measure of economic evaluations. 
e sociotropic retrospective indicators are measured
on the three point scale (worse: -, same: , better: ) used in the first rounds of Latinobarómetro.
For the latter rounds, better and much better are coded , same is coded , and worse and much
worse are coded -. Model  in the Table below re-estimates Model  from Table , while Model 
includes the additional controls from Appendix .
Table : Models with Continuous Measure of Economic Evaluations
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Economic Evaluations . (.) . . (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Successor . (.) . . (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Re-run . (.) . . (.) .
Successor . (.) . . (.) .
Re-running President . (.) . . (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Majority Situation . (.) . . (.) .
Majority Situation . (.) . . (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Concurrent Elections -. (.) . -. (.) .
Concurrent Elections -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Primary . (.) . . (.) .
Primary . (.) . . (.) .
Economic Evaluations*ENPS -. (.) . -. (.) .
ENPS . (.) . -. (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Trade Dependence -. (.) . -. (.) .
Trade Dependence . (.) . -. (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Policy Switch . (.) . . (.) .
Policy Switch . (.) . -. (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Party System Inst. . (.) .
Party System Institutionalization -. (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Age Incumbent Party -. (.) .
Age Incumbent Party -. (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Personalist Vehicle -. (.) .
Personalist Vehicle . (.) .
Economic Evaluations*Coalition . (.) .
Coalition . (.) .
Per Capita GDP -. (.) .
Per Capita GDP*Successor . (.) .
Per Capita GDP*Re-running President . (.) .
Log of Inflation . (.) .
Log of Inflation*Successor -. (.) .
Log of Inflation*Re-running President -. (.) .
Unemployment Change -. (.) .
Unemployment Change*Successor . (.) .
Continued. . .

 :       
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Unemployment Change*Re-running President -. (.) .
Male -. (.) . -. (.) .
Age . (.) . . (.) .
Education -. (.) . -. (.) .
Married . (.) . . (.) .
Socioeconomic -. (.) . -. (.) .
Intercept -. (.) . -. (.) .
σIntercept . .
σEconomicEvaluations . .
Number of observations  
Number of elections  

 :         
 :         

e following table re-estimates the main models of the paper without the eight cases for which I
was not able to use the first two criteria to code successors and non-successors. 
e coefficients on
the interactions between type of candidate and individual-level government performance remain
in the same direction, and very close to the values reported in Table  in the main text.
Table : Models Using First Two Criteria to Code Candidates
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Economy Better . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Successor . (.) .
Economy Better*Re-running President . (.) .
Economy Worse -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Successor -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Re-running President -. (.) .
Presidential Approval . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Successor . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Re-running President . (.) .
Successor -. (.) . -. (.) .
Re-standing President . (.) . . (.) .
Intercept -. (.) . -. (.) .
σIntercept . .
σEconomyBetter . .
σEconomyWorse . .
σPresidentialApproval .
Number of observations  
Number of elections  

 :    - -
 :    - -

e following table re-estimates the main models of the paper controlling for left-right self-
placement. Because this variable is not available for three cases – Chile , , and 
– the models presented in this section are estimated on two subsamples of  and  cases. 
e
measure of left-right self-placement is constructed using responses to the item “On a scale where 
is left and  is right, where would you place yourself?” 
e measure is recoded into a categorical
variable – -: Left, -: Centre-left, : Centre, -: Centre-right, -: Right. To avoid missing
values, individuals who do not respond to the self-placement question are included as an additional
category. 
e baseline category is Centre.
Table : Models Controlling for Left-Right Self-Placement
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Economy Better . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Successor . (.) .
Economy Better*Re-running President . (.) .
Economy Worse -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Successor -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Re-running President -. (.) .
Presidential Approval . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Successor . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Re-running President . (.) .
Successor -. (.) . -. (.) .
Re-running President . (.) . . (.) .
Left -. (.) . . (.) .
Center-left . (.) . . (.) .
Center-right . (.) . . (.) .
Right . (.) . . (.) .
No Self-placement . (.) . . (.) .
Intercept -. (.) . -. (.) .
σIntercept . .
σEconomyBetter . .
σEconomyWorse . .
σPresidentialApproval .
Number of observations  
Number of elections  

 :         
 :         
Four presidential elections – Peru in  and , Ecuador in , and Venezuela in  –
score below , and are therefore not considered “democracies” in the Polity IV Authority Trends.
As the following table shows, the results are essentially unaffected by the subtraction of these four
cases, remaining in the same direction, statistically significant, and very close to the results reported
in Table  in the main text.
Table : Models Without Cases Scoring Below Six in Polity IV
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Economy Better . (.) . . (.) .
Economy Better*Successor . (.) .
Economy Better*Re-running President . (.) .
Economy Worse -. (.) . -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Successor -. (.) .
Economy Worse*Re-running President -. (.) .
Presidential Approval . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Successor . (.) .
Presidential Approval*Re-running President . (.) .
Successor -. (.) . -. (.) .
Re-standing President . (.) . . (.) .
Intercept -. (.) . -. (.) .
σIntercept . .
σEconomyBetter . .
σEconomyWorse . .
σPresidentialApproval .
Number of observations  
Number of elections  

B
A P P E N D I X T O P A P E R 
 :  
Table : Balance in Survey Response Assignment
Treatment Control T-Test Wilcoxon KS KS p value
Presidential Approval . . . . . .
Education . . . . . .
Age . . . . . .
Partisanship
PAN ID . . . .
Gender
Male . . . .
As Ho et al. () note, there is no single way of assessing balance in random assignment. A
thorough assessment of balance combines different tests (Bowers ). Table  displays several
balance statistics. 
e first two columns report the means and proportions of each variable in the
treatment and control groups. 
e third column reports the p values for difference of means and
proportions t-tests, followed by p values for Wilcoxon rank sum tests. 
e fifth and sixth columns
report the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for non-categorical variables, and their p values.

e similarity in averages and proportions across conditions suggests that the treatment conditions
are balanced. Indeed, the p values for the difference-of-means and proportions tests suggest no sig-
nificant difference at the  percent confidence level between treatment and control groups. Further
evidence that random assignment was not abrogated is provided by the p values of the Wilcoxon
rank sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. None of these show significant differences between treat-
ment conditions. Finally, an omnibus test following Hansen and Bowers (), which provides a
single statistic for assessing balance, finds no imbalance (χ 2=., df=, p value=.).
For the categorical variables – partisanship and gender – a baseline category is omitted from the table.

 : 
 : 
VOTE FOR INCUMBENT
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent votes for the incumbent party,  if she votes for any
other candidate (“no answer” and “don’t know” are coded as missing).
TREATMENT
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent was assigned to the treatment group,  if she was
assigned to the control group.
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL
Continuous variable coded from  (failure) to  (excellent).
PANISTA
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent identifies with the PAN,  if she does not.
PRIISTA
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent identifies with the PRI,  if she does not.
PRDISTA
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent identifies with the PRD,  if she does not.
INDEPENDENT
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent does not identify with any party,  if she does not.
MALE
Dummy variable coded  if the respondent is a man,  if she is a woman.
EDUCATION
Education level of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:
 — Illiterate
 — Incomplete Elementary
 — Complete Elementary
 — Incomplete Secondary
 — Complete Secondary
 — Incomplete High School
 — Complete High School
 — Incomplete Higher Education
 — Complete Higher Education
 — Postgraduate Degree

 : 
AGE
Age of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:
 — -
 — -
 — -
 — -
 — -
 — -
 — -
 — -
 — -
 — -
INCOME
Income of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:
 — Less than the minimum salary
 — One to three minimum salaries
 — 
ree to five minimum salaries
 — Five to seven minimum salaries
 — Seven to ten minimum salaries
 — Over ten minimum salaries
STATE-LEVEL GDP GROWTH
State-level per capita GDP growth in the quarter previous to the  presidential election
Source: INEGI.
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 :   
I re-estimate the main models of the paper using ordered logistic regression. Table  estimates ATEs,
while Table  estimates CATEs. 
e first two models in Table  estimate the interactions for voters
who identify with the PAN, while Models  and  report the same interactions for non-panistas.

e point estimates on the treatment in Table  and on the interactions between the treatment and
presidential approval remain in the same direction and close to the values reported in Tables  and
 in the main text.
Table : Average Treatment Effects – Ordered Logistic Regression
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Endorsement -. (.) . -. (.) .
Male -. (.) .
Education -. (.) .
Age . (.) .
Cut  -. (.) -. (.)
Cut  -. (.) -. (.)
Cut  . (.) -. (.)
Cut  . (.) . (.)
Number of observations  
Pseudo R Squared . .

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 :   -  
I re-estimate the linear regression models presented in the paper using a four-point Likert scale in
which subjects answering don’t know are left out of the analysis. Table  estimates average treatment
effects, while Table  estimates conditional average treatment effects. 
e first two models in Table
 estimate the interactions for voters who identify with the PAN, while Models  and  report
the same interactions for non-panistas. 
e point estimates on the treatment in Table  and on
the interactions between the treatment and presidential approval in Table , remain in the same
direction and close to the values reported in Tables  and  in the main text.
Table : Average Treatment Effects – Four-point Likert Scale
Model  Model 
Coefficient P>|Z| Coefficient P>|Z|
(Standard
Errors)
(Standard
Errors)
Endorsement -. (.) . -. (.) .
Male -. (.) .
Education -. (.) .
Age . (.) .
Intercept . (.) . . (.) .
Number of observations  
R Squared . .

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I re-estimate the models presented in Tables  and  in the main text using a binary measure of
presidential approval. I collapse the lower three categories –  to  – into , and the top three cate-
gories – - – into . Table  estimates conditional average treatment effects using the continuous
dependent variable, while the models reported in Table  use the binary dependent variable. 
e
first two models in each table estimate the interactions for voters who identify with the PAN, while
Models  and  report the same interactions for non-panistas. 
e point estimates on the interac-
tions between the treatment and presidential approval remain in the same direction and close to the
values reported in Tables  and  in the main text. Figure  shows CATEs based on Models  (top
left panel), and Model  (lower left panel) from Table , and Model  (top right panel), and Model
 (lower right panel) from Table . 
e panels show that endorsements provide an additional ac-
countability effect among voters who identify with the PAN, but not for non-panistas. 
e slopes
for endorsed candidates are clearly steeper than the slopes for non-endorsed candidates in the top
left and lower left panels.
Figure : PAN Vote Using Binary Presidential Approval Variable
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PANEL 3: NON-PAN - LINEAR REGRESSION (95% CIs)
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
Vo
tin
g 
In
cu
m
be
nt
0 1
Presidential Approval Among Non-panistas
No Endorsement Endorsement
PANEL 4: NON-PAN - LOGIT (95% CIs)
Notes: Vote intention for endorsed and non-endorsed PAN Senate candidates among panistas and non-panistas who
approve and do not approve of the performance of the president. 
e left-side panels show linear predictions of voting
for the incumbent party, while the right-side panels indicate predicted probabilities of voting for the PAN. Vertical lines
with bars represent  percent confidence intervals. Panel  is based on Model  in Table  below, panel  on Model 
in Table , panel  on Model  in Table , and panel  on Model  in Table .
Source: Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica.
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I re-estimate the models for non-panistas subdividing by partisanship. 
e first two models in
each table estimate conditional average treatment effects using the continuous dependent variable,
while Models  and  use the binary dependent variable. 
e results show that priístas, prdistas,
and independents, do not hold the incumbent party more accountable for the performance of the
government when the Senate candidates are endorsed than when they are not.
Figure : PAN Vote Among Priístas, Prdistas, and Independents
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PANEL 1: PRIISTAS - LINEAR REGRESSION (95% CIs)
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PANEL 2: PRIISTAS - LOGIT (95% CIs)
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PANEL 3: PRDISTAS - LINEAR REGRESSION (95% CIs)
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PANEL 4: PRDISTAS - LOGIT (95% CIs)
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PANEL 5: INDEP. - LINEAR REGRESSION (95% CIs)
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PANEL 6: INDEPENDENTS - LOGIT (95% CIs)
Notes: Vote intention for endorsed and non-endorsed PAN Senate candidates among priístas, prdistas, and independents
with different levels of presidential approval. 
e left-side panels show linear predictions of voting for the incumbent
party, while the right-side panels present predicted probabilities of voting for the PAN. Vertical lines with bars represent
 percent confidence intervals. Panel  is based on Model  in Table  in this Appendix. Panel  is based on Model 
in Table , panel  on Model  in Table , panel  on Model  in Table , panel  on Model  in Table , and panel 
on Model  in Table .
Source: Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica.
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e analyses include the following variables measured at the municipal level:
PAN VOTE 
PAN vote shares in the  presidential election.
Source: IFE.
PRI VOTE 
PRI vote shares in the  presidential election.
Source: IFE.
PRD VOTE 
PRD vote shares in the  presidential election.
Source: IFE.
LOG OF PAN VOTE 
Logged PAN vote shares in the  presidential election.
Source: IFE.
LOG OF PRI VOTE 
Logged PRI vote shares in the  presidential election.
Source: IFE.
LOG OF PRD VOTE 
Logged PRD vote shares in the  presidential election.
Source: IFE.
LOG OF FEDERAL TRANSFERS
Logged per capita transfers from the federal government to the municipalities.
Source: INEGI.
PAN MAYOR
Dummy variable coded  if the mayor belongs to the PAN,  otherwise.
Source: IFE.
PRI MAYOR
Dummy variable coded  if the mayor belongs to the PRI,  otherwise.
Source: IFE.

 : 
PRDMAYOR
Dummy variable coded  if the mayor belongs to the PRD,  otherwise.
Source: IFE.
DEPRIVATION
Grado de Marginación. Multi-dimensional continuous measure of deprivation developed by
CONAPO.
Source: INEGI.
HIGH DEPRIVATION
Dummy variable coded  for municipalities categorised as “very high” or “high” deprivation in the
grado de marginación, and  otherwise.
Source: INEGI.
LOG OF PAN MUNICIPAL VOTE
Logged PAN vote shares in the latest municipal election.
Source: IFE.
LOG OF PRI MUNICIPAL VOTE
Logged PRI vote shares in the latest municipal election.
Source: IFE.
LOG OF PRDMUNICIPAL VOTE
Logged PRD vote shares in the latest municipal election.
Source: IFE.
LOG POPULATION
Logged population in .
Source: INEGI.
ILLITERACY RATE
Percentage of illiterate inhabitants in .
Source: INEGI.
MUNICIPALITIES LESS  RESIDENTS
Percentage of residents living in settlements of less than  people.
Source: INEGI.
PAN MPs
Percentage of MPs in the municipality that belong to the PAN.
Source: IFE.
PRI MPs
Percentage of MPs in the municipality that belong to the PRI.
Source: IFE.

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PRDMPs
Percentage of MPs in the municipality that belong to the PRD.
Source: IFE.
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES IN 
Effective numbers of parties at the municipal level in the  presidential election.
Source: IFE.

e following state-level variables were included in the analyses:
PAN ID
Percentage of respondents who identify with the PAN based on survey-level data.
Source: BIIACS.
PRI ID
Percentage of respondents who identify with the PRI based on survey-level data.
Source: BIIACS.
PRD ID
Percentage of respondents who identify with the PRD based on survey-level data.
Source: BIIACS.
PAN GOVERNOR
Dummy variable coded  if the governor belongs to the PAN,  otherwise.
Source: IFE.
PRD GOVERNOR
Dummy variable coded  if the governor belongs to the PRD,  otherwise.
Source: IFE.
PAN SENATORS
Percentage of senators elected in the three-seat state-level constituencies that belong to the PAN.
Source: IFE.
PRI SENATORS
Percentage of senators elected in the three-seat state-level constituencies that belong to the PRI.
Source: IFE.
PRD SENATORS
Percentage of senators elected in the three-seat state-level constituencies that belong to the PRD.
Source: IFE.

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We estimate similar models to the ones reported in the Tables in the main text using state fixed
effects. As the tables below show, the results remain very close to the ones reported in the second
paper. We omit the coefficients for each state.
Table : Municipal Control Models with State Fixed Effects
PRI PAN PRD
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept -.*** . .
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRI Vote  .*** -.*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRD Vote  -.*** -.*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log Population -.*** -. .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Municipal Vote -.*** .*** -.***
() (.) (.)
Log PRD Municipal Vote -.*** -.** .***
() () ()
Log PRI Municipal Vote .*** -.* -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor . -. .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor -. -. .
(.) (.) (.)
High Deprivation -. -. .
(.) (.) (.)
Less  Residents . . -.
(.) (.) (.)
Illiteracy Rate .*** . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation . .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation .  -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation . . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Adjusted R2 . . .
Number of observations 
*p<.. **p<.. ***p<.

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Table : Spending Models with State Fixed Effects
PRI PAN PRD
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept . . -.
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRI Vote  .*** -.*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRD Vote  -.*** -.*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log Population -.*** . .***
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor .*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor .** -.** .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor .*** -. -.*
(.) (.) (.)
Transfers  -. -. .
(.) (.) (.)
Deprivation (continuous) -. . 
(.) (.) (.)
Illiteracy Rate .***  -.**
(.) (.) (.)
Less  Residents . . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Transfers -. . 
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Transfers . . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Transfers . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation . .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation .*** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Transfers*Deprivation -. . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation -.* . .
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation . -.** .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
Adjusted R2 . . .
Number of observations 
*p<.. **p<.. ***p<.

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We re-estimate the models presented in Tables  and , using a standardised measure of deprivation.
As the two tables below show, the results remain very close to the ones reported in the tables in the
main text.
Table : Municipal Control Models with Continuous Measure of Deprivation
PRI PAN PRD
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRI Vote  .*** -.*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRD Vote  -.*** -.*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log Population -.***  .***
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor .*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor .*** -.*** .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor .*** -. -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Deprivation (continuous) . . -.*
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation -. .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation . -. .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation .*** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
σIntercept . . .
Number of observations 
Number of states 
*p<.. **p<.. ***p<.

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Table : Spending Models with Continuous Measure of Deprivation
PRI PAN PRD
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRI Vote  .*** -.*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRD Vote  -.*** -.*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log Population -.***  .***
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor .*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor .** -.** .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor .*** -. -.**
(.) (.) (.)
Transfers  -. -. .
(.) (.) (.)
Deprivation (continuous) . . -.*
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Transfers -. . 
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Transfers . . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Transfers . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation . .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation .*** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Transfers*Deprivation -. . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation -.* . .
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation . -.** .
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
σIntercept . . .
Number of observations 
Number of states 
*p<.. **p<.. ***p<.

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We re-estimate the model displayed in Table  in the main text, controlling for vote shares in the
latest municipal elections. As the table below shows, the results remain very close to the ones
reported in Table .
Table : Municipal Control Models with Past Vote Shares in Municipal Elections
PRI PAN PRD
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept -. -. .**
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PRI Vote  .*** -.*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
Log PAN Vote  -.*** -.*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Log Population -.*** -. .***
() (.) (.)
Log PAN Municipal Vote -.*** .*** -.***
() (.) (.)
Log PRD Municipal Vote -.*** -.* .***
() () ()
Log PRI Municipal Vote .*** -.** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor .** .** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor . -. 
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor .  -.
(.) (.) (.)
Deprivation (continuous) . . -.
(.) (.) (.)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation . .*** -.***
(.) (.) (.)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation .*** . -.***
(.) (.) (.)
σIntercept . . .
Number of observations 
Number of states 
*p<.. **p<.. ***p<.

